Nazi Propaganda toward French Muslim Prisoners of War

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Because of the strategic value of French North Africa for the Axis war effort, German authorities carried out extensive propaganda efforts among prisoners of war from that region. Special propaganda camps were established in Germany and occupied France to win over a select group of prisoners who, it was hoped, could later influence other prisoners. German propaganda stressed the power of German arms, affinities between Nazism and Islam, and French discrimination against Muslims, and exploited Muslim resentment over the status of Jews in French North Africa. Although the success of their propaganda efforts among the masses of prisoners was limited, the Germans did manage to recruit some spies and collaborators and to drive a wedge between the Vichy authorities and North African soldiers.[1]

At the time of the armistice with France on June 22, 1940, Germany held as prisoners of war some 90,000 to 100,000 non-European soldiers from the French colonial empire. Among these so-called "colonial prisoners" were approximately 65,000 North Africans and 16,000 to 20,0000 West Africans. Muslims, who constituted the vast majority of the prisoners, soon became the target of German pro-Islamic propaganda. Because of the strategic value of French North Africa for the Axis war effort,[2] German propaganda agents—most of them members of the Abwehr, the secret service of the Wehrmacht—focused on the prisoners from that region. They reached out to the West Africans in the summer of 1940, but soon, it seems, lost interest in them. At no point did they appear interested in soldiers from the other French territories. The propaganda was most intense between July 1940 and the summer of 1943, in the context of German military operations in North Africa.

This article analyzes the methods the Germans employed to win over French Muslim prisoners. On the basis of French and German documents, as well as individual memoirs, it gauges the success of the propaganda, and traces the official French reactions to the indoctrination of soldiers from the French colonies in North Africa. It argues that the Germans made a sustained effort to win over a core of North African prisoners by appealing to their sensibilities as Muslims. They hoped to form an anti-French and pro-German elite that would, upon release, spy for Germany and facilitate a German military penetration into the Maghreb. In

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tracing the methods and impact of German propaganda, it considers the influence of the experience of captivity on the Muslim prisoners' susceptibility.[3] The conclusion places the findings within the broader context of German designs on North Africa, Nazi pro-Islamic and antisemitic propaganda, and the implications for Muslim-Jewish relations in the Maghreb.

The content of German propaganda toward Muslims is relatively well known. In an article published in 1979, French historian Charles-Robert Ageron analyzed German propaganda in the Maghreb on the basis of materials held in the French National Archives. Ageron used transcripts of Arabic-language German radio broadcasts that were recorded and translated into French by the French postal and secret services, as well as a collection of newspapers and pamphlets in Arabic or Kabyle (a language spoken by much of Algeria's population) collected by the Vichy authorities. He found that, at different times, depending on the military situation, the main threads of Nazi propaganda were: (1) an insistence on the superiority of German arms and the inevitability of a German victory; (2) the assertion of an affinity between Nazism and Islam, often with a reference to the pro-German attitude of the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini; (3) a critique of French and British colonialism and a promise of German support for an improved status for North Africans, including perhaps national independence; and (4) an attack on Jews and Zionism, with an increasing tendency to depict the war as the plot of a Jewish-led alliance bent on destroying Islam and Nazism and creating a Jewish state in Palestine.[4] Ageron points out that consideration for Italy, Spain, and Vichy France muted some aspects of German propaganda and limited German support for North African nationalists, leading Hitler in February 1945 to bemoan what he considered to be a singular opportunity lost.[5]

The propaganda that Ageron summarizes closely resembles the messages described in Jeffrey Herf's book *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, although Herf focuses on the Middle East rather than on French North Africa.[6] Some of the radio broadcasts transcribed by the American envoy in Cairo, Alexander C. Kirk, and analyzed by Herf, are the same as those the Vichy services picked up and that Ageron considered. There was overlap also insofar as French colonial prisoners occasionally listened to Arabic-language broadcasts from Radio Berlin and received some of the newspapers and pamphlets that were distributed in the Middle East. French prisoners of war were interviewed for the radio during special tours of Berlin (although some later claimed that the interviews were recorded without their knowledge), and their messages about how well the Germans treated them were broadcast to North Africa and the Middle East.[7]

Regarding the methods of German propaganda, a great deal of information is available on German radio broadcasts and other news media in North Africa and the Middle East during the war. Ageron describes the German takeover of a French radio station (the former "Radio Coloniale," renamed "Paris-Mondial") and the

opening of a propaganda office in Paris. Both were staffed by North Africans, including some nationalist activists who had been imprisoned by the French.[8] Given the widespread illiteracy among Muslim North Africans at that time, German propaganda relied heavily on radio messages (in both Arabic and Kabyle) and on images in print media. Although radios were rare in North Africa, propaganda messages spread through a rumor mill known to the French colonial administrators as the *téléphone arabe*.[9] Jeffrey Herf traces a similar development of Arabic-language programs at Radio Berlin, where organizers relied on prominent collaborators who had fled to Berlin—namely the grand mufti of Jerusalem and the leader of the abortive pro-Axis coup d'état in Iraq, Rashid Ali Kilani. Sophie Wagenhofer, in her book on the image in Nazi Germany of Arabs, has rounded out the picture by analyzing the Arab-language newspapers and magazines edited by the German Propaganda Ministry and the German Foreign Ministry. Most relevant for the POWs were the newspapers *Barid as-sarq* (Orient Post) and *El Hilal* (The Crescent). A third, *Lisan al-asir* (Voice of the Prisoner), was published specifically for Arab-speaking prisoners and was printed by the commandant's office (Kommandantur) of the POW camp in Saint-Médard, outside Bordeaux.[10] According to a French General Staff report, these newspapers—especially the first two—spoke above all to the educated elite. For the mass of North African prisoners, the Germans distributed the richly illustrated magazine *Signal*, featuring photos from German campaigns and caricatures targeting Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Jews, with captions in Arabic and French.[11]

Ageron says little about the prisoners of war except that they were naturally less susceptible to German propaganda than Muslims who had no experience of being held captive by the Germans.[12] In a book on Muslim Algerians in the French army, Algerian-born historian Belkacem Recham echoes Ageron's point and places German propaganda in the context of the competing propaganda influences emanating from Communists, Algerian nationalists, and the French colonial authorities. Recham also provides more information on the engagement of Maghrebine soldiers, many of them former prisoners of war, in military units under German or Vichy French command. Among these units were the Deutsch-arabische Lehrabteilung formed in Greece for deployment in Egypt; the Phalange tunisienne and Phalange africaine, deployed in Tunisia in early 1943; and the Milice nord-africaine, used in anti-partisan operations in France in 1944. Despite these recruitment successes, however, Recham views the effectiveness of German propaganda among North African soldiers as rather limited, an outcome he ascribes mainly to the Germans' transparent instrumentalization of North African nationalisms.[13]

In her book *Prisonniers de guerre "indigènes": Visages oubliés de la France occupée*—which relies largely on Ageron and Recham—Armelle Mabon describes French authorities' reactions to propaganda aimed specifically at French Muslim POWs. The Vichy government screened escaped or released North African

prisoners in order to identify and arrest spies and collaborators and carried out counter-propaganda by providing food parcels and special privileges to ex-prisoners who reached the unoccupied zone. Mabon demonstrates that German propaganda deeply worried the Vichy authorities, who saw the preservation of stability and French rule in North Africa as a high priority.[14] In a similar vein, Martin Thomas outlines German propaganda efforts toward North African POWs, stressing the German authorities' appeal to nationalist circles in the POW camps and their recruitment of informers and collaborators. Thomas argues that the prisoners' prolonged inactivity and their disappointment over the racism and ineffectiveness of the Vichy authorities provided fertile ground for the propaganda. But like Mabon he concludes that few were won over in the end.[15]

Mabon and Thomas did not, however, consult the German documents available from the Foreign Office archive in Berlin, the Military Archives in Freiburg, or the collection of papers of the Military Commander in France (Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich, MBF) at the National Archives in Paris. Other sources that the works mentioned above did not explore are the rich materials in the Morocco section of the French Foreign Ministry Archives. With a view to guarding French sovereignty in the region, the resident general in Morocco and commander-in-chief for French North Africa, General Charles Noguès, collected documents on German propaganda; the records of his office even contain lists of names and addresses of POWs who had been identified by co-prisoners as collaborators or potential spies. The archives also preserved a forty-page report written by the French General Staff in October 1941.[16]

Much detailed information on German propaganda comes from prisoners' statements. Many prisoners—colonials as well as "white" French—took note of German propaganda efforts and informed the French authorities about them. The French secret service, the Colonial Ministry, the General Staff, and the various agencies responsible for prisoners of war perceived German propaganda as a vital threat to the French territories in Africa; in order to learn more about the propaganda and to counteract its effects, the Vichy police and secret service therefore set up three centers in the unoccupied zone (in Marseille, Châteauroux, and Clermond-Ferrand) where agents interviewed North Africans who had escaped or been released from camps in occupied France. By January 1942, these agents had interviewed more than five thousand North African ex-prisoners who had entered Vichy territory from occupied France.[17] In addition to gathering detailed information, these officials had established a collection of Arabic-language articles and pamphlets distributed to prisoners, among them transcripts and translations of radio broadcasts and newspapers such as *Voice of the Prisoner*.[18] German sources include information gathered by the Foreign Ministry as well as some Abwehr documents from occupied France.

North African and European prisoners, Frontstalag 184/Angoulême, 1940 or 1941 (before July 3, 1941). Courtesy of Dietrich Klose (www.historicmedia.de).

The German ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz, penned a set of guidelines specifically for propaganda aimed at Muslim POWs. Those guidelines appear to have been lost, but German propaganda provides hints about their content.[19] First, this propaganda often highlighted the French military's discrimination against Muslim soldiers, and argued that the French had stayed safely behind the lines in 1940 while sacrificing the colonial troops as "cannon fodder." Second, the propaganda suggested that Arabs could easily govern themselves and included many references to the pro-Axis King Ibn Saud and to North African freedom fighters such as Abd el Krim, who had led an insurrection against Spain and France in the Rif Mountains of Morocco between 1921 and 1926. Third, German propaganda often painted a gloomy picture of the risks of escape: the difficulties of reaching the Free Zone of France, the likelihood of being conscripted into a labor battalion by the French, and the poor economic situation in French North Africa. This last was important because North Africans were perceived as the most likely among the colonial prisoners to run away, and because the German Military Commander in France always faced a shortage of guard personnel.[20] Fourth, the Germans emphasized their respect for the religious needs of Muslim prisoners, for example by disseminating pictures of a mosque built for a POW camp near Berlin. Finally, German propaganda sought to fuel the prisoners' resentment over what many saw as the privileged status of Jews in North Africa. In Algeria, the Crémieux Decree of

1870 had awarded Jews the same rights as French citizens. Although the Vichy government abrogated the Crémieux Decree in October 1940, and although the French plenipotentiary in North Africa, General Maxime Weygand, passed discriminatory laws against Jews, the Germans continued to argue that North African Jews were using their connections to the French administration to earn profits at the expense of the absent Muslim servicemen.[21]

The propaganda apparatus of the German embassy in Paris relied on the assistance of the Austrian Egyptologist and Berber specialist Dr. Werner Vycichl (1909–1999), who directed the Maghreb broadcasts of Paris-Mondial and advised the MBF and the Embassy on Islamic issues. Vycichl, a highly accomplished scholar who taught at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), had a staff of North African collaborators and occasionally took them to interview North African prisoners and laborers in France. It seems that he did not speak publicly after the war about his activities in occupied Paris.[22]

Evolving German Policy

The first major act of German propaganda was carried out soon after the armistice and took the form of a drastic improvement in the treatment of prisoners. All prisoners, including the British and the white French, suffered greatly during the first weeks of captivity, but the treatment of the French colonial prisoners, and especially the black soldiers among them, was by far the harshest. During the campaign, German forces had massacred thousands of black prisoners, many of them Muslim. Abuses of black and, to a lesser extent, North African prisoners continued both as the men were conducted to transit POW camps, and after they had arrived in these overcrowded, under-supplied, and disease-ridden facilities. Almost half of the colonial prisoners were brought to Germany for a short time, where they were often received with insults and blows from German civilians provoked by the media and by local Nazi leaders. Warrant officer Édouard Ouédraogo from Burkina Faso, for example, had narrowly survived a massacre of black prisoners on June 5, 1940, and had witnessed extreme brutality on his way to the camp of Bathorn in northwest Germany. When he and the other prisoners arrived in Germany, civilians spat on them and threw stones at them. Yet, in late July, German treatment of French colonial prisoners suddenly changed. Ouédraogo reports that one morning during roll call, the camp commander appeared in front of the colonial prisoners. Speaking in French, he declared that the Africans' discipline had won them the respect of the German army; the men would return home after the imminent defeat of Britain and then work in peace with Germany. The commander then walked down the line of prisoners and looked every prisoner in the eye. Immediately thereafter, the rations for colonial prisoners improved. White French prisoners received the harsh work assignments previously reserved for the colonial prisoners, and colonial

prisoners were given leading roles in the camp police and access to the camp kitchen; the latter enabled them to participate in a lucrative food trade in the camp.[23]

Lieutenant Papa Guèye Fall, a Senegalese prisoner held in the Épinal camp in northeastern France, also noted a drastic improvement in the treatment of black prisoners at this time. He even received a visit from an Abwehr officer who told him about plans for a vast African colonial empire under German leadership. The officer asked him: "In that case, what will you do for us?"[24] Fall took advantage of a work assignment to a farm to escape and wrote to the French authorities about his encounter with the Abwehr officer.[25] A French NCO by the name of Lagout, writing shortly after his escape in early 1941, confirmed that the Germans adopted a "much more correct treatment" toward colonial prisoners and promised them that they would soon be able to return home. The Germans asked for information about French colonialism and told the colonial prisoners that they might soon fight against Britain (probably a reference to German-backed French plans to confront the British and Gaullist forces in Africa—plans that never came to fruition).[26]

German propaganda interests did lead to a drastic improvement in the treatment of black prisoners, as Ouédraogo and Fall noted, but the main target of propaganda from the start were the Muslim North Africans. The German orders privileging Muslim North Africans are lost, but they are reflected in the war diary of Lt. Col. Johannes Gutschmidt, who was highly placed as district commander of several German POW camps in the region of Orléans. Gutschmidt understood that the favorable treatment of North African prisoners contributed to German expansionist designs. On August 29, 1940, he noted in his diary in reference to some transfers of prisoners: "The Arabs—meaning the Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans—are supposed to be housed in special camps for political reasons. Apparently we want to keep [*sic*] the North African coast."[27] Gutschmidt regretted that the North Africans had to be treated particularly well for propaganda reasons because he (like several other German officers and guards) found the Blacks from West Africa to be much more disciplined, cooperative, and trustworthy than the North Africans. After the arrival of a train filled with North African prisoners, he grumbled: "Unfortunately the new arrivals are all Moroccans, the laziest riff-raff. And these Arabs, of all things, have to be treated particularly well according to a Führer order."[28] The privileging of North African prisoners has to be considered in the context of a German note submitted to the Vichy authorities on July 15, 1940, calling for the French to hand over air bases in Morocco. The request caused consternation in France, coming as it did so soon after the conclusion of the armistice. The Vichy government rejected it, and Pétain explained the decision in a personal letter to Hitler. The German government repeated the demand later on, but again to no avail.[29]

As Gutschmidt indicated, German propaganda efforts included the establishment of special camps in Germany for North African prisoners. Although Hitler had ordered that all non-European French POWs should be transferred back to France, presumably as a humanitarian gesture meant to house these prisoners in a milder climate,[30] an estimated one to two thousand North African POWs were secretly held back in Germany. The most significant propaganda facility was a subcamp of Stalag III-A Luckenwalde in the village of Großbeeren a few kilometers south of Berlin. French authorities soon received a stream of information about this camp. The aforementioned NCO Lagout, for example, found himself among North African prisoners from Luckenwalde when he was transferred to a camp in occupied France. These North Africans had been told that they were the only Frenchmen fighting in 1940, that France had sacrificed them by sending them with rifles against tanks, that French colonialism was abusive, and that the French army had paid them less than they paid white soldiers. Lagout noted that these prisoners were now being sent to various camps in France to spread the propaganda.[31]

An Algerian officer held in Oflag XI-A (Osterode) reported that a German lieutenant named Rokka, who spoke Arabic, one day asked him and a colleague if they would like to be transferred to a camp with a mosque. The two Algerian officers were then brought to Luckenwalde-Großbeeren, where they received excellent food and service (coffee at the bedside, buttered toast for breakfast). Every Saturday, a group of North African prisoners was taken for a tour of Berlin, and in the evening they had to report about their experiences for an Arabic radio program. In addition, the prisoners received newspapers edited by pro-German Arabs. Lieutenant Rokka asked the two Algerian officers whether they would like to work for Germany; they declined and were then sent to a camp in France. On their last evening in camp Luckenwalde, the Germans organized a party for them with roast lamb and North African dancers. A camera team recorded the event.[32] Another "graduate" of Luckenwalde provided similar information and pointed out that the key figure, aside from Rokka, was a German lieutenant by the name of Krebs, who spoke Arabic and French. Krebs took the prisoners to Berlin and introduced them to North African deserters. After several weeks, he sent the North African prisoners to camps in France, so that they would disseminate German propaganda.[33]

Krebs and Rokka, accompanied by an Algerian collaborator, also made several trips to the camps in France to select prisoners for a stay in Luckenwalde. According to the French General Staff report on German propaganda, several thousand Muslim North Africans thus received an "internship" in the camp, and the most deserving of them were selected for the tour of Berlin to see monuments, armaments factories, and fine restaurants, with photographers and radio reporters following them closely. After a few weeks, most of the prisoners were sent back to France. A few were brought to a German camp in Wollstein (Provinz Posen), where they were asked to teach Arabic to German officers. Still others were sent to a

secret Abwehr facility in Dijon where they were trained in the use of wireless transmitters. These prisoners were expected to return to their countries to work as spies for Germany; they were told that they would receive money and wireless transmitters via Spain and Spanish Morocco.[34]

Other camps in Germany also operated propaganda sections aimed at North African prisoners. After he was liberated in 1941, an Algerian soldier, Joseph Benevente, reported to a French officer that he had been exposed to German propaganda in Stalag IV-B (Mühlberg in Saxony). According to Benevente, the Germans promised that Germany would pay North Africans more than the French did and would treat them better once it took over North Africa.[35] French secret service agents also identified a group of Arabs from Stalag II-D (Stargard in Pomerania) who had received treatment similar to that of the North Africans in Luckenwalde. In the spring of 1941 the Arabs from Stargard were brought to a camp in France (Montargis) where they were supervised by a German officer who spoke Arabic; the Arabs enjoyed various privileges and ate with the guards.[36]

The Germans initiated intense propaganda efforts in the camps of occupied France as well. A detailed anonymous report by a prisoner whom I have identified as Léopold Sédar Senghor, a renowned poet and philosopher and later the first president of Senegal (1960–1980), mentions extensive German propaganda in the camp of Poitiers.[37] Senghor, who was held in the camp from October 1940 to November 1941, stresses that the propaganda was directed exclusively at the Arab population among the prisoners. Arab inmates received Arabic-language newspapers and were placed in privileged positions inside the camp—for example in the camp police. In Saint-Médard near Bordeaux, where Senghor spent November 1941 to February 1942, he found a less engaged German propaganda effort, though he noted that Arabic newspapers were available and that Arabs enjoyed many privileges there, too.[38] Brahim Ben Driss, an Algerian soldier who escaped from the POW camp of Joigny (Burgundy) in August 1941, reported to the French authorities that the Germans had tried to persuade the North Africans that France had led them toward a pointless slaughter. Ben Driss also saw a more pragmatic goal in the propaganda: the Germans were telling the North Africans that, given the imminent German presence in North Africa, an escape would not make sense.[39] In a similar vein, a repatriated Algerian prisoner reported that a German NCO had mingled with North African prisoners in France and told them that Germany would never allow the type of discrimination that North Africans were suffering at the hands of the French. Some of the North African prisoners, mostly NCOs themselves, had then agreed to become spies. They received instructions on how to use wireless transmitters and were asked to report to the Germans all troop movements in North Africa as well as any developments there regarding Jews.[40]

The Vichy intelligence services documented a broad range of more or less coordinated anti-French propaganda. After Rashid Ali Kilani's anti-British coup

d'état (later defeated) in Iraq, for example, the commander of the camp in Épinal assured the North African prisoners of German solidarity and encouraged them to throw off their own colonial yoke. In another camp, a German officer who spoke fluent Arabic asked Moroccan prisoners for their addresses and announced that he would visit them soon in Morocco. While traveling to camps in southwestern France during the summer of 1941, Lieutenant Krebs from Luckenwalde announced to North African prisoners that Germany would take over French North Africa after a final victory. Escaping from the POW camps made no sense, he went on, because the French planned to enlist the North Africans for forced labor anyway. The Vichy secret service believed that the Germans were grooming the North African prisoners used as camp police (these men are mentioned by Senghor and many other prisoners) to form the core of a pro-German police force; allegedly, the force was to be deployed in North Africa after a German takeover. They also heard repeatedly that German recruiters were trying to attract volunteers from among the North African prisoners for military service in the campaigns against the Soviet Union and Britain.[41] With the support of the Germans, Arab intellectuals with connections to the Algerian and Tunisian independence movements were speaking in favor of national independence in several camps.[42]

German secret service documents reveal special efforts to enlist imams and *marabouts* (religious leaders) who could explain contemporary events to the North African prisoners with a pro-German twist. The religious authority of these men and their role in leading religious services in the camps made them preferred targets for German propaganda recruitment. Confirmation for the German interest in religious dignitaries comes from a French document noting that the Germans had recruited students of religious schools in Fez, Marrakesh, and Tlemcen for propaganda work. The Germans also received unexpected assistance from the director of the Paris mosque, Si Kadur Benghabrit, who proposed to a German Embassy official that he would recruit and pay five or six imams from French North Africa who would travel to POW camps and perform religious services for French Muslim prisoners. According to German Embassy files, Benghabrit assured the Germans of his and the imams' willingness to speak to the Arab world on a Parisian radio station (probably Paris-Mondial) and on German radio stations. He also suggested that the imams chosen by him could from time to time go back to North Africa and report about their experiences with Germany. Thus, the same Benghabrit who, according to Robert Satloff's book about the Holocaust's reach into Arab lands appears to have hidden Jews in occupied Paris, made a thinly veiled offer to support German propaganda.[43]

Some German officers, moreover, gave North African students in France—many of whom considered themselves nationalists—access to colonial prisoners. A Captain Lölhöffel from the Bordeaux branch of the German Army's Propaganda Section was particularly active in this respect. He reported in May 1941 that he had

helped to set up an Arab committee consisting of students in Paris who organized aid shipments to camps in the Bordeaux region. Moreover, Arab medical students performed medical services in the camps while spreading German propaganda. Arab students also translated and wrote letters for the illiterate prisoners, voiced propaganda messages on sound recordings, and edited a prisoner newspaper in the camp at Saint-Médard (probably *Voice of the Prisoner*).[44] As Ageron has stressed, many Arab students at French universities had become strongly nationalist during the interwar years.[45]

One recurring theme of German propaganda was that the French did not want North Africans to be released from POW camps because they feared that they might instigate rebellions at home. According to a French general's summary report on German propaganda, for example, German agents told North Africans: "You were Frenchmen for fighting, for letting yourselves get killed, for becoming prisoners. You are no longer considered Frenchmen when it comes to liberation."[46] The Germans' release of 10,000 North Africans in December 1941 was therefore a spectacular propaganda coup. In reality, this measure was a reward for the French decision to recall their delegate general to the North African colonies, Maxime Weygand. General Weygand, while widely perceived as a collaborator, nevertheless staunchly opposed German bases in North Africa. In any case German officials used the release as an opportunity to engage in propaganda aimed at Muslim North Africans. French secret service agents had noted a marked increase of German propaganda activity in the months preceding the release.[47] The German embassy in Paris pointed out to the Foreign Ministry that the release "should be beneficial for propagandistic reasons" and "would at least to some degree contribute to an improvement of the mood in North Africa."[48] The release of the ten thousand was disturbing to the French authorities because, among other reasons, the Germans took all the credit for the measure and presented it to the ex-prisoners as a confirmation of the theory that Germany was a friend of Islam, whereas the French were not interested in liberations of Muslim prisoners.[49] Until the last moment, the Germans misled the French into believing that 6,500 North Africans along with 3,500 West Africans would be released (in some documents, the figures are 6,200 North and 3,800 West Africans), but they released only North Africans—the ones in whom they had the strongest propaganda interest.[50] The release action relied on the help of men in the camps who had won the trust of the German camp authorities. In Saint-Médard, for example, Senghor reported about a corrupt, anti-French prisoner by the name of Mohamed Bel Aïd. While working for the camp administration, Bel Aïd gave priority to his companions and demanded bribes for putting other prisoners on the release lists.[51]

A later release turned into a public relations disaster for the Germans, however. In April 1943, Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), suggested that all Tunisian POWs should be released as a

reward for the Tunisian population's support for the Axis troops in their country. This idea was leaked to the press, and French newspapers in May announced the impending liberation of all Tunisian prisoners, including the Muslims. French camp inspectors began telling Tunisian Muslim prisoners that they would soon be liberated. Yet, it suddenly became clear that the OKW meant only Tunisians of European descent, and, to make matters worse, it cancelled the action in mid-May. It is possible that the French POW authorities set a trap for German propaganda here by quickly announcing a "promise" to the colonial prisoners that the Germans were not committed to fulfilling. But even if there was no trap, the failed release of Tunisian prisoners was sure to undermine German propaganda efforts. The German embassy in Paris and the Foreign Office furiously protested to the OKW.[52]

The Effects of German Propaganda

How successful was German propaganda toward French Muslim POWs? With respect to the populations of the Maghreb, Ageron argues that many Arabs and Kabyles were receptive. He quotes, for example, a Tunisian man who said as late as July 1944: "Cut open the heart of an Arab, and you will find a little Hitler."[53] But Ageron stresses that the susceptibility of North Africans to German propaganda rested mainly on the expectation of national independence after a German victory. He notes that more specific messages, such as incitements to desert or to commit violence against Jews, seemingly had little resonance. Still, the anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist theme in German propaganda played a role in the French authorities' decision to delay the cancellation of Vichy's anti-Jewish laws after the Allied landings in North Africa; the cancellation, they feared, would alienate many Muslims.[54] With respect to the prisoners of war, as we have seen, Ageron and Recham argue that the propaganda was less successful, and Mabon and Thomas concur.

The contemporary evidence is mixed, however. Individual reports suggest that a strong minority among the North African POWs was receptive, especially during their first year of captivity. When the NCO Lagout tried to refute the German propaganda, for example, prisoners from Luckenwalde angrily responded that the Germans were more just than the French; they insisted that they would prefer to be ruled by the former. Lagout pointed out that the North African officers, and especially the Tunisians among them, seemed to be most susceptible to German propaganda.[55] The Algerian prisoner Benevente found the propaganda highly successful among the Tunisians, less successful among the Algerians, and largely ineffective among the Moroccans. Whereas the Tunisians were habitually performing the Hitler salute, Benevente heard two Moroccan prisoners say to a German agent: "If you come to Morocco, we will cut your throat."[56]

According to Senghor, the tensions among the prisoners, particularly between the North Africans and the West Africans, meant that German propaganda fell on fertile soil. In Poitiers, Senghor observed that many North Africans spoke ill of France

and accused the West African and Caribbean prisoners of Germanophobia. North African spies reported to the Germans plans for escape and denounced prisoners whose attitude was particularly anti-German. For example, Senghor's two best friends, the brothers Robert and Henri Éboué, sons of the Gaullist governor of French Central Africa, Félix Éboué, were among those prisoners who were punished after being denounced (the brothers were sent to different camps in the summer of 1941, although the documents do not disclose whether the transfers were part of a punishment).[57] Senghor also observed that when German recruiters asked for volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union, only Arabs signed up—especially the more educated among them. (Senghor mentions, however, that for unknown reasons the Arab volunteers remained in the camp.) Like others, Senghor distinguished between pro-French Moroccans and largely pro-German Algerians and Tunisians. But he saw the Algerians and Tunisians as opportunists rather than as real converts, and in this he expressed a French stereotype about North Africans: "German power obviously impresses them, and with their strongly developed common sense, they turn toward the stronger side, ready to betray it at the first opportunity."[58]

Édouard Ouédraogo, who had been in several camps in occupied France, including Saint-Médard, where Senghor was sent after Poitiers, also reported on powerful spying and corruption networks involving North Africans and some West Africans. He confirmed Senghor's accusations against the collaborator Mohamed Bel Aïd, for example.[59] Later, when Ouédraogo was on assignment in Paris as a member of the French resistance, he saw that many North African and a few West African ex-prisoners spied on colonial soldiers in the resistance and betrayed them to the Gestapo.[60]

The French military physician Hollecker (his first name is not documented) noted that the Algerians were initially very receptive to German propaganda but lost interest when they realized that a pro-German attitude would not necessarily lead to immediate liberation. The Tunisians, according to Hollecker, were least resistant to German wooing. Many of them marched in military formation while singing nationalist songs.[61] But even among the Tunisians, Hollecker found that a majority remained loyal to France, and he considered German propaganda completely ineffective among the West Africans and the Moroccans.[62]

On the basis of its interviews of released and escaped colonial prisoners, the French secret service tended to rate the effectiveness of German propaganda as rather low. It conceded that the Germans had won over some prisoners, particularly among the more educated and among students of religious schools. But according to the secret service, the Germans' ill treatment of the colonial prisoners at the beginning of their captivity remained an important obstacle to the propaganda. As a summary report written in July 1941 pointed out: "The majority of those who return retain the memory of the brutal acts of which they were the victims, the ill treatment they suffered, and the cruel acts they witnessed."[63] Half a year later, the

A West African and two North African prisoners, Frontstalag 132/Laval, 1941. Courtesy of Dietrich Klose (www.historicmedia.de).

secret service came to a similar conclusion: "The very large majority of returning prisoners seem little affected by this propaganda. As one of them said recently: 'The Germans would do better if they properly fed us and treated us decently rather than wasting their time with speeches.'"[64] In some camps the North African prisoners shredded the pro-German Arabic newspapers.[65]

The French General Staff report also concluded that most North African prisoners were unimpressed by German propaganda. Many of them had witnessed mass executions of black prisoners during the campaign and observed or suffered countless abuses in the weeks following. Although the ex-prisoners unanimously recognized the massive improvement in treatment in July 1940, they never forgot or forgave the brutality of the first weeks and, in the case of those who had been to Germany, "the insults and blows from the Teutonic populace."[66] Papa Guèye Fall and Édouard Ouédraogo, who both experienced the drastic change of treatment in the camps, were likewise unimpressed. Ouédraogo dismissed the sudden friendliness of the German commander as phony.[67] Yet, several secret service agents saw the Tunisians and the Algerian Kabyles as particularly open to German propaganda, and the General Staff report confirmed that the Tunisians were most susceptible, followed by the Algerians.[68]

Opinions were divided on the prisoners coming from special German propaganda camps. The French secret service admitted that the Luckenwalde prisoners had caused some damage after returning to occupied France.[69] Yet, a French physician involved in camp inspections argued in October 1941 that the few prisoners won over by the Germans had remained isolated: the other prisoners resented them because of the privileges they enjoyed.[70] The French General Staff took the targeted German efforts to woo the educated elites, especially the students of religious schools, very seriously, however. According to the General Staff report, the Germans knew that they

could not immediately bring the masses around, but they hoped to create a small but influential core of collaborators and spies who would help them control North Africa in the future. The General Staff therefore urged the local authorities to monitor potential collaborators closely after their return to North Africa.[71]

To be sure, these French assessments have to be read with caution as they were based on statements of ex-prisoners to Vichy interrogators. The ex-prisoners had a strong interest in stressing their pro-French attitude and in downplaying the success of German propaganda, not least because recognizing it was tantamount to treason. It is therefore hardly surprising that many prisoners highlighted the abuses they had suffered during the first weeks of captivity. Moreover, one has to consider that the Germans also released numerous spies and collaborators who would have wanted to join in the pro-French chorus when interacting with secret service or police officials.[72] Thus, despite the reassuring interrogation reports, the French government remained deeply worried about the corrosive effects of the German propaganda on French prestige within the colonial empire—prestige that had already suffered because of the defeat in 1940. Indeed, how easy would it be, in light of the Germans' emphasis on the inequality inherent in French colonialism, to integrate colonial ex-prisoners into a blatantly discriminatory colonial regime? To what extent would German propaganda spread across the French-controlled territories through returning collaborators and through prisoners' letters, given that many North African prisoners until November 1942 had some postal connections with their homes?

Vichy's Response to Anti-French Propaganda

The French government was worried enough to launch a series of countermeasures. Aside from screening North African ex-prisoners, they started their own propaganda, which focused on Marshal Pétain. French aid organizations included his picture in packages they sent to the camps, and they organized special deliveries of aid packages called "*colis du maréchal*" (the marshal's package). Prisoners received Pétain postcards with a caption in French and in their own language saying: "Follow me! Maintain your belief in eternal France!"[73] According to all accounts, Pétain was highly respected by most colonial prisoners. Even Senghor, who later declared that he was a Gaullist of the first hour, argued in 1942 that France had to launch a counter-propaganda campaign based on Pétain's prestige: "Pétain symbolizes France, and his portrait therefore is much venerated."[74]

But the French authorities soon concluded that in regard to the colonial prisoners, the best propaganda was to improve the conditions of captivity and to push for the liberation of as many prisoners as possible. This seemed particularly important in light of the Germans' efforts to persuade the colonial prisoners that France did not care about them. The French authorities' strategy involved persistent efforts by the Diplomatic Service for Prisoners of War under Special Ambassador Georges Scapini (also called the Scapini Mission) to induce the Germans to release all colonial

prisoners; the Scapini Mission also worked to improve conditions and supplies in the camps and admonished French prefects and mayors who did not seem sufficiently concerned about the conditions of the colonial prisoners held in their département or town.[75] In September 1941, for example, the Scapini Mission and the Colonial Ministry wrote in a memo to aid organizations that the purpose of their work was to ensure that colonial soldiers would go home and report that because of the aid they had received while they were in the camps, they had felt an intense bond with France.[76] In a memorandum from March 1943, the Ministry listed aid efforts for the colonial prisoners that it had sponsored, concluding: "It is indeed important from a higher point of view that the Indigenous have a very clear feeling that even in their present misery the French Government maintains its benevolence toward them."[77] The minister of colonies, Rear Admiral Henri Bléhaut, bluntly admitted that all aid programs were aimed at easing the reintegration of prisoners into the colonial regime after the war.[78] As late as 1944, Scapini asked French doctors to visit camps with colonial prisoners even if there was no medical reason for the visits. The doctors' contact with colonial prisoners was desirable simply because "it would show them that the French government is interested in their fate."[79]

Scapini was so worried about the effects of German propaganda on the colonial prisoners that he made a remarkable proposal to the German embassy in Paris in May 1942: he suggested the creation of a joint Franco-German newsletter for the prisoners, published in Arabic with a section in French for those who did not speak Arabic. Among other themes, the newsletter would stress Germany's respect for the French colonies and their peoples, advertise the anti-Jewish measures of the Vichy government in France and Africa, and emphasize the connection of British war aims with the "Jewish question." This last was a hint at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, a plan allegedly supported by the British. Scapini justified the need for such a newsletter by arguing that the colonial prisoners were beginning to blame both Germany and France for their situation and that their resentment thus required a joint Franco-German response.[80] The German embassy's contact man for POW questions, Albrecht Röhrig, found the project "very interesting," but there is no evidence that it came to fruition. Although the Foreign Ministry tended to be more sympathetic to Vichy than were other German agencies, its officials knew how awkward it would be, in light of previous propaganda, suddenly to ask the Muslim prisoners to respect French colonialism. Scapini, who on other occasions fought vigorously for Jewish POWs, was willing to jump on the German anti-Jewish propaganda bandwagon if the Germans would remove the anti-French sting from their propaganda toward French Muslims.[81]

There was only so much that the French authorities could do while the prisoners were in German captivity. It was therefore particularly important to give them a warm welcome after their release or successful escape. Following the German release of the 10,000 North Africans, a memo from the French War Ministry

offered guidelines on the reception of North African ex-prisoners: Arabic-speaking officials were to greet them at the demarcation line and take them to the interrogation centers, where they could send telegrams to their families, obtain extra tobacco and food rations, and attend welcome parties, theater performances, and Arab cafés.[82] Whether the welcome was always as warm as this memo required remains doubtful, however. A letter from a French general two years later complained that the ex-prisoners had not received adequate attention and that it therefore had not been possible to counteract German propaganda effectively.[83] It did not help that many released or escaped colonial prisoners could not be repatriated on short order and were instead integrated into labor battalions under French command, just as German propaganda had predicted; after the German occupation of the Southern Zone of France in November 1942, these ex-prisoners often found themselves working for their old masters again, this time under French command. This is what happened to Ouédraogo after he escaped from Saint-Médard. Assigned to a labor battalion of African soldiers under French command working for the Wehrmacht in the port of Toulon, he decided to escape a second time and to join the resistance.[84]

Still, French counter-measures seem to have yielded at least temporary success. By June 1941, the French secret service claimed that the discreet "propaganda" of the French Red Cross, which delivered meals of couscous to North African prisoners twice a week, was more effective than all German-edited newspapers and pamphlets.[85] The German Abwehr office in Bordeaux argued in January 1943 that, although German propaganda had resulted in some early successes, French counter-measures had largely neutralized them. On the basis of intercepted letters from prisoners, the Abwehr concluded: "It follows that defeated France succeeded through clever propaganda and a deft method of support for the prisoners of war in winning the confidence and affection of the colonial peoples more effectively than prewar France ever did."[86]

The Germans may have failed to win over the majority of North African prisoners of war, but they did succeed in recruiting a number of agents. Undoubtedly, some of the North Africans registered by the French as having escaped or as having been released on medical grounds were collaborators and spies, although it is possible that some of them agreed to work as spies simply in order to get home.[87] The German Foreign Ministry, for example, recorded a series of releases of Moroccan POWs in late 1942 and early 1943 for work as pro-German propagandists. As a Tunisian prisoner in Stalag IV-D (Thorgau) reported, Abwehr agents were drafting North Africans as agents and showing them how to fill out applications for transfer to France or release on medical grounds.

Similarly, the Germans assembled a group of Moroccan and Algerian ex-prisoners in Berlin for deployment as a "disruptive element" behind Allied lines, but it is not clear whether they were able to transport them to their homelands. They did not have a pressing need for Tunisians at this time because Tunisia was

occupied by German troops, and the Foreign Office was confident that a sufficient number of collaborators could be recruited from among the local population.[88] As late as July 1944, SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger proposed to Heinrich Himmler that the Germans intensify the recruitment of French colonial prisoners, especially Muslim North Africans, with the help of the collaborationist grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini. These prisoners would reinforce SS units deployed against French partisans. Ambassador Abetz supported these efforts, arguing that the colonial prisoners were foremost soldiers and would prefer to fight rather than to stay in POW camps.[89]

In some cases, the Abwehr recruited spies from among the colonial prisoners for more limited purposes, such as preventing escape attempts or monitoring prisoners' illegal contacts with the civilian population (for instance, the smuggling of letters and black-market transactions).[90] Given their corruption and gang-like jockeying for privileged positions in the camps, the spying networks observed by Senghor and Ouédraogo certainly belonged to the organizational framework favored by the Abwehr.

Jews and North Africans

Did German propaganda succeed in creating or fanning hatred of Jews among the Muslim North African prisoners? We have to consider that most Jews from North Africa, unlike the vast majority of Muslims, as a consequence of the 1870 Crémieux decree held French citizenship upon capture and initially were viewed as "Whites" with status equivalent to that of the European residents of North Africa. The abrogation of the Crémieux Decree in Algeria by the Vichy government does not seem to have had strong repercussions for German policy toward French POWs, although it is noteworthy that the Germans generally did not apply to Jews measures that benefited prisoners in any way (such as the decision to release the small number of white French prisoners left in the Frontstalags in France, and the release of World War I veterans and of fathers with large families).[91] Some North African Jews in the POW camps in occupied France were mixed in with the Muslims and were not recognized as Jews by the Germans, and there were also a few hundred Jews from mainland France who had been held back in these camps. Jewish prisoners were sometimes accused of corruption by Muslim prisoners, or became targets of resentment for other reasons.[92] In one case, the Abwehr noted that North African prisoners had become angry at the Jews in their camp; they believed that the camp was poorly supplied because of the presence of Jews.[93] A French police officer interrogating released North Africans reported: "The North Africans asked me whether Jews were still holding the leading posts in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. They were reassured when I explained to them the laws that hit [*sic*] the Jews [this was probably a reference to the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree and the passing of anti-Jewish laws in French North Africa]. The North Africans held the Jews

responsible for their misfortune."[94] The report by the French General Staff also mentioned that the Germans sometimes fanned anti-Jewish resentments among the prisoners by suggesting that Jews in North Africa had largely avoided fighting in the war and were making excellent profits at the expense of Muslims. The report suggested that this propaganda was effective because many Muslim North Africans resented what they saw as the privileged status the Jews in their homelands had held.[95]

While there are clear signs of resentment against Jews among Muslim North African prisoners, it is impossible to determine whether this feeling resulted from German propaganda in the camps or reflected prewar tensions in North African society, or both. Although historians of the Maghreb and of Jews in North Africa agree that the anti-Jewish measures implemented by Vichy triggered little enthusiasm among the Muslim population in the Maghreb, it is fair to say that some level of tension predated the war. Relations had become more tense, leading to occasional anti-Jewish riots, as in Constantine in August 1934.[96] Muslim attacks on Jews occurred under the Vichy administration, too. For example, Admiral Jean-Pierre Estéva, the French resident-general in Tunisia, reported to Weygand that returning North African soldiers had touched off massive riots against Jews in August 1940, and that he was worried about the effects of German propaganda on returning prisoners. But at the same time Estéva confirmed that the anti-Jewish legislation had not been received with great joy by the Muslims of North Africa.[97]

What should we make of the frequently observed susceptibility of Tunisians and, to a lesser degree Algerians, to German propaganda, as well as the relative immunity of Moroccans? First, German propaganda toward Moroccans appears to have been more muted than propaganda towards Algerians and Tunisians, probably out of consideration for Spain. Most of the northernmost region of Morocco was a Spanish protectorate. A too-obvious support for Moroccan independence would have antagonized Spain, for several years a strongly pro-Axis neutral. We must also consider recruitment practices in the three parts of French North Africa. In Tunisia and Algeria, many "indigenous" soldiers had been drafted. In French Morocco, however, there was no draft. All soldiers from Morocco were therefore volunteers, although one would have to argue that, as in other territories of the French empire, the "volunteers" often had no real choice: alternatives such as more or less coerced agricultural labor were worse.[98] Still, the susceptibility of North African prisoners to German propaganda seems to be related to the degree of coercion leading to their military service.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we may say that German propaganda toward French Muslim prisoners, although it contained elements typical of Nazi propaganda for the wider Arab

world, was surprisingly anti-French. In sharp contrast to the official policy of cooperation, German Abwehr agents worked hard to undermine French prestige, to foster Muslim resentment over discrimination in the French army and colonial administration, and to encourage nationalist strivings, particularly among the North African prisoners. The anti-French tone of German propaganda did not go unnoticed in Vichy: the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission, for example, lodged a protest over the German-edited Arabic newspapers' bitter denigration of France.[99] Clearly, the Germans were working hard to win over North African Muslim prisoners, particularly the elites, as future collaborators.

Yet, German propaganda included contradictory elements, at least over the long run. How would Germany establish a credible authority in French North Africa after having done so much to denigrate French colonialism and after having supported anticolonialist groups in the Maghreb? With no troops to spare (given Hitler's priority on defeating the Soviet Union) and with Vichy as a reliable partner when it came to defending its conquests against the British and Free French, why would Germany want to stir up unrest in Vichy's colonies (not to speak of the ramifications of such a policy for relations with Italy and Spain, both ambitious colonial powers in North Africa)? Perhaps there was some potential in inciting nationalist sentiment in the Maghreb with the hope that it would spread to Egypt and the Middle East—a region where Hitler felt he had missed his opportunity. This policy may have fit the desperate situation that arose for the German troops in North Africa at the end of 1942, but causing North Africa to become engulfed in nationalist uprisings could not have been conducive to future German domination.

German propaganda did have some appeal to North African prisoners, especially during the early part of the war. French Muslim soldiers, like many others, were thoroughly impressed by the German military power displayed during the 1940 campaign. Vichy officials pointed out, for example, that films about the German military successes, shown in several Frontstalags, made a strong impression on the prisoners.[100] But prolonged captivity and the declining fortune of German arms undermined this early propaganda success. As the Germans "rewarded" collaborating prisoners by letting them go, most famously within the framework of the release of the 10,000 North Africans, the prisoner population overall tended to become less pro-German. Moreover, German propaganda methods seemed to be designed mostly with large POW camps in mind. In those camps the distribution of Arabic newspapers was assured and formal religious services could be led by potentially pro-German religious men. The reality was that by the spring of 1941 the majority of colonial prisoners were working in widely dispersed labor commandos outside the big camps. Most of these work commandos were small (typically fewer than one hundred prisoners). They involved daily contact with French civilians, who were generally friendly and likely to neutralize pro-German propaganda. Work

commandos rarely received Arabic-language newspapers, and religious services were provided inconsistently.[101]

Altogether, pragmatic rather than ideological considerations seem to have been the most important determinant of French Muslim prisoners' susceptibility to German propaganda. Although conditions for colonial prisoners in the POW camps improved massively beginning in late summer 1940, captivity still was a bitter experience. Shortages of food and clothing, diseases, lack of contact with family, and lack of freedom were debilitating and demoralizing over the long run. Prisoners wanted to make life in captivity more bearable, and longed for liberation and repatriation. Some were willing to accept a degree of collaboration with the victors in order to reach these goals. Perhaps they also thought in terms of appeasing potential new colonial masters. The North African spying and corruption networks present in many camps reflect this pragmatic interest in making life in a POW camp more comfortable—not a "conversion" to a pro-German attitude. Germany made few friends among the Muslim POWs, perhaps because of the harsh—and in the case of the black prisoners, murderous—treatment of French POWs in the early period of captivity, and perhaps because the prisoners knew that they were still viewed with contempt by the Nazi media. Even the North Africans, who stood on a higher level of the Nazi racial hierarchy than Blacks, were viewed in this way.[102]

German propaganda helped promote North African nationalisms far more than it rallied support for Germany and its Führer, who allegedly loved Islam.[103] When German agents told the Muslim prisoners that the French paid them less and subjected them to various forms of discrimination, they spoke the truth—although the prisoners hardly needed German propaganda to point this out to them. While it is simplistic to say that African troops were used as "cannon fodder" in 1940, it is true that African troops took part in some of the bloodiest fighting and that many Africans had the *perception* that they had been sacrificed under the leadership of incompetent and confused French officers while many white French soldiers had surrendered without a fight. This notion, widespread among colonial prisoners, underpinned demands for recognition and equality.[104]

The Vichy regime, worried about the effects of German propaganda for its colonial empire, used its own sparse resources to improve the supplies of colonial prisoners. This step revealed the level of the regime's concern, as supplying the prisoners was properly the duty of the detaining power. But the consequence was that the blame for shortages and uneven distribution of goods fell squarely on the Vichy authorities. In closed negotiations, the Scapini Mission relentlessly demanded the liberation of all colonial prisoners (not least to protect them from German propaganda), and asked that they be considered by the Germans on par with white French prisoners. Advertising these efforts would have harmed its diplomatic efforts, however. The racism of some of its officials notwithstanding, the Vichy government has not received due credit for its efforts.

The Free French administration, initially without access to the Vichy secret service reports, was even more afraid of German propaganda and treated the colonial ex-prisoners with a callousness that alienated them further. The Free French tended to blame German propaganda for all difficulties with the reintegration of African soldiers into a barely reformed colonial regime, going so far as to see even the interaction of Africans with French civilians, especially women, as a deliberate German propaganda plot to sap the prestige of France. German propaganda was only one factor among many, but by highlighting it the Free French administration hoped to deflect attention from its own mistakes and failures.[105]

As we have seen, German propaganda attempted to take advantage of existing resentments against Jews among North African Muslims. The situation in Palestine played a less prominent role in these efforts than did the prewar status of Jews in North Africa, which made French citizenship, education, and higher office more accessible to Jews than to Muslims. The anti-Jewish measures of the Vichy government, which Weygand applied to North Africa with a particularly sharp edge, may therefore have undermined the effectiveness of the anti-Jewish elements in German propaganda. It is unclear, however, to what extent Muslim prisoners were aware of the measures, and if they were, whether they cared. The riots of demobilized soldiers in August 1940, as described by Admiral Estéva, demonstrate that German propaganda in POW camps was not necessary to inspire violence against Jews in North Africa.

Concerning the larger implications of German propaganda for French Muslim prisoners, we may say that the German army, had it been able to occupy French North Africa (more than just Tunisia, which the German Army held from November 1942 to May 1943), might well have been able to rely on the services of collaborators recruited from among French Muslim prisoners. These prisoners had been carefully groomed by a propaganda apparatus that drew on significant resources and employed North Africans from both within and outside the POW camps, including promising scholars, nationalist students, and Muslim clerics. A German occupation of the Maghreb, supported by these collaborators, would have had fearful consequences for North African Jewry.

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Notes

1. This article is an expanded version of a conference paper presented at the thirty-fifth German Studies Association (GSA) meeting in Louisville, Kentucky in September 2011. I

want to thank the two anonymous readers for *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* as well as Jeffrey Herf, the panel commentator at the GSA conference, for their helpful advice. Ethan Katz generously sent me the relevant chapters of his dissertation on Jews and Muslims in France and made thoughtful comments on a draft of this article. The research for this article was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Division at Colby College as well as a Franklin Grant from the American Philosophical Society. The latter allowed me to explore the experience of Léopold Sédar Senghor in more depth.

2. This strategic value rested in part on German hopes for bases on the Atlantic coast from Morocco to Senegal (requested for the first time in July 1940, but to no avail) and in part on the proximity of French North Africa to Libya, where German troops were fighting from February 1941 through early 1943. For the former, see Norman J.W. Goda, *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998); for the latter, see Christine Levisse-Touzé, *L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre, 1939–1945* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 113–14.

3. The literature on prisoners of war has rapidly expanded in the last fifteen years and has explored many aspects of the experience of captivity. See, for example, Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, eds., *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II* (Oxford and Washington, DC: Berg, 1996); Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad, eds., *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 2005); S.P. MacKenzie, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II," *The Journal of Modern History* 66, no. 3 (1994): 487–520; S.P. MacKenzie, *The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Rüdiger Overmans, "Die Kriegsgefangenenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1939 bis 1945," in *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2005).

4. Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb face à la propagande allemande," *Revues d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale* 29, no. 114 (1979): 30–32.

5. Ibid., 39.

6. Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009).

7. Note of Commissaire Fau, Tlemcen, 29 September 1941, based on the statements of a Lieutenant Meriouah, Archives nationales, site de Paris (henceforth: AN), F9, 2892 and 2276. See also Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, *Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 64, available in English as *Nazi Palestine* (New York: Enigma Books in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2010).

8. Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 18–20; Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 54.

9. News and rumors were shared in cafés, baths, markets, and the weekly women's assemblies in cemeteries. Horse traders and wandering artisans then brought the "news" to the countryside. Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 14.

10. For examples, see Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), Deutsche Botschaft Paris, vol. 1204: Deutsches Propagandamaterial in arabischer Sprache; the dossiers

with propaganda materials in AN, F9, vols. 2345 and 2892; and Sophie Wagenhofer, *"Rassischer Feind"—politischer Freund? Inszenierung und Instrumentalisierung des Araberbildes im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2010), 72–95.

11. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," by Etat-Majeur de l'Armée, 6 October 1941, pp. 8–9; and Estéva to Weygand, 12 December 1940, both in Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE), La Courneuve, Sous-série M, Maroc, vol. 47.

12. Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 19. For a similar opinion, see Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa*, 54.

13. Belkacem Recham, *Les musulmans algériens dans l'armée française (1914–1945)*, 139–74. A more recent article by Recham on North African prisoners of war summarizes the same points while applying them also to Moroccans and Tunisians: "Les indigènes nord-africains prisonniers de guerre (1940–1945)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 56, no. 223 (2006): 109–25.

14. Armelle Mabon, *Prisonniers de guerre "indigenes": Visages oubliés de la France occupée* (Paris: La Découverte, 2010), chapter 9.

15. Martin Thomas, "The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War, 1940–1944," *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 4 (2002): 670–75. A brief summary appears in Martin Thomas, "Le Gouvernement de Vichy et les prisonniers de guerre coloniaux français (1940–1944)," in *L'empire colonial sous Vichy*, ed. Jacques Cantier and Éric Jennings (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 2004), 312–13.

16. MAE, Sous-série M, Maroc, vol. 47. Levisse-Touzé briefly refers to some materials from this collection: Levisse-Touzé, *L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre*, 109–10.

17. "Note de renseignements," 26 January 1942, in AN, F9, 2892.

18. These papers are collected in two boxes at the French National Archives in Paris: F9, 2892 and 2345. These documents might not have been available yet to Ageron in the 1970s, but they partly overlap with his sources and with the materials reported by U.S. Ambassador Kirk, as cited in Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*.

19. Bran to Schleier (General Consul, German Embassy in Paris), 6 May 1941, in PAAA, R 67003. In this letter, Dr. Fritz Bran of the Foreign Office alludes to a set of guidelines formulated by Abetz.

20. On the propensity of North Africans to escape, see Raffael Scheck, "French Colonial Soldiers in German Prisoner of War Camps, 1940–1945," *French History* 24, no. 3 (2010): 426. For the shortage of guard personnel, see the reports (Lageberichte) of the Militärbefehlshaber, online at the site of the Institut de l'histoire du temps présent, http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/prefets/, especially the reports from September 1940 to June–July 1941 (accessed April 24, 2012).

21. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 12. For an elaboration of the third point, see Wagenhofer, *"Rassischer Feind, "* 72–95. On the Crémieux Decree and anti-Jewish legislation, see Michael M. Laskier, *North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: The Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria* (New York and London:

New York University Press, 1994), 76–81; and Robert Satloff, *Among the Righteous: Lost Stories from the Holocaust's Long Reach into Arab Lands* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 105–106.

22. See the dossier "Rundfunkpropaganda Nordafrika," in PAAA, Botschaft Paris, 1116b; and Peter Rohrbacher, "Werner Vycichl" (2010), online at Geschichte der Afrikanistik in Oesterreich, www.afrikanistik.at/personen/vycichl_werner.htm (accessed August 15, 2012). Rohrbacher says that almost nothing is known about Vycichl's wartime activity. The personnel file on Vycichl, held in the German Foreign Ministry archives, will become accessible only in 2029.

23. Édouard Ouédraogo, "Composition française," Service historique de la défense, Vincennes (SHD), 5 H 16, p. 4.

24. "Rapport d'évasion du Lt. de la réserve Fall, Papa Guèye," in SHD, 34 N 1090.

25. Guèye to Buhrer, 14 January 1941, in AN, F9, 2276; and "Renseignements donnés par le Lieutenant de réserve Fall Papa Gueye évadé du camp d'Epinal le 2 janvier 1941," in AN, F9, 2345.

26. Ministre de l'Intérieur to Sec. de la Guerre, 16 February 1941, in AN, F9, 2356 (also in F9, 2892). Lagout belonged to the 3rd Algerian Infantry Regiment (3ème Régiment de tirailleurs algériens).

27. Johannes Gutschmidt, *Kriegstagebuch 1940–1944*, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BA-MA), Nachlass Gutschmidt, MSG 1/257, entry of 29 August 1940. For biographical information on Gutschmidt, see Christian Hartmann, "Massensterben oder Massenvernichtung? Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im 'Unternehmen Barbarossa': Aus dem Tagebuch eines deutschen Lagerkommandanten," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49, no. 1 (2001): 97–158.

28. Gutschmidt, *Kriegstagebuch*, entries of 20 July and 21 August 1940. For an example of a similar assessment of diligent "Neger" versus lazy "Nordafrikaner," see Wagenhofer, *"Rassischer Feind,"* 85n200.

29. Goda, *Tomorrow the World*, 21–23; Levisse-Touzé, *L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre*, 94–5; Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 61.

30. Press clipping, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 19 September 1940, in National Archives, RG 84, Diplomatic Posts: Germany. Prisoner of War Section Correspondence, 1940–1941, UD Entry 24, Box 2.

31. Ministre de l'Intérieur to Ministre, Secrétaire de la Guerre, 16 February 1941, including the report by Lagout, in AN, F9, 2356 and also in 2892. Uwe Mai, *Kriegsgefangen in Brandenburg: Stalag III A in Luckenwalde 1939–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 1999), does not mention this propaganda camp, which was kept secret, but Wagenhofer has found pictures of it—including photos of the mosque. See *"Rassischer Feind,"* 89–92.

32. "Fiche de renseignements," n.d., in AN, F9, 2276 and 2892.

33. "Renseignements. Le Stalag III A à Luckenwald [*sic*]," 22 July 1941, in AN, F9, 2276. The French General Staff report argued that Krebs and Rokka were one and the same

person, but prisoners' accounts describe them as separate. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," annexe III, p. 1.

34. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 11–12; and annexe III, pp. 1–2.

35. Rapport du Maréchal des Logis Chef Leveugle, 3 October 1941, in AN, F9, 2276. Judging by his last name, Benevente may have been an Algerian with Italian roots. Since the Germans usually distinguished between Algerians of European descent and "native" Algerians by looking at the skin color, many people ended up in the "wrong" category. Quite a few Muslim Algerians passed for white French prisoners and remained in Germany even though Hitler had ordered in the summer of 1940 that all non-European prisoners should be kept in France. For an example, see Note "Cabinet," 15 October 1942, and Rosenberg to Scapini, 14 April 1942, both in AN, F9, 2277, as well as SDPG, Délégation de Berlin, to Auswärtiges Amt, Kulturpolitische Abteilung, Referat Lilienthal, 29 July 1943, PAAA, R 67003.

36. "Note de renseignements," 28 June 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

37. After extensive research, I was able to corroborate my initial impression that Senghor wrote this anonymous report, which I then released to the press: See Benoît Hopquin, "Un document inédit de Léopold Sédar Senghor," *Le Monde* 67, 17 June 2011, and Nicolas Michel, "Senghor: Le manuscrit inconnu," *Jeune Afrique* 51, no. 2637 (24 July 2011): 22–31 (with the full text of the report).

38. "Compte-rendu de captivité établi par un prisonnier indigène récemment libéré," 7 July 1942, in AN, F9, 2345, and also in SHD, 2 P 70.

39. "Fiche de renseignements," no date, in AN, F9, 2276 and 2892.

40. "Rapport du capitaine Campan, commandant la Section Bône," 12 February 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

41. Dossier "Propagande antifrançaise auprès des prisonniers Nord-Africains," specifically "Note de renseignements" of 26 July, 9 and 23 August, and 6, 15, and 29 September 1941, all in AN, F9, 2345.

42. "Note de renseignement," 16 May 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

43. "Kommandanturbefehl 14/42," 10 March 1942, in AN, F9, 3657. "Note de renseignement," 15 April 1941, in AN, F9, 2892. On Benghabrit: Note of Rudolf Schleier, 8 February 1941, in PAAA, R 40747, Völkerrecht-Kriegsrecht. Marokko; Compte-rendu 9 and 10 octobre 1942, in AN, F9, 2177, and de Calan (Comité central d'assistance aux prisonniers de guerre) to Scapini, 1 April 1941, in AN, F9, 2356; and Satloff, *Among the Righteous*, 141–58. Wagenhofer offers a more critical perspective on Benghabrit, depicting him essentially as a collaborator and pro-German propagandist. See *"Rassischer Feind,"* 87–88. For a nuanced evaluation of Benghabrit, see Ethan Katz, "Did the Paris Mosque Save Jews? A Mystery and Its Memory," *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 102, no. 2 (2012): 256–87.

44. "Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Propaganda-Staffel Bordeaux an Militärbezirkschef Bordeaux," 20 May 1941, in PAAA, Paris 2403: Verbindung des AA zu den Wehrmachtstellen 1940–42.

45. Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains en France durant l'entre-deux-guerres: Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes maghrébins," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 70, no. 1/2 (1983): 25–56.

46. "Note de renseignements," 25 November 1941, and General Boisseau to Secrétaire d'État à la Guerre, Chateauroux, 1 October 1941, both in AN, F9, 2892. This argument had some plausibility because the Germans had liberated all white POWs remaining in the camps in occupied France (with the exception of officers, translators, and medical personnel) on 3 July 1941. This was a German decision, but the colonial prisoners widely believed that the Vichy government was responsible for it. See Scheck, "French Colonial Soldiers in German Prisoner of War Camps, 1940–1945," 438–9, and Scheck, "The Prisoner of War Question and the Beginnings of Collaboration: The Franco-German Agreement of 16 November 1940." *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 2 (2010): 381–82.

47. Note de renseignements," 25 November 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

48. Schleier (Embassy Paris) to Auswärtiges Amt, 30 October 1941, in PAAA, R 67003. See also Wagenhofer, *"Rassischer Feind, "* 92–95, although she misinterprets the transfer of non-European POWs to France as release.

49. "Note de renseignements," 25 November 1941, in AN, F9, 2892. The French authorities were also concerned about having to screen so many ex-prisoners in a short time, especially in light of the fact that the Germans had mixed some collaborators and spies into the group: "Note de renseignement No. 8995/5," in MAE, Sous-série M, Maroc, vol. 47.

50. For background on the negotiations, see Scheck, "French Colonial Soldiers," 439–40; and Scheck, "The Prisoner of War Question," 382. Many secondary sources use the erroneous numbers that included West African prisoners.

51. "Compte-rendu de captivité établi par un prisonnier indigène récemment libéré," 7 July 1942, in AN, F9, 2345. Bel-Aïd was so notorious and corrupt that he triggered a German investigation shortly after Senghor's release and figured on Noguès' list of suspected collaborators (which pointed out that he had not wanted to be released): Inspection report of Camp des As (Frontstalag 221) by Dantan Merlin, 26 February 1942, in AN, F9, 2356; and Préfet d'Alger to Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie, 17 February 1942, MAE, Sous-série M, Maroc, vol. 47.

52. See the dossier "Geplante Entlassung aller tunesischen Kriegsgefangenen, April–Mai 1943," in PAAA, R 67003. This correspondence shows massive confusion. In one note, somebody pencilled in "the white French" before "prisoners with Tunisian parents" in a telegram (Rahn to Auswärtiges Amt, 12 April 1943), and in later correspondence, only prisoners from Tunis itself are mentioned (telegram, Schleier, Paris, 19 May 1943).

53. Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 35. See also Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa*, 55.

54. Benjamin Stora, *Les trois exils Juifs d'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions Stock, 2006), 97–100; Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 32; Levisse-Touzé, *L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre*, 305.

55. Ministre de l'Intérieur to Ministre, Secrétaire de la Guerre, 16 February 1941, including the report by Lagout, in AN, F9, 2356 and also 2892.

56. Rapport du Maréchal des Logis Chef Leveugle, 3 October 1941, in AN, F9, 2276.

57. Files of Robert and Henri Éboué, Bureau des archives des victimes des conflits contemporains (BAVCC), Caen; Michel, "Senghor: Le manuscrit inédit," 26 (the original document contains a typo: "the brothers EBONE" instead of Éboué).

58. "Compte-rendu de captivité établi par un prisonnier indigène récemment libéré," 7 July 1942, in AN, F9, 2345.

59. He stressed that these West Africans were from the Fulani group (*Peuls* in French), a people of originally nomadic shepherds on the southern rim of the Sahara who had less attachment to the French colonial administration than the other peoples of French West Africa, and were probably also less connected to these peoples. Mentions of corruption networks based on ethnic kinship appear in many other documents as well, often in the context of tensions between privileged North Africans and exploited West Africans. See, for example, the collective letter of West African prisoners to Comité Algérien d'Assistance aux Prisonniers de guerre, 9 March 1942, in AN, F9, 2356.

60. Édouard Ouédraogo, "Composition française," SHD, 5 H 16, pp. 5 and 7.

61. Another report confirms that the Germans encouraged the singing of nationalist songs, for example of the Tunisian Destour movement: General Laurent (Comité d'Assistance aux Prisonniers de guerre de la Gironde) to Scapini, 21 March 1941, in AN, F9, 2356.

62. Hollecker, "Rapport sur la capture et la captivité," in SHD, 34 N 1097.

63. "Note de renseignements," 21 July 1941, in AN, F9, 2345. Ageron argues that civilians in North Africa and North African workers in France and Tunisia were therefore more receptive to the propaganda than prisoners of war. "Les populations du Maghreb," 19.

64. "Note de renseignements," 12 January 1942, in AN, F9, 2892.

65. "Note de renseignements," 9 August 1941, in AN, F9, 2345.

66. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 17.

67. "Rapport d'évasion du Lt. de la réserve Fall, Papa Guèye," in SHD, 34 N 1090, and Édouard Ouédraogo, "Composition française," SHD, 5 H 16, p. 4.

68. "Note de renseignements," 28 June 1941 and "Note de renseignements," 25 November 1941 (both in AN, F9, 2892); and "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 16, 17.

69. "Note de renseignements," 5 January 1942, in AN, F9, 2892.

70. "Note pour l'Ambassadeur. Compte-Rendu de ma visite au Ministère des Colonies et dans les différents services coloniaux," 24 October 1941, in AN, F9, 2276.

71. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 18.

72. Simon Kitson, *The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 30, 103–104. French interrogations occasionally led to the arrest of North African spies. See "Note de renseignements," 26 January 1942, in AN, F9, 2345, and Paul Paillole, *Fighting the Nazis: French Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1935–1945* (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 211.

73. This example is from a postcard for Indochinese prisoners from Christmas 1943; in "Comité Lacaze," AN, F9, 2965. The quotation is from a famous speech on 30 October 1940 in which Pétain announced the policy of collaboration.

74. "Compte-rendu de captivité établi par un prisonnier indigène récemment libéré," 7 July 1942, in AN, F9, 2345.

75. For examples, see Scheck, "French Colonial Soldiers," 432–34, 437; and Scheck, "The Prisoner of War Question," 376–77.

76. "Comité d'assistance aux PG nord-africains," in AN, F9, 2351.

77. Gouverneur des colonies, le Directeur du Cabinet Demougeot, 18 March 1943, in AN, F9, 2966.

78. L'amiral, secrétaire d'état à la marine et aux colonies [Henri Bléhaut] to Mr. le Général, Directeur du Service des Prisonniers de Guerre, 7 August 1943, in AN, F9, 2966.

79. Scapini to Capitaine Segond, 26 January 1944, in AN, F9, 2276.

80. Scapini to German Embassy, 21 May 1942, in AN, F9, 2581, and "Objet: Feuille d'information destinée aux PG de couleur et nord-africains," in AN, F9, 2276. Scapini's idea appealed to the rhetoric employed by some Foreign Office personnel, such as the notorious Dr. Bran, about a future German-French or "European" colonial administration in French Africa.

81. For Scapini's engagement on behalf of Jewish prisoners, see, for example, the dossier "Prisoners of War, French. Jews," in Hoover Institution Archives, Scapini Papers, box 11.

82. "Note pour le cabinet du Ministre," Secrétaire Général à la guerre, Vichy, 24 December 1941, in SHD, 2 P 78, dossier 3.

83. "Note pour l'état major de l'armée, par le Général Revers," Vichy, 1 December 1943, in SHD, 2 P 78, dossier 3.

84. Édouard Ouédraogo, "Composition française," SHD, 5 H 16, p. 4.

85. "Note de renseignement," 28 June 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

86. Abwehrnebenstelle Bordeaux, 23 January 1943, AN, F9, 3657.

87. Pierre Dourasso to Scapini, 20 December 1943 and "Herrn Sethe von Dr. Bran," undated, both in PAAA, R 67003 F 301 d Farbige Truppen. Kolonialbeamten; and "Rücksendung von eingeborenen Nordafrikanern aus Kriegsgefangenenschaft zu politischen Zwecken," Memorandum of Rudolf Schleier (Consul General), Paris, March 7, 1943, and notes by von Rantzau on a discussion with the OKW, March 16, 1943, both in Nachlass Höpp, Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin, 01.02.005 (source: PAAA, R 60660).

88. Berger to Reichsführer-SS, 14 July 1944, in Nachlass Höpp, 01.16.052.

89. Ageron, "Les populations du Maghreb," 19n33. Kitson, *The Hunt for Nazi Spies*,103–104.

90. "Geschäftsverteilungsplan," Chartres, 5 July 1943, in AN, F9, 3657.

91. "Stalag XVII A," in AN, F9, 2810 (Dossier "Stalags").

92. For examples, see anonymous prisoners to president of the Red Cross in Paris, 1 December 1941; and Mohamed ben Amara to Service diplomatique des prisonniers de guerre, 2 December 1943, both in AN, F9, 2351.

93. Abwehrnebenstelle Bordeaux, Allgemeiner Inhalt der Kgf.-Post im Monat Februar 1943, 18 March 1943, in AN, F9, 3657.

94. Azario, secrétaire de police, to Cmdt. Lassalle, Lyon, 25 December 1941, in AN, F9, 2892.

95. "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 5.

96. Ethan Katz, "Jews and Muslims in the Shadow of Marianne: Conflicting Identities and Republican Culture in France (1914–1975)," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2009), 122–26; Stora, *Les trois exils Juifs d'Algérie*, 62–63; Michael M. Laskier, "Between Vichy Antisemitism and German Harassment: The Jews of North Africa during the Early 1940s," *Modern Judaism* 11 (1991): 344–45; David Cohen, "Les nationalistes nord-africains face au sionisme (1929–1939)," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 77 (1990): 5–30; Joshua Cole, "Antisémitisme et situation coloniale pendant l'entre-deux-guerres en Algérie: Les émeutes antijuives de Constantine (août 1934)," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 108 (October 2010): 3–23. Many historians consider the virulent antisemitism present within the European population in North Africa and other social factors to be decisive in the deterioration of Jewish-Muslim relations in French North Africa. Cole highlights the effects of polarizing electoral reforms, while Laskier and Cohen also see the unrest in Palestine as a contributing factor.

97. Estéva to Weygand, 12 December 1940, in MAE, Sous-série M, Maroc, vol. 47. For another instance of violence against Jews, see Daniel Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia* (Hanover, NH, and London: Brandeis University Press, 1994), 212–13.

98. Driss Maghraoui, "Moroccan Colonial Soldiers: Between Selective Memory and Collective Memory" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (1998): 21–42; Recham, *Les Musulmans algériens*, 65–67; and Thomas, "The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War," 671.

99. Alfred Costes, ed., *La délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d'armistice: Receuil de documents publié par le gouvernement français* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1947–1959), 5:92.

100. Note de Renseignements, 5 January 1942, in AN, F9, 2892. It should be noted that film projectors were available only in the main camps, whereas the majority of the prisoners were assigned to smaller work commandos.

101. For the situation in the work commandos, see Scheck, "French Colonial Prisoners of War," 426, 430–32.

102. Wagenhofer, *"Rassischer Feind,"* 43–61. See also the broader treatment of this issue in Eberhardt Kettlitz, *Afrikanische Soldaten aus deutscher Sicht seit 1871: Stereotype, Vorurteile, Feinbilder und Rassismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007).

103. The French General Staff report paraphrased a German propaganda line about Hitler: "Is he not the best friend of Muslims, whose religion he adores and whose beliefs he

respects?!" in "L'Action allemande auprès des prisonniers musulmans nord-africains," 7. On the hypocrisy of Hitler in this matter, see also Mallmann and Cüppers, *Halbmond und Hakenkreuz*, 43–44, as well as Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, 15–17.

104. Thomas, "The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War," 668; Scheck, "French Colonial Prisoners of War," 439.

105. See Scheck, "Les prémices de Thiaroye: L'influence de la captivité allemande sur les soldats noirs français à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale," in *French Colonial History* 13 (2012): 73–90; and Scheck, "French African Soldiers in German POW Camps, 1940–1945," in *Re-Centering Africa in the History of the Second World War*, ed. Judith Byfield, Carolyn Brown, Tim Parsons, and Ahmad Sikainga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).