Between Vichy Antisemitism and German Harassment: The Jews of North Africa during the Early 1940s

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BETWEEN VICHY ANTISEMITISM AND GERMAN HARASSMENT: THE JEWS OF NORTH AFRICA DURING THE EARLY 1940S

In June 1940, the Germans conquered France. They occupied most of the country and left the 'unoccupied zone' to be administered by Marshal Philippe Pétain's at Vichy; the Vichy regime retained France's overseas possessions. On October 3, 1940, the Vichy government enacted its first anti-Jewish law. At the end of March 1941, a special commission headed by Xavier Vallat, was created to deal with Jewish affairs. These developments seriously affected the situation of the Jews in French Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.[1]

Of the three important Maghribi Jewish communities, the Algerian had the most to lose, in political status at least. During the forty years following the French conquest of Algeria (1830–1870), the Jews had experienced several significant changes. First, their communities were reorganized under the consistorial system, which was the communal organizational structure of French Jewry. Second, the Algerian Jews were exposed to French secular education while their traditional Jewish culture was in ready decline—especially after the First World War in large communities like Algiers and Oran. They were becoming assimilated to the French lifestyle. Third, France had granted Algerian Jews French citizenship *en bloc* through the Crémieux Decree of October 1870.

The Vichy anti-Jewish legislation would deprive the Algerian communities of their rights.

In Tunisia, too, the Jewish communities had been granted certain rights, some of which were removed during Vichy rule (1940–43). Tunisian Jews could obtain French citizenship by virtue of the Morinaud Law (1923), though they were subjects of the Husaynid Beylicate (Muslim rulers of Tunisia). This left them in a position inferior to that of the Algerian Jews (who were automatically citizens), but in a more advantageous situation than their Moroccan coreligionists.

The French Moroccan Protectorate did not intend to reverse the basic legal system of the country which was based on the Quran and

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its interpretation as well as on the will of the Sherifian Sultan. The French were politically prudent, attempting to adjust their political interests to the laws and customs adhered to by the Islamic courts. The laws introduced by the French after 1912 dealt with the civil status of French citizens and foreigners, not of local Muslims or Jews. Since the Jews were the Sultan's subjects, they were not in a position to acquire French or any other citizenship. The French did define ways in which Moroccans could obtain French citizenship, but Jews were virtually ineligible. A Moroccan Jew could become a French citizen if he had performed exceptional services in the French army for a considerable period of time. The only way for him to acquire a foreign nationality was to leave Morocco on condition of not returning. Of the four social strata in Morocco—the French, the citizens of foreign countries, the Muslims, and the Jews—the Jews were at the bottom of the scale. There was one important benefit to this system: personal status, such as birth registration, divorce, and inheritance, was regulated by Jewish law and adjudicated by rabbinic tribunals. However, except for such personal matters, the great mass of civil and criminal litigation involving Moroccan Jews continued to be in Islamic tribunals presided over by officials appointed by the Sultan: these were the Sherifian courts or the *Chrâa.* Despite the fact that French domination had done less for Moroccan Jews than for other Maghribi Jewish communities, the Moroccan Jews' position, too, was impaired by the Vichy regime.

Anti-Jewish attitudes had been evident in North Africa for many years before the establishment of the Vichy regime. In the latter half of the nineteenth century in Algeria, the European population protested violently against the rights which France granted the Jews, and was especially vocal during the Dreyfus Affair. During the first decade of the twentieth century, these hostilities subsided somewhat, only to resurface in the early 1930s. There was one difference between nineteenth century anti-Semitism and the agitation of the 1930s. Whereas earlier European antisemites had enlisted support from fellow Europeans, during the 1930s they sought to enlist Muslim support.

MUSLIM-JEWISH RELATIONS IN THE PRE-WAR YEARS: 1933–1939

French and other antisemitic elements seized upon the Palestine problem and the Arab Revolt of 1936–39 to portray international Jewry, including the Jews of the Maghrib, in a negative way to the Muslims, many of whom expressed solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism and the British authorities in the Mandate. Nazi propaganda

broadcasts from Berlin and Stuttgart, as well as broadcasts from fascist Italy, added fuel to the ongoing anti-Jewish campaign.[2]

One success in the attempt to incite Muslims against Jews took place in Algeria. In the city of Constantine, Muslims organized a pogrom against Jews on August 3–5, 1934. Although we still do not have all information on the causes of this event, it appears that the antisemitic campaign in Algeria, inspired by European Algerians, contributed to the hostility between Muslims and Jews in the Constantine region. In this pogrom, 23 Jews as well as three Muslims were killed. Eighty-one persons were wounded.[3]

Unrest came to the surface in Tunisia, too, where anti-Jewish riots took place in Sfax in 1932. While it has been alleged that Palestinian Arabs instigated local Muslims against Jews,[4] we were unable to confirm this claim. More serious Muslim-Jewish tensions arose in French Morocco (Casablanca, Rabat), in Spanish Morocco (Tetuan), and in Tangier during the Spring and Early Summer of 1933. Though other motives should not be ruled out in the Moroccan case, the editor of the usually reliable *Survey of International Affairs* concluded that these incidents emerged from militant antisemitism encouraged by European elements.[5]

It is noteworthy that European anti-Semitic activity in the Maghrib gained momentum mainly among the European population and through the efforts of the Parti Social Français (PSF) and the Parti Populaire Français (PPF). In the final analysis, their propaganda endeavors, augmented by the local European press and the Italian-German broadcasts, did not much influence the Muslim population as a whole. Despite the abovementioned events, the Muslim majority continued to coexist with their Jewish neighbors. The numerous incidents of Muslims intimidating the Jews or assaulting them physically were an integral part of life in the Maghrib. The French archives on the Maghrib, available at Nantes, point to this phenomenon. However, major pogroms on the scale of the event in Constantine did not take place.

Whereas European anti-Jewish propaganda did not gain support among the Muslim masses, it did influence segments of the embryonic Maghribi nationalist movement. The Algerian nationalist supporters of Messali Hadj's *Etoile nord-africaine* and the *Parti du peuple algérien*, in both Algeria and France, organized activities that included the publication of the newspapers *El Ouma* and *Ech Chaab*, which was occasionally partially financed by the Pan-Islamic activist Amir Shakib Arslan. At the war's outbreak, Messali's supporters split into two factions: one supported Germany, seeking to secure her aid in the struggle for independence; the other, more moderate, considered supporting the France of the pre-Vichy era.

What was the position of Algerian nationalists regarding the Jews? Messali and most of his supporters argued that the Jews weakened France internally and contributed to her political and moral corruption. On the other hand, they contradicted themselves by saying that French Algeria was dominated by the Jews who ruled the country in the name of France. The Crémieux Decree of 1870, in Messali's opinion, had transformed the Jews into an over-privileged element hostile to the Arabo-Berber population. Messali's PPA, operating underground after 1939, included activists who later supported the Pétain government in part because of its anti-Jewish policy.[6]

In Tunisia, the nationalists were not quite so extreme. True, the *Vieux Destour* and the orthodox Islamic *Zeituna* circles held anti-Jewish attitudes, but their hostility was most often passive. However, the secularly-oriented *Neo-Destour* movement which gradually became the most popular political force in the country, demonstrated greater understanding towards the Jews.[7]

As in the rest of the Maghrib, the Moroccan nationalist movement was divided into moderates and radicals. Generally speaking, Spanish zone nationalists enjoyed greater freedom to express political views than their counterparts in French Morocco, particularly after 1937 when French Morocco's nationalist leaders suffered a strong wave of repression. The more moderate nationalists of French Morocco, among them Muhammad al-Kholti encouraged a Judeo-Muslim entente in order to enlist Jewish support for their reforms they meant to request from the French. Al-Kholti advocated "une action commune en vue de réformes urgentes à introduir par la France dans le domaine de la justice, comme dans tous les autres domaines." But he added that Judeo-Muslim solidarity "ne pourrait être durable que si une égalité complète englobait Israélites et Musulmans."[8]

Were these views promoted following Muslim-Jewish tensions between April and July 1933 to reduce hostilities, especially in view of the large urban Jewish population concentrations? Was this a plea to French-educated Jews to support nationalist reformist claims? Or, did the early nationalists genuinely seek a friendly entente? We have not been able to reach definite conclusions, although it is noteworthy that al-Kholti represented the French-educated stratum in the movement. Those more traditionally educated (at the Qarawiyine in Fez) were less moderate in their approach to the Protectorate authorities and to the Jews.

As in Algeria and Tunisia, Moroccan Jewry—including educated Jews who had graduated from the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU) schools[9]—did not reveal any enthusiasm for Arab nationalist causes and, in the Spanish zone, they were profoundly disturbed by anti-Jewish declarations made by local nationalists. This is how an AIU

director in Larache described the attitude of Spanish Zone nationalists in the wake of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, on the eve of the Second World War:

> . . . ce qui nous paraît . . . grave c'est que les manifestations anti-juives dans les milieux arabes: il y a quelques jours, le secrétaire du Grand Mufti de Jérusalem est venu faire de la propagande au Maroc espagnol pour réunir les fonds destinés aux Arabes de Palestine. Le chef nationaliste du Maroc Abd al-Khaliq Torrès, a pris violemment à partie dans des conférences faites à El-Ksar, Larache, Tétouan et Arcila les Juifs de Palestine ainsi que les Anglais. Des cris "A mort les Juifs!" "A mort les Anglais" ont été proférés par une nombreuse assistance arabe.[10]

Another threat facing the Jews of Morocco during the period immediately preceding the War was tied to the Civil War in Spain and its impact on Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Zone was under martial law beginning on July 19, 1936. The Jews were not harassed by the Zone's military authorities throughout the crisis, but they were pressured to donate funds and other forms of wealth in support of Franco, as were the local Spaniards. Albert Saguès, the AIU director in Tangier, a keen observer of political developments in Northern Morocco clearly indicated that the Spanish authorities went out of their way to maintain cordial contacts with the Jewish communities. This, however, was not the case with various political movements and their adherents who aggressively pressured the Jews to adopt political positions. According to Saguès:

> Indeed it seems that the responsible authorities are applying a fair approach towards our coreligionists, but things are not so on the part of organizations with fascist tendencies, which recruit their members among the Spanish youth. . . . These organizations are more active in small settlements like Arcila or Chaouen than in the big centers. I know that Jewish youths fell victim to these organizations in Larache . . . In any case, the military authorities intervened in many cases in order to restrain excessive outbursts of enthusiasm. Our coreligionists suffer, in that case, loss of their property: merchandise, foreign currency, jewelry—it is all stolen by the military government; the Spanish civil war will totally impoverish them: however, there is in all this some consolation in the knowledge that until now they haven't suffered loss of life . . .[11]

Some of this politically motivated harassment—whether perpetrated by the authorities or by pro-fascist movements—seems to have influenced the Jews of Larache to the extent that they expressed profound anxiety about a rumor that the Tangier Jewish community council had made a declaration against Franco. The Larache Jews were re-

lieved when assured by Tangier's Jewish leaders of their neutrality in regard to the Spanish Civil War.[12]

MOROCCO UNDER VICHY INFLUENCE

During the months which preceded the German occupation of France, Moroccan Jews, like their coreligionists in Tunisia and Algeria, expressed solidarity with France. They donated funds to a special war chest, donations which often ranged between 50,000 and 500,000 francs per donor—considerable sums for those days.[13] When France recruited volunteers (during the period 1939–40), hundreds of Jews signed up. In order to facilitate their registration, Jewish recruitment centers were set up in Rabat and Casablanca. After several days' effort, a list containing 1,300 names was presented to the French Protectorate administration.

A. Cohen, an AIU school director in Safi, described the pro-French sentiments of the Jews during the early months of the war. The Jews soon realized that France did not want their support:

> Les conventions en vigueur ou des considérations qui demeurent ignorées du public, n'ont pas, jusqu'à présent, permis de donner une suite favorable à nos ardents volontaires. Et ils attendent. Certains, à bout de patience, ont pris le parti de s'engager dans la Légion Etrangère.[14]

The Protectorate Administration politely expressed gratitude to the Jewish volunteers but rejected them, ostensibly to avoid alienating the Muslims or antisemites among the European population. Despite their warm loyalty to France, these young Jews were told they had to wait indefinitely until they would be needed.

But it was in the summer of 1940, with the rise of Vichy, that anti-Semitism became official policy in France and her possessions. Anti-Jewish laws were promulgated beginning in the second half of 1940 which inevitably stirred anxiety among Maghribi Jews. Article 9 of the Law of October 3, 1940, concerning the status of the Jews, provided that the Law should be introduced in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia and in France's other colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories. The law was introduced into Morocco through a *ẓahīr* (a Sherifian decree) of October 31, 1940. It applied to all Jews by "race," which was defined as three Jewish grandparents, as well as to all members of the Jewish faith. Despite its discriminatory passages, the law expressly authorized the exercise of rabbinical jurisdiction, the practice of calling in Hebrew court interpreters, and allowed Jews to continue teaching at institutions intended solely for Jews. Its provi-

sions were not to prejudice Jewish institutions, i.e., communities.[15]

The Vichy Law of June 2, 1941, increased the hardships inflicted by the Law of October 31, 1940 in many respects. It was followed by the *ẓahirs* of August 5, 1941, introducing it into Morocco. These decrees (issued separately for Moroccan Jews and for European Jews living in the French Zone) enlarged the list of occupations prohibited to Jews including money-lending in any form and the real estate business. They did, however, permit handicrafts and wholesale trading. A penalty was prescribed for violations of the *ẓahir* concerning personal status. All Jews were required to appear for registration of their persons and occupations and for declarations of their property. The Vichy Law of July 22, 1941, concerning the "Aryanization" of the French economy, was not introduced in Morocco.

According to Article 4 of the August 5, 1941 *ẓahir*, the following professions were prohibited to Moroccan Jews:

> Banker, money-changer, peddler, broker of an agency for stocks or loans; investments in businesses and in distributing merchandise; agent; lessee of woodlands; sports commissioner; editor, director, administrator, journalist with the press or a periodical (except for scientific or religious periodicals); concessionaire; theatrical director; movie producer or director of an agency for movie distribution; director or administrator of movie theaters; impresario for entertainment presentations; director or administrator in broadcasting enterprises.[16]

We do not yet possess adequate data to fully assess the impact of these restrictions. Which of the *ẓahirs*—and the regulations for their implementation—were adhered to partially, and which fully, by the Resident-General, General Charles Noguès? It appears that, in addition to the aforementioned restrictions outlined in Article 4 of the *ẓahir* of August 5, 1941, there were certain restrictions which were harshly implemented in the cities but not enforced for the Jewish communities of the rural countryside (the *bled*). We also cannot always ascertain to what extent decrees, and the regulations for implementing them, were enforced in all urban communities. On the basis of available data, there is no doubt that the restrictions were at least partially implemented. We see this from the data in Table 1 regarding the removal of Jews from administrative employment in Fez and Oudjda.

The regulations for putting the decrees into effect contained detailed provisions limiting the number of Jewish lawyers and physicians to 2 per cent of the total of these professions and providing compensation for officials dismissed under the *ẓahīrs*.

Most of the lawyers affected by these measures were probably non-Moroccan European Jews. As for physicians, their status requires

Table 1. Jews Removed From Administrative Duties (1941) in Two Cities

Employment	Fez	Oudjda
Population Registration	1	—
Tax Bureau	—	1
Public Works	1	—
Civil Inspection	2	—
Urban Services	2	—
Hospitals	5	3
Military Administration	2	8
Teaching	3	7
Electric Company	2	2
Posts & Telegraph	7	10
Railroad	3	3
Bus Transportation	6	1
Courts	4	2
Banks	4	2
Totals	42	39

SOURCE: M.Y., R.S., R.B. (Robert Benazeraf), *Rapport confidentiel:* "L'application du statut des juifs et des dispositions raciales à la population juive du Maroc" (Fonds Institut Ben-Zvi), p. 14 (unpublished).

further investigation. The new law for Morocco (1941) severely restricted the number of Jews allowed to practice medicine. Jewish physicians were not even permitted to care for Jewish patients. However, they were authorized to do so by the Protectorate administration in Tunisia. On the other hand, new findings in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay seem to suggest that a region by region survey of the application of the restrictions would be necessary. Since the number of non-Jewish physicians was limited during the War and since Jews, mainly among the European immigrants, were relatively well represented in that profession, Jewish physicians were often indispensible. In Casablanca, for example, seventeen per cent of the physicians were Jews. Removing them from the practice of medicine would have endangered health services for the general population. Therefore, apparently, the restrictions were not implemented in Casablanca.[17]

Another restriction, dated August 22, 1941, prohibited Jewish subjects of the Sultan from residing outside the traditional Jewish quarters (*mellāḥs*), and especially from living in the *villes européennes* constructed by the French for European residents and also inhabited by the more affluent Muslims and Jews. Only specific categories of Jews, essentially war veterans, were permitted to stay outside the *mellāḥs*. Moreover, if unable to prove that their residence in the *villes européennes* predated September 1, 1939, these Jews too were compelled to return to the *mellāḥ* by September 22, 1941. Article 4 of the regulation indicated that a new ordinance would be published, calling

for the evacuation of Jews who had lived in the *villes européennes* prior to September 1, 1939. Those who resisted the new law were to be expelled and required to pay a fine of between 500 and 10,000 francs. Once again, while we do not have accurate records as to what extent this policy was implemented, several hundred Jewish families in the urban centers evacuated or were expelled. The return of well-to-do Jews back to the *mellāḥs* caused further overcrowding and hastened the spead of typhoid.[18]

In a country where Jews had long suffered from a higher rate of illiteracy than the Jewish communities of Algeria and Tunisia, they were now further restricted. The number of Jews in the Protectorate's elementary and secondary schools was limited to ten per cent of the number of non-Jews, and in institutions of higher learning to three per cent. There is clear evidence that a quota (*numerus clausus*) in education was enforced at least to some extent. While the communal religious schools continued to function, the heaviest responsibility for providing secular education to Jewish children throughout Morocco fell on the AIU institutions. Whereas French Protectorate-sponsored schools had opened their doors to outstanding Muslim and Jewish students and to the privileged indigenous socioeconomic stratum, the majority of the Jews had obtained a modern education within the AIU framework. In 1940–41, 15,000 Jewish youths attended AIU schools, but only a bit over 1,000 studied at the Protectorate schools. This already small number was reduced as a result of the new measure, particularly in Casablanca, Rabat, Meknes, and Fez; Jewish teachers employed by the Protectorate also suffered.[19]

What was Vichy's policy vis-à-vis the AIU? There is no doubt that this school system continued to function under Vichy. The AIU schools had been receiving financial assistance from France on a regular basis since 1928. On the eve of the Second World War, the French were subsidizing eighty per cent of the schools' maintenance costs. Without this support, the AIU system could not have survived. The support continued into the Vichy era. We cannot clearly identify the motives as to why the Vichyites maintained the AIU schools in Morocco, though one can make some inferences.

Resident-General Noguès probably believed that it would be preferable to stabilize the educational system of French Morocco and not curtail the work of the AIU, a move that would send Jewish youths into the streets. After all, the anti-Jewish legislation limited their educational opportunities to begin with.[20] Roger Thabault (until 1941 inspector-general of European primary education for the Protectorate) related years later that Nogues had enabled him to travel to Vichy and request that the authorities publish an edict legitimizing the continuation of the AIU's subsidy. Thabault claims to have come to the

AIU's rescue, because he suspected that certain high officials at the Residency were determined to either neutralize the schools of this French-Jewish organization or, at the very least, restrict the scope of their activity.[21]

Whereas Vichy and its senior officials in North Africa were reactionaries and old-fashioned anti-Semites, they were not as vicious as the Nazis. Vichy may have appreciated the pro-French role of the AIU and felt that it would be better to let its schools survive. In fact, Admiral François Darlan was concerned about the possible disappearance of the AIU schools when he wrote to Xavier Vallat, urging him to prevent the collapse of "un important réseau d'expansion de la langue française."[22] It seems that in the final analysis, and despite opposition to the AIU emanating from Vallat's men, Darlan and his colleagues may well have shared the opinion of their adversary General de Gaulle concerning the cultural significance of the AIU in the Maghrib.[23]

As for other restrictions and hardships, both Muslims and Jews were disadvantaged in the distribution of rationed foods and most other essential consumer products. Available data presented in Table 2 give an accurate indication of monthly rations during the final months of 1942. Among other examples: Jews were entitled to a 2½ liter wine ration whereas the Europeans got ten liters.

Jews consumed large quantities of wine in religious observances and needed more wine than others. Since sugar was consumed more heavily by Muslims and green tea only by Muslims, Jews and Europeans were not disadvantaged in these categories. However, whereas the Europeans were provided with three liters of kerosene, Muslims and Jews had to buy it on the free market at exaggerated prices, the same holding true for meat.

In French Morocco, a final aspect of persecution was detention and labor camps. These camps held Jewish inmates, among others. A Vichy law of October 4, 1940, had provided for detention of "foreign nationals of the Jewish race" in special concentration camps. This law was not introduced in Morocco, because a *ẓahīr* had already been promulgated on January 2, 1940. It provided for detention in designated places of persons endangering national defense or public security, or unable to emigrate after having received expulsion orders, or in the country illegally. The detainees could be forced to perform labor of use to the community and for that purpose to be organized in special units. This *ẓahīr* was directed against Communists, anti-French elements among the Muslims, and foreigners, especially foreign Jews seeking refuge in Morocco. Twelve detention and labor camps with a partly Jewish population were set up in Morocco during the War. There are reports and testimonies of harsh conditions pre-

Table 2. Monthly Rationing of Foodstuffs and Essential Products

Product	Europeans	Muslims	Jews
Sugar (in grams)	500	700	350–400
Cooking Oil (in centiliters)	250	330	230
Coffee (in grams)	200	—	50
Green Tea (in grams)	—	40	—
Hand Soap (in grams)	200	70	70
Wine (liters)	10	—	2.5
Kerosene (liters)	3	—	—
Meat (in grams)	200–250	—	—

SOURCE: La situation des Juifs en zone français de l'empire chérifien: fin 1943, CZAZ4/10.266.

vailing in the camps. It seems, however, that the plight of the detainees was generally less severe in Morocco than in Algeria and Tunisia.[24] These camps were not intended for Moroccan Jews but only for European Jews.

In the Spanish Zone, no drastic changes occurred that endangered the Jews following Franco's rise to power. Although the Spanish radio and press engaged in anti-Semitic propaganda during 1940–41, not a single discriminatory law was issued against Jews. Gradually, their position improved. It cannot be said that the Jews suffered from any racial or religious persecution. Even their food rations were absolutely identical to those of the Spanish and foreign population, contrary to what had occurred in the French Zone.[25]

Tangier as an international zone posed special problems, some of them involving Jewish refugees. During 1942–43, there were between 1,500 and 2,000 Jewish refugees in Tangier, many of whom had arrived during the pre-war era. Approximately half were Sephardim; the remainder, Central Europeans. The Sephardim originated from the Dodecanese Islands (then under Italy); some had left Rhodes for Italy and France even before Italy introduced anti-Jewish laws in 1938. Most of these families had three or more children. The men were craftsmen, shoemakers, drivers, or small businessmen. They spoke Italian, Spanish, Turkish, and French. The Central Europeans had come mainly from Hungary and Poland via Italy where a number of them lived for two years before the enactment of the 1938 anti-Jewish laws. As long as Tangier remained an international zone, refugees were admitted without difficulty. Nor were there any regulations to prevent them from earning their living. After the Fall of France and Spain's occupation of Tangier in June 1940, these people were deprived of the right to work. Their standard of living fell rapidly from that time on. The intervention of the World Jewish Congress, the

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), and the AIU helped relieve some of their misery; after April 1944, AJDC spent $12,000 monthly on behalf of these refugees—funds that were allocated through a local relief committee. This sum was separate from funds earmarked for school meals at the AIU.[26]

During the 1939–40 period, the Jewish population of Tangier reached 12,000, refugees included. Most of the Jews were craftsmen, bank clerks and bank officials, as well as merchants and agents of trading companies. Despite various restrictions and the Spanish occupation (until 1945), their political and economic conditions were better than in French Morocco under Vichy. The Jews continued to engage in certain lucrative trades. Whereas Jews in French Morocco were now discriminated against in the textile trades, Tangier Jewry was still represented in that sector. Blandin, who conducted a thorough investigation of the situation in Tangier during the War, observed rather optimistically that the Jewish elite, whose members had ties with the new Spanish administration, enjoyed a stable economic situation. In fact, he added:

> Le juif contrôle l'exportation vers l'Angleterre et vers l'U.S.A. des cuirs, des oeufs, des peaux et l'importation de tous les produits manufacturés indispensables à la zone et au protectorat espagnol: tissus, automobiles, meubles, farines, épicerie, en gros et demi-gros . . . Mais c'est surtout dans la banque que le juif tangérois s'est spécialisé avec profit . . .[27]

It is possible that this was true insofar as the elite was concerned. It was certainly not the case for the lower middle class. Their position under the new administration was precarious. Their businesses were heavily taxed and new licenses were often refused by the authorities.[28]

Politically, the Jews faced certain anxieties under the Spanish occupation. The Spaniards dissolved the Legislative Assembly, encouraged the departure of the last vestige of Sherifian authority in Tangier, the *mandūb* (the Sultan's representative in the international zone), and enacted legislation for administrative reform. The *ẓahīr* of February 15, 1925, which had legalized the Jewish community's council, was abrogated. All communal activity came under Spanish supervision.[29] The Jewish community lost the subsidies previously allocated, as well as the right to elect its communal leaders who would now be directly appointed by Spain from a list submitted by the community. The autonomous rabbinic tribunal and its constitutions were also dissolved.[30] Interestingly, similar measures were not adopted in the French zone where the authorities preferred not to upset the Jewish organizational structure.

Nevertheless, the situation in Tangier remained relatively secure

despite the fact that the Jews were victims of Nazi propaganda promoted by German merchants who pretended before 1940 to be Swiss and Dutch nationals and afterwards carried out open political action. Politically speaking, the Jews of Tangier enjoyed the highest level of freedom attainable under an authoritiarian regime. They were free of racial and legal discrimination.[31]

Returning to the situation in French Morocco, even after the American landing on November 8, 1942, the position of the Jews remained precarious. The Americans did not interfere in French internal affairs and Vichy sympathizers still dominated the administration. On January 9, 1943, M. Poussier, the head of the civil administration in the Casablanca district, summoned the local Jewish notables and warned them that the Jews would be held responsible if the demonstrations of General de Gaulle's National Front and the Veterans' Union, scheduled for the next day, did in fact take place.[32] This was only one of a number of oppressive acts, which were all the more distressing as they occurred after the Allied landing. There were also attacks on Jews in the *mellāḥ* of Casablanca, anti-Jewish riots in Rabat and Salé, discriminatory measures in Meknes and Fez, and harassment of Jews at Beni-Mellal.

At Beni-Mellal, the local *qā'id* (governor) and the French *contrôleur civil* (who was known for his hostility to the Jews) announced that any European desiring to settle in town could choose a home from the houses or apartments occupied by Jewish tenants. Once a residence was chosen, the family would have to evacuate within forty-eight hours. Several Jewish families were forced out of their home during the difficult winter of 1942–43. They found temporary refuge in local synagogues and community centers.

The Jews' situation began to gradually improve only after June 3, 1943. On that date, General de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, in charge of those French territories in North Africa not under German occupation, reached an agreement for the creation of a French Committee of National Liberation. The agreement also marked the end of Vichy influence in Morocco. On the following day, General Noguès fled to Portugal.

TUNISIA - THE DUAL CHALLENGE: VICHY INFLUENCE AND GERMAN OCCUPATION

The Law of October 3, 1940, was extended to Tunisia through the edict of November 30, 1940, just as it had been applied to Morocco. It contained twelve articles outlining the measures in the name of the Bey and signed by the Resident General, Admiral Esteva. The edict

restricted Jewish representation in the public service (Articles 3 and 9), and in educational institutions and journalism (Article 7). Article 5 stipulated that certain public functions would be open to Jews provided they could prove one of the following: that they had been decorated by France for military service during the First World War; had received *L'ordre du jour* in the 1939–40 War; had received the *Médaille militaire*; were descendents of soldiers who had died for France between 1914–18; or were widows of men who had died in war and had received a pension from the French government.[33]

On October 9, 1941, measures were adopted regarding lawyers of the Jewish faith (*avocats défenseurs*). Article 3 stipulated that a date would be announced after which lawyers who were blacklisted would be prohibited from providing services.[34] Measures were also taken against Jewish physicians. According to Article 16 of the November 6, 1941, decree, however, they were still authorized to provide medical care to the Jewish population and their credentials were supposed to indicate this.[35]

Some of the measures remained purely theoretical. They were either not applied at all or were implemented very slowly and partially. The Germans, who occupied Tunisia in November 1942, attributed this to the liberal policies of Admiral Esteva. By the summer of 1941, Moroccan and Algerian Jewry had begun to feel the effect of the anti-Jewish measures, but Esteva's Tunisia was considerably less oppressive. As Nahum Yerushalmi, a Hebrew educator from Palestine active in the Jewish community of Tunis, observed in June 1941:

> Tunisian Jewry was not much harmed by the war. Only a few rich men and members of the liberal professions, who were harmed by the new French legislation, were lowered in their situation. On the other hand, religious-national enthusiasm increased and contributions for the community and its institutions, especially for Hebrew education, were given generously.[36]

The situation, however, worsened drastically following the American landing in North Africa in November 1942, which soon precipitated the invasion of Tunisia by the Germans and Italians. Control of Jewish affairs now passed to the German-Italian *Kommandatura*, headed by a German general. Still, because of their Italian partners, the Germans were unable to vent their hatred upon the Jews in the same manner as in occupied Europe. Difficulties of communication with Europe and a certain slackening of discipline also made it harder for the *Kommandatura* to display the same brutality as the Nazis did in Europe.[37] But conditions for the Jews did deteriorate.

Harassment began with the arrest of notables, including the president of the Jewish community of Tunis, Moïse Borgel. The notables

were released a week later after a forceful protest by Esteva whose administration continued alongside the Germans', albeit with considerably reduced authority. On December 6, 1942, Borgel and the Chief Rabbi of Tunis, Hayyim Belaïche, were summoned to German headquarters. They were told that in view of the prevailing shortage of manpower, General von Nehring, in charge of Axis forces in North Africa, had ordered the drafting of Jewish laborers. The Germans formed a labor recruitment commission (*Le Comité de Recrutement de la Main d'Oeuvre*) with functions strikingly similar to those of the *Judenrat* in occupied Europe. Paul Ghez, a leading member of the Jewish community, was appointed chairman of the commission.

To ensure the implementation of German instructions, several dozen Jewish notables were detained as hostages. Some of them, accused of supporting General de Gaulle or Socialist and Communist causes, were sent to concentration camps in Germany, from which they did not return. The commission and similar bodies managed to recruit several thousand poorer Jews from throughout the country. Many bitter conflict complaints were heard that the well-to-do managed to avoid the dangerous labor in camps, airfields and on fortifications which the Allies bombed relentlessly. The work was mostly carried out under German command in strategic places such as Bizerte, Mateur, and the El Aouina aerodrome near Tunis. The Italian labor camps were remote from the main strategic points and therefore less exposed to bombing. Furthermore, the conditions in these camps were far better than in those under German command.

The Germans intended to have the Jews wear the Yellow Star as they had done in occupied Europe. But, as far as we were able to ascertain, this badge was introduced in Sfax but only partially, if at all, in Tunis. On the other hand, during their six months of occupation, the Germans required the Jews to pay heavy fines and provide funds to maintain the Jewish labor force. In Tunis, the community leadership levied payments from 1,397 affluent members among the 40,000 Jews in the city; during the six-month occupation, the Jews of Tunis provided 35,748,898.85 francs for community expenses. Of this, 31,022,311.50 were allocated to maintain the labor force.

Anti-Semitic accusations were used as pretexts for demands for money from Jews. In 1943, for example, the Germans in Tunisia accused "international Jewry" of helping the Allies prepare for war against Germany. This charge became a pretext for imposing fines on Tunis Jewry amounting to 20,000,000 francs. In order to meet the various German demands, the Jewish leadership was compelled to mortgage real estate and use the property of affluent Jews as a guarantee for bank loans.[38] Thus, the terror organized against the Jews had a significant financial aspect.

This form of terror was intricately bound up with other outrages such as Germans barging into synagogues, belittling rabbis, and intimidating ordinary Jews. The intimidation originated in the upper echelons of the German command. For instance, early in 1943 the *Ortskommandant* (the local German commander for Tunis), wrote to Georges Sarfati, a representative of the Jews of Ariana, a suburb of Tunis, warning:

> . . . I have recently [become aware of] several acts of sabotage which were carried out especially on military telephone lines in Ariana. Moreover, I have received reports that many among the Jewish population were spreading accusations and propaganda against the Axis states, a situation that disturbs public peace and security. I am inclined to believe that the policy of restraint implemented in this connection towards the Jewish population has not at all been properly understood—I order you to announce to the Jewish population that any attempt to disturb the public peace and security will lead to severe punishment. These punishments will include the death penalty. If I receive one report about activity against the interests of the Axis states originating within the Jewish population, I will have several men arrested as hostages in order to have peace prevail.[39]

We can conclude on the basis of personal accounts of individuals involved that local Jews were profoundly concerned with the threat to their existence. Although the number of Jews who died in forced labor camps under the Germans was small, and many others died as a result of Allied aerial bombardments, it is vital to stress the fact that the very presence of the Germans caused the deaths. During the early months of 1943, Jews began to desert fortifications works and labor camps; no more than 600 of them were still obeying forced labor orders. One of the most dangerous strategic points at the time was the El Aouina aerodrome near Tunis. According to Avraham Sarfati from Tunis who worked there:

> There was something special about our group. In the community [in Tunis], they called us a *groupe volant*, that is, a mobile group. For the most part, all the groups were in camps or on the border with . . . the front. I was not at the front, but . . . I worked at unloading the airplanes . . . I will give an example of our relationship to the Germans . . . We were working at the airfield and there were Allied bombings of the airfield. Then we would flee in cars together with the Germans. We used to immediately leave the airfield and go off some distance. But since the bombs also fell outside the airfield . . . there were also Jews, not from my group but from those working outside the airfield, who were killed. Our group continued to travel to this airfield every day until one day there was a British

> bombing by planes that flew in low and destroyed all the planes that were landing at that time as well as those that were on the airfield . . . We saw a frightening sight: The pilots were burnt inside their cockpits. The Germans told us that there was nothing to unload but that we must gather up the corpses. Also, several Jews working outside the airfield were killed in that bombing . . .[40]

A final issue of central importance in connection with the Holocaust in Europe has been raised by researchers regarding Tunisian Jewry: Were the Germans moving to exterminate them? Yitzhak Avrahami's personal account claims:

> [the Germans] did not have enough time to carry out their plan for mass expulsion and extermination. I know that they planned to carry out acts of burning people and I know that near Tunis there was a brick kiln and they planned to use this brick kiln to carry out their plan.[41]

A similar version was provided by Naftali Bar-Giora, one of the first envoys of the Zionist Organization in Palestine to arrive in Tunisia during the latter half of 1943, following the country's liberation by the Allies:

> I know that an S.S. unit was preparing gas chambers near Kairouan in a plant for producing cement and plaster. These installations were not completed before the withdrawal of Rommel's army from Africa and were dismantled. There were Frenchmen and Arabs who saw the place and told about its existence . . .[42]

There are countless other theories and accounts—about plans which were foiled, or on the creation of facilities to carry out plans which were not completed due to lack of time before Tunisia's liberation on May 7, 1943. At this stage of research, however, it is widely agreed by historians that the Germans were in panic and frustrated by the bombings and other military operations and thus did not deal with this issue; they had little faith in the Muslim population and it is doubtful that the latter would have rendered support for such an endeavor; the Germans did not succeed in organizing an effective propaganda apparatus; their channels of communication with Europe were weak at best; and the presence of the Italians may have been a moderating factor on the Germans vis-à-vis the Jews.

ALGERIA—REGRESSION IN THE JEWS' ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS

The status of Algerian Jewry deteriorated significantly—juridically and politically—with the rise of Vichy. Not only did the 1940–41 laws,

discussed above, apply to them but, on October 7, 1940, Philippe Pétain signed an edict abrogating the Crémieux Decree of October 24, 1870. This decree had granted Algerian Jews French citizenship. Thus all Algerian Jews lost their French citizenship, with the exception of Jews who had fought in the French army and were decorated. However, personal property rights remained in effect for all Jews.

Serious confusion arose as a result of the Law of October 7, 1940. For instance, there were Jews who argued they were entitled to conserve their full citizenship rights because they had fought for France in 1939–40; they claimed to have been taken prisoners of war but managed to escape and consequently were candidates for military decoration. Yet, if they were unable to prove this claim on the basis of official documents; if they presented only written evidence from their divisions' commanding officers; if there was no consistency between their declarations and the written evidence—they could not receive the *Médaille militaire*. Consequently, they could not enjoy the benefits of Article 4 of the law abrogating the Crémieux Decree which entitled combattants from 1914–18 and 1939–40 who had been decorated to remain citizens of France.[43]

But retaining French citizenship was not simple even for army veterans: an Algerian Jew who had fought for France but not during the First World War or in 1939–40, was not entitled to keep his political rights as a French citizen, for Section 4 of the Law of October 7, 1940, stipulated that the citizenship rights of Algerian Jews would be preserved only if they had fought during these wars and were decorated. Hence, those who were decorated, for example, during the French military pacification campaign in Morocco in 1926, were not eligible to keep their citizenship.[44]

Among the most crucial government agencies dealing with Jewish matters in France and Algeria was the *Commissariat général aux questions juives*—a body advising the Vichy regime on laws affecting Jews as such and on applying such laws, as well as on confiscating or sequestering Jewish property and overseeing Jewish economic activity. Xavier Vallat, the head of the *Commissariat*, visited Algeria in August 1941. He aimed to investigate various possibilities of applying the newly adopted laws. Vallat met with Chief Rabbi Maurice Eisenbeth to discuss the new educational policy and held discussions with Jewish war veterans. The latter had hoped that no further discriminatory measures would be enacted and implemented. Despite his outwardly friendly disposition, Vallat had no intention of recommending policy revisions.[45] Thus, for example, in the spirit of the 1940–41 laws, the decree of November 5, 1941, called for enforcing the numerus clausus on Jews in the legal profession: only two per cent of the 800 registered

lawyers could be Jews. Therefore, only sixteen Jews remained as lawyers.[46]

As for Jewish midwives, the decree stipulating restrictions on them was published in Algeria's *Journal officiel* on November 29, 1941, predating the decree's publication in France (December 26). The number of Jewish midwives, in the spirit of the Law of June 2, 1941, could not, under any circumstances, surpass the two per cent restriction. Yet, even for those who were among the fortunate few, the bureaucratic process of proving eligibility was long and drawn out.[47]

More demoralizing, however, was the extension to Algeria of the French law of November 25, 1941, stipulating that Jews were to be deprived of the right to possess real estate (*Journal officiel*, November 25, 1941). The Jews' real property would be turned over to *administrateurs provisoires*. According to Article 1 of the Law:

> (Art. I) La loi est applicable à l'Algérie, dans les conditions ci-après: En vue d'éliminer toute influence juive dans l'économie algérienne, le gouverneur général de l'Algérie peut nommer un administrateur provisoire à: 1. Toute entreprise industrielle, commerciale, immobilière ou artisanale; 2. Tout immeuble, droit immobilier ou droit au bail quelconque; 3. Tout bien meuble, valeur mobilière ou droit mobilier quelconque, lorsque ceux à qui ils appartiennent ou qui les dirigent, ou certains d'entre eux sont Juifs. Toutefois, ces dispositions ne s'appliquent pas aux valeurs émises par l'Etat français et le gouvernement général et aux obligations émises par les sociétés ou collectivités publiques françaises ou algériennes. Et, sauf exception motivée—aux immeubles ou locaux servant à l'habitation personnelle des intéressés, de leurs ascendants ou descendants, ni aux meubles meublants qui garnissent les dits immeubles ou locaux.[48]

In other words: they were entitled to hold on to bonds and government securities as well as to their private homes and their contents. The *administrateurs* were required to prepare lists of the properties and to assess their value; they were vested with the authority to manage Jewish-owned properties.[49]

In the area of education, the *numerus clausus* (quota) in Algeria was enforced with greater severity than in the Protectorates. Whereas in Morocco and Tunisia, the Jews were somewhat less represented in the Protectorate-sponsored schools and kept many traditional religious schools, not to mention the AIU schools, Algerian Jewry, more culturally and politically assimilated to France than the Moroccan and Tunisian Jews, had fewer religious schools. In fact, the AIU in Algeria played a marginal educational role, most Jewish youth attending state schools. Hence, when Vichy extended its educational restrictions to Algeria in 1941, leaders of the Jewish consistory faced a serious prob-

lem: creating school places for 20,000 youths to be ousted from the state schools, practically overnight.

In institutions for higher learning, especially the *Université d'Alger*, Jews were limited to three per cent of the total enrollment. Jewish professors, who were also ousted, raised the idea of organizing courses in private forums for the ousted students and those not admitted to the university. But the authorities would not hear of this and forbid the initiative through the Law of December 31, 1941. Simultaneously, in the primary and secondary schools, the Jewish quota was set at fourteen per cent of the total. To enable young people to pursue their education, the authorities postponed the implementation of the restrictions for several months. During this interval, the *consistoires* of Algiers, Oran and Constantine, in conjunction with Jewish intellectual circles, created classes throughout Algeria. The one advantage of the new laws: the authorization for Jews to take the state examinations demonstrated that the new institutions maintained high educational standards, as the students performed well on these examinations. But during the latter half of October 1942, a new policy restricted Jewish representation in primary and secondary schools from fourteen to seven per cent.[50] (See table 3 on educational statistics.)

As early as May 1941, Jewish university students, alarmed by the possibility of quotas, wrote to the French Minister of Education, emphasizing that:

> la pensée même d'un *numerus clausus* nous semble sacrilège. Comment concevoir l'idée d'une culture parcimonieusement accordée aux uns et refusée aux autres, et qui impose un choix, aussi cruel à ceux qui seront appelés qu'à ceux qui seront exclus?[51]

However, the pleas and demands did not change policy. Affluent Jews subsidized the new community schools. Nevertheless, as time elapsed, funds were becoming scarce, for the Law of November 21, 1941 pertaining to the transfer of Jewish real estate to the *administrateurs* made it exceedingly difficult for the elite to provide sufficient financial support. As Elie Gozlan of the Jewish leadership observed following the American landing: if the liberation of Algeria had been postponed, it is doubtful that a proper educational apparatus could have been maintained.[52]

Following the liberation, Rabbi Eisenbeth demanded that Governor-General Yves Châtel totally abolish all anti-Jewish laws. Yet his pleas fell on deaf ears at the time. Moreover, as in Morocco, not only did the Americans not interfere in internal French affairs but agreed to the appointment of Admiral Darlan, one of Pétain's closest collab-

Table 3. Primary & Secondary Schools

Type of School	Non-Jewish Students *Nov. 5, 1940*	Academic year 1941–42 *Quota: 14%* Jewish Students *accepted*	*removed*	Academic year 1942–43 *Quota: 7%* Jewish Students *accepted*	*removed*
Lycées & Collèges	10,000	1,000	765	549	1,314
Cours complémentaires	13,693	1,100	530	550	1,000
Technical Ed.	764	71	8	35	43
Elementary Ed.	223,282	10,658	10,234	5,529	16,583
Agricultural Ed.	238	7	4	3	7
Commercial Ed.	118	6	7	3	10
Naval Ed.	70	2	—	1	1
Artistic Ed.	3,600	225	414	112	526
Total	251,765	13,069	11,962	6,782	19,484

SOURCE: Robert Brunschvig, "Les mesures antijuives dans l'enseignement, en Algérie sous le régime de Vichy," *Revue d'Alger*, 1,2 (1944), p. 65.

orators, as the head of the French nation in French territories not under German occupation.

In December 1942, Darlan was assassinated and Henri Giraud, Darlan's appointee as French military commander for North Africa, inherited his position. Following Châtel's departure, Marcel Peyrouton, a participant in the formulation of the October 7, 1940 decree, became Governor-General of Algeria. Only in the wake of protests made by Jewish organizations in Algeria and the United States, in the American press and by Gaullist supporters, did Giraud publish, on March 18, 1943, a decree calling for the elimination of discriminatory policies. But not all anti-Jewish measures were abrogated immediately. Significantly, moreover, Giraud simultaneously issued another edict abrogating the Crémieux Decree for the second time. If, following the publication of the Law of October 7, 1940, Algerian Jews had lost their citizenship and political rights, their situation in 1943 was far worse. Giraud's steps aimed at depriving the Jews not only of their political rights but also at regression in matters of personal status, requiring a return to the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts which had prevailed prior to the 1870 decree.

General de Gaulle arrived in Algiers at the end of May 1943. He met with Rabbi Eisenbeth and told him in the name of the French Committee for National Liberation that the Committee had decided to nullify the Giraud Decree which abrogated the Crémieux Decree. Indeed, on October 20, 1943, the Committee made an official dec-

laration calling for total abolition of all the discriminatory laws, including the Giraud Decree.

THE JEWS AND THE UNDERGROUND IN ALGIERS: 1940–42

During the years 1940–42, many Jews joined the Resistance. A segment of Jewish youth in Algiers was determined to organize self-defense and underground activity. According to the personal account of Paul Sebaoun, an underground activist, a group of Jewish young men began, as early as 1940, to organize clandestinely at the Géo Gras sports club in Algiers whose owner was a non-Jew. Under the guise of sports activity, the club served as a façade for self-defense training. These men went out at night to paint the symbol of Free France and the letter V for victory on the walls of buildings throughout Algiers. They even purchased weapons (pistols and rifles) from Spanish smugglers, which they stored at the Club Géo Gras. As Sebaoun relates: "Nous utilisions des caches aménagées dans les murs, les planchers, sous le ring de boxe, tout cela à l'insu de notre ami Géo Gras."[53] These activists saw as their main enemies the militant supporters of the *Service d'Ordre Légionnaire* (the French version of the Nazi S.S.) and the *Parti Populaire Français*.

On October 22, 1942, American General Mark Clark arrived secretly at Cherchell on the coast west of Algiers and negotiated with senior representatives of the Resistance in order to coordinate military operations of the Resistance with the American landing in North Africa. The clandestine negotiations at Cherchell revolved around two critical, complementary efforts: 1) the Resistance would be responsible, with the aid of volunteers, for cutting Vichy communications at zero hour, for arresting pro-Vichy senior officials, and for taking over the headquarters of the Vichy Chief of Staff for North Africa; 2) the Allied forces would land commando units before the arrival of regular American troops in order to relieve the Resistance whose numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Vichy armed forces would preclude its holding the positions taken indefinitely.[54]

In order to accomplish the plans negotiated at Cherchell, eight hundred volunteers would be needed, Sebaoun observed. This emphasized the importance of local underground movements, such as the Géo Gras group who had direct and indirect contact with the Resistance leadership. Only six hundred men and youths agreed to cooperate with the Resistance operation. And only 377 actually turned up for action. Most of them were Jews (other sources indicate that of the 377 volunteers, 315 were Jews).[55] Of this Jewish majority, 132

were Géo Gras activists, known as Group B. They constituted the largest and most dynamic unit of volunteers.[56]

On the afternoon of November 7, 1942, British radio broadcast the code phrase: "Hello Robert, Franklin is arriving" (Robert was Robert Murphy, the special American representative at Algiers; Franklin was, of course, President Franklin D. Roosevelt). The volunteers and the Resistance leadership worked out the final details of their coup d'état at the home of a local Jewish professor, Henri Aboulker. Weapons were distributed to the volunteers. The operation began on the morning of November 8. The sources agree that due to the active participation of the 377 men of the Resistance, the mission to neutralize the administrative center at Algiers was accomplished.[57] Despite the presence of 11,000 (unprepared) pro-Vichy soldiers and thousands of S.O.L. legionnaires, the city was taken over before the Americans arrived. The activists themselves were surprised at their success, as Sebaoun indicates: "Que 377 hommes aient pu tenir pendant presque un jour tous les points stratégiques d'une grande ville comme Alger peut sembler incroyable."[58]

The action of the Resistance volunteers enabled the Americans to enter Algiers without having to engage in combat, and to put an end to Pétain's direct authority over the country.

CONCLUSION

Did the events of 1940–43 and those immediately preceding the War convince the Jews that France *in particular* had disappointed them, the same France that they had learned to respect since 1830? There are no simple answers. The arrival of the Jewish Agency's emissaries beginning in 1943 helped cultivate strong Zionist sentiments among segments of French-educated Maghribi Jewish youth. And the deteriorating political and economic conditions of Moroccan Jews, in particular, during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s eventually served as a catalyst for Jewish emigration to Israel. What finally led to the self-liquidation of these communities were economic and political factors not directly tied to the Vichy period and the anti-Jewish legislation. Only among the dynamic elite of the French-educated in Tunisia and Morocco were there those who preferred Palestine (and later Israel) over France as a result of the Vichy era. These people were by no means a negligible force, but they were not a homogeneous unit. Among them were also Socialists, Communists, and those who gradually came to support the idea of an independent or semi-autonomous North Africa and a Judeo-Muslim *entente* without France or with a very limited French colonial presence.

In Algeria, the Jews were more inclined to let bygones be bygones. Their faith in France, particularly Free France, was not shaken as a result of Pétain's laws or the German threat. The Zionists of Algeria, who were a precious few, did not turn their backs on France, although they did level certain accusations at her about the temporary deviation from the moral values of the French Revolution and "les droits de l'homme." They very much wanted France to remain in Algeria and the rest of the Maghrib and they feared the possibility of a Muslim Algeria, even though the root of their problems stemmed from France. Of the 250,000 Jews in Morocco and the 100,000 Jews in Tunisia (during the late 1940s and the early 1950s), many eventually settled in Israel. By contrast, of the 140,000 Jews in Algeria, only 10,000 in 1962 immigrated to Israel. The rest—who had of course regained their French citizenship in October 1943—preferred France. Neither an independent North Africa nor Zionism and the State of Israel constituted attractive alternatives to the *patrie adoptée*.

SPERTUS COLLEGE

NOTES

1. In 1940, there were approximately 100,000 Jews in Algeria (conquered by France in 1830), a similar number of Jews in Tunisia (a French protectorate since 1881), and 200,000 Jews in Morocco—divided in 1912 into French and Spanish Protectorates while Tangier became an international zone in 1923.

2. On these developments, see: Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during World War II* (Jerusalem, 1986) (in Hebrew), pp. 31–33.

3. On the pogrom of August 1933, see: Charles Ageron, "Une émeute antijuive à Constantine (août 1933)," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, (1973), pp. 23–40; Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during World War II*, pp. 22–24; Joseph Fischer, *Pogrome de Constantine: Rapport présenté à la Conférence juive mondiale de Génève (20–23 août 1933)*, Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem (CZA), S25/5217.

4. J.D. Mosseri, "Les désordres antisémites de Sfax à l'instar d'Aden," *Israël*, xiii année, no. 33 (12 août 1932), pp. 1–2.

5. J.P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism: 1912–1944* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 153,155.

6. Michael M. Laskier, *France, Palestine, and the Jewish Communities of North Africa during World War II (1939–1945)*, Tel Aviv University, Diaspora Research Institute, in press.

7. Elie Cohen-Hadria, "Les juifs francophones dans la vie intellectuelle et politique en Tunisie entre les deux guerres," in: M. Abitbol (ed.): *Judaïsme d'Afrique du Nord aux xixe–xxe siècles* (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 49–66; Michael M. Laskier, "From Hafsia to Bizerte: Tunisia's Nationalist Struggle and Tu-

nisian Jewry, 1952–61," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol 2, no. 2 (1986), pp. 188–222.

8. Muhammad al-Kholti, "Les israélites et nous," *L'Action du Peuple* (18 août 1933), p. 1.

9. On the work of the AIU, see: Michael M. Laskier, *The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862–1962* (Albany, 1983).

10. Léon Aranias à l'Alliance, Larache, 27 juillet 1939, Arch. AIU. MAROC, LXXIII, E. No file number.

11. Albert Saguès à l'Alliance, Tanger, 8 septembre 1936, Arch. AIU. MAROC, LX. E. 943 (e).

12. Ibid.

13. *La situation des Juifs en Zone français de l'empire chérifien: fin 1943*, CZA Z 4/10.266.

14. A. Cohen à l'Alliance, Safi, 18 décembre 1939, Arch. AIU. MAROC, XLVIII. E. 743.

15. *Bulletin Officiel du Maroc (BOM)*, 31 octobre 1940; "Le statut officiel des Juifs au Maroc: le dahir du 31 octobre 1940," *Bulletin de la Fédération des Sociétés Juives d'Algérie (BFSJA)*, 8ème année, no. 67 (février-mars 1941), pp. 14–15.

16. *BOM*, 8 août 1941; "Statut des Juifs Marocains," *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 73 (octobre 1941), p. 18.

17. David Cohen, "The Nature of the Implementation of the Anti-Jewish Legislation in Morocco Under Vichy in Accordance with New Documents from the Quai d'Orsay," in the *Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies*, Division B, Volume II (Jerusalem, 1986), p. 227 [in Hebrew].

18. M.Y., R.S., R.B. (Robert Benazeraf), *Rapport Confidentiel: L'application du statut des juifs et des dispositions raciales à la population juive du Maroc* (Fonds Institut Ben-Zvi, Jérusalem), pp. 16–18. Unpublished MS.

19. Ibid., pp. 13, 23–24. The report provides ample statistical data on the expulsion of Jewish students and educators.

20. Michael M. Laskier, *The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862–1962*, p. 183.

21. Roger Thabault, "Le Maroc à l'heure du Vichysme," *Les Noveaux Cahiers*, Vol 43 (hiver 1975–76), p. 17.

22. Lettre de Darlan à Vallat, Documents: Centre de Documentation Juive, LXXII—12 et XXVII12–41 et 330.

23. Claude Singer, "Servir la France - le journal de René Cassin à Londres," *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*, Vol. 81 (Eté 1985), p. 63.

24. H.Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leiden, 1981), Vol. II, pp. 324–325.

25. Past and Present Conditions of the Jews in Morocco: *From the Origins to the Advent of the French and Spanish Protectorates in 1912* (Report from November 1944) - submitted to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Commit (AJDC), AJDC Archives, Jerusalem, North Africa File/327.

26. Fritz Lichtenstein to the Jewish Agency, Tangier, May 3–17, 1944, CZA S26/1397.

27. Blandin, "La population de Tanger en 1940", *Revue Africaine*, Vol. 88 (1944), p. 97.

28. See source in footnote 26.

29. Charles Hamet, *La communauté israélite de Tanger*, Tanger 1951, unpublished MS. of C.H.E.A.M., p. 74.

30. See source in footnote 25.

31. See source in footnote 2.

32. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, Vol. II, p. 326.

33. "Décret du 30 novembre 1940 portant statut des Juifs en Tunisie: La nouvelle législation sur le statut des Juifs", *BFSJA*, 8ème année, n. 66 (janvier 1941), pp. 12–14.

34. "Mesures concernant la Tunisie: avocats défenseurs", *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 74 (novembre 1941), p. 12.

35. *Journal Officiel de Tunisie (JOT)*, 6 novembre 1941; "Mesures concernant la Tunisie: médecins", *BFSJA*, 9ème année, no. 76 (Janvier 1942), p. 16.

36. Nahum Yerushalmi, Tunis, to the Zionist Federation Organization Department in Jerusalem, June 15, 1941, CZA S5/795.

37. On important studies regarding Tunisian Jewry under the German occupation, see Yitzhak Avrahami, "Tunisian Jewry under German Occupation: Financial Matters," *Pe'amim*, Vol. 27 (1986), pp. 107–125 [in Hebrew]; Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during World War II, esp.*, pp. 115–124; R. Borgel, *Etoile jaune et Croix gammée: récit d'une servitude* (Tunis, 1944); Daniel Carpi, "The Italian Government and the Jews of Tunisia in the Second World War (June 1940–May 1943)," *Zion*, Vol. LII, No. 1 (1987), pp. 57–106 [in Hebrew]; Paul Ghez, *Six mois sous la botte* (Tunis, 1943); H.Z. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, Vol. II, pp. 140–143; Yaron Tsur, "The Jewish Communities of Tunisia during the Nazi Occupation", *Annual for the Study and Research on Contemporary Jewry*. 2 (1985), pp. 153–173 [in Hebrew].

38. See especially Avrahami, "Tunisian Jewry under German Occupation: Financial Matters," *Pe'amim*, Vol. 28 (1986), pp. 114–115.

39. David Chemla, "Quand l'allemand occupait la Tunisie, *La Voix Juive* (7 juillet 1944), p. 1.

40. Interview with Avraham Sarfati conducted by the Ghetto Fighters Museum Staff, June 24, 1968, Ghetto Fighters Museum Archives (GFMA)/ 50/01.

41. Interview with Yitzhak Avrahami, ibid.

42. Naftali Bar-Giora to this author, March 3, 1982.

43. "Revue de la jurisprudence: conservation des droits politiques du citoyen," *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 67 (février - mars 1941), p. 11.

44. "Revue de la jurisprudence: conservation des droits politiques du citoyen", *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 67 (février - mars), pp. 11–12.

45. Michel Ansky, *Les juifs d'Algérie du décret Crémieux à la liberation* (Paris, 1950), p. 166.

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47. "Mesures concernant l'Algérie sages femmes", *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 75 (Décembre 1941), p. 16.

48. *Journal Officiel d'Algérie (JOA)*, 25 novembre 1941; "Mesures concernant les biens, décret du 21 novembre 1941 étendant à l'Algérie la loi du 22

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49. Ibid.

50. "L'application du *numerus clausus* en Algérie (documentation officielle): instruction pour l'admission des élèves juifs", *BFSJA*, 8ème année, no. 83 (octobre 1942), p. 1.

51. "Sur le *numerus clausus*", *BFSJA*, 9ème année, no. 86 (mars 1943), pp. 10–11.

52. Elie Gozlan, "Des écoles, des collèges, des lycées!", *BFSJA*, 9ème année, no. 83 (octobre 1942), p. 1.

53. Paul Sebaoun, *La résistance juive algérienne*. Unpublished account, The Tabenkin Institute for the Study of the Zionist Movements in the Middle East and North Africa. I thank Yitzhak Avrahami for the use of this document.

54. Ibid.

55. Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during World War*, p. 106.

56. Sebaoun, ibid.

57. Sebaoun, ibid; Abitbol, p. 106; see especially Gitta Amipaz-Silber, *La résistance juive en Algérie: 1940–1942* (Jérusalem, 1986), pp. 77–79.

58. Sebaoun, ibid.