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THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF JEWS IN TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the political life of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco in the early 1970s. The findings reported are part of a comparative study of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel.[1]

Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel have been selected for study because they are religious minorities in states officially rejecting secularism. The sociopolitical context within which they exist makes them incapable of embracing or being embraced by the dominant national ethic that is the basis of statehood and political legitimacy, and in this they are examples of what we shall call nonassimilating monorities. Israel, for example, is firmly committed to a Jewish identity. Its name, its flag, and the Law of Return attest to an association of church and state. Further, many Jewish customs are the law of the land and religious instruction is mandatory in state-run schools. The situation is similar in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as in other Arab nations. Constitutions make Islam the religion of state. Governments build mosques and cemeteries, provide religious instruction, conform officially to Muslim holy days, and operate on the basis of a legal code that owes much to the Koran and its interpretations.[2]

Religious minorities in nonsecular states can never integrate fully into the social fabric of the nation. Further, major political objectives pursued by the state are often of little concern to these groups and, on occasion, they are actually hostile to their interests. This is not to suggest that either Israel, Tunisia, or Morocco deliberately persecutes religious minorities. Official policy prohibits discrimination and the minority group in each country is relatively prosperous. Nor is it to suggest that the social position of the minorities under examination is defined exclusively by the association of religion and politics among the dominant majority. Other relevant factors will be discussed presently in relation to Tunisia and Morocco. Nevertheless, the rejection of secularism necessitates a separate social and political status for Arabs in Israel and Jews in Tunisia and Morocco, making these groups distinctive political entities. The objective of the present research report is to describe the social situation of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and to determine how these groups respond ideologically and politically to their position in society. The concluding section also comments briefly upon the situation of the Arabs in Israel and proposes some more general conclusions about the political culture of nonassimilating minorities.

ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICAN JEWRY[3]

Jews have lived in North Africa since the earliest days of recorded history, and well-organized communities existed throughout the Maghreb when Islam entered the area in the seventh century. The history of the Jews under Islam is marked by both periods of stability and good relations between Jews and non-Jews and periods of tension and, on occasion, communal violence. As People of the Book, Jews had a protected place in the Islamic community. Yet they were rarely fully integrated with the people among whom they dwelt. Initially, Jews and non-Jews lived in the same areas. Later, separate Jewish quarters (known as *mellas* in Morocco and *haras* in Tunisia) were established in most towns and many villages. Jewish communities were usually semi-autonomous and daily life was regulated by officials of the community itself.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Spanish Jews entered North Africa in sizable numbers. And in the seventeenth century, in the case of Tunisia, many Italian Jews arrived to swell the "Western" element in North African Jewry. The new Jews settled in the larger cities, modifying little the character of Jewish life in the villages. They gave urban Jewish communities, however, a somewhat European character, at least in comparison with the dominant Muslim population, and introduced important social and cultural cleavages into the ranks of the Jews themselves. These cleavages were a major element in Jewish life in many cities until the nineteenth century, producing much tension and dissipating energy that might otherwise have been directed toward communal development. The arrival of the new immigrants did not radically alter the political status of Jewish communities, but it did increase the social and cultural distance between Jews and Muslims in the cities.

A new era in the history of the Maghreb began in the nineteenth century with the emergence of colonialism and modern nationalism. Both forces dramatically increased the distance between Jews and Muslims. For one thing, French colonial policy deliberately exploited existing differences between Jews and non-Jews. Privileges were offered to the Jews who, because of their relatively marginal status in Islamic society and the oppressive conditions under which they sometimes lived, were generally eager to accept them. In Algeria, for example, most Jews were accorded French citizenship en masse in 1870. Elsewhere, Jews were given preferential access to coveted places in French schools. The result of such policies was the assimilation of many Jews into French culture. This assimilation was most intense in Algeria and least intense in Morocco; but overall, by the end of the colonial period, French was the preferred tongue of approximately half of North Africa's Jews and a large number considered themselves culturally a part of France.

Jewish assimilation of French culture was enhanced by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, an independent international educational foundation that operated in North Africa with support from the colonial establishment. Through its extensive network of primary and secondary schools, the AIU spread the French language and culture far more broadly than did elite and settler-oriented French schools. In a few instances, as in Djerba in southern Tunisia, traditionalist ele-

ments successfully resisted the incursions of the AIU. In general, however, Jews welcomed the AIU and viewed it as an agent of progress. Together, the AIU and the colonial mission narrowed the cleavage between indigeneous Jews and those of European origin and taught many Jews to accept France as their spiritual home. Thus, they greatly increased the cultural distance between Jews and Arabs. They also produced among many Arabs a view of the Jew as collaborator. Jews were seen as profiting by, and indeed becoming a part of, a political force that most Arabs considered oppressive and humiliating.

The evolution of Arab political consciousness also contributed to the separation of Jews from Muslims. Defensive modernization in the nineteenth century led to a concern for Islamic reform among Arab intellectuals. From Egypt, Tunisia, and the Levant especially, new ideological currents swept over the Arab world, provoking thought and discussion. A major preoccupation was the relationship between Islam and development and the place of religion in Arab society, and the heavy religious content of these concerns made meaningful Jewish participation in one of the most pressing intellectual issues of the day extremely difficult. In the twentieth century, as modernist movements evolved into anticolonial crusades, Islamic themes continued to be emphasized and in fact a more conservative view of Islam gained prominence as nationalists attempted to appeal to the people in a familiar idiom. But such nationalism was problematic for Jews. They were reluctant to join movements based in large part on Islam and could not but wonder about their own future in the independent states for which nationalists were drawing blueprints.

Some Jews, especially those of the political left, did support the nationalists; and it is perhaps ironic that they were generally drawn from the most westernized sectors of Jewish society. In some cases, these individuals made significant contributions to the cause of the nationalists and, in Tunisia and Morocco, a few were rewarded with important positions after independence. Nevertheless, these Jews remained atypical of the communities from which they came, and, moreover, they were often in positions of considerable ambivalence. Undoubtedly they hoped, as did some Arab leaders, that after independence the neotraditional ideology of the nationalists would give way to a new, radical, more secular approach to nation-building.

Since Algerian nationalism was more radical and secular than that of Tunisia and Morocco, it might be surprising that by the end of the revolution virtually all of Algeria's 175,000 Jews had left or were leaving. But colonialism was more intense in Algeria than in Tunisia and Morocco, and Algerian Jews were much more thoroughly tied to France. Jews had been French citizens since the nineteenth century, and few could imagine life outside the French cultural and political orbit. Also, the experience of the revolution—which left one million dead—hardly put Algerians in a frame of mind to worry about Jews. Algerian attacks on synagogues during the war, reflecting both bitterness toward a group seen as "turncoats" and displaced anger against the French, solidified Jewish determination to leave.

The situation was different in Tunisia and Morocco, although there were, of course, significant migrations. Departures had been going on since the estab-

lishment of Israel in 1948, and, by 1962, the Jewish populations of Tunisia and Morocco were only about one-fourth of their preindependence total. There were about 30,000 Jews in Tunisia and 80,000 in Morocco. The position of Jews in both countries was one of relative prosperity and considerable, if intermittent, political freedom. Jews occupied high positions in government, business, journalism, teaching, and so forth; Jewish organizations operated with comparative effectiveness; and the fortunes of most wealthy Jews were left intact. None of this is to say that Jews had total economic and political freedom or were without serious complaints. But, since economic difficulties and a measure of authoritarianism affected Muslims as well as Jews, many Jews did not feel discriminated against and considered their situation comparatively satisfactory. As a result, a sizable minority of each community chose to remain and play a part in the life of the newly independent nations.

THE SITUATION OF THE JEWS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Arab-Jewish Relations in Recent Years

Since the late 50s and early 60s, the position of the Jews in Tunisia and Morocco has gradually deteriorated and the contradictions of Jewish life in North Africa have come to the fore. On both official and personal levels, numerous examples of both excellent Arab-Jewish relations and incidents Jews consider harrassment can be found. An appreciation of the ambiguous character of Arab-Jewish relations will contribute to an understanding of the position of Jews in contemporary Tunisian and Moroccan society. The following list of incidents illustrates the tenor of these relations in recent years.[4]

1. In Tunis, on the first day of the 1967 Six Day War, a mob of young, unemployed street rabble looted Jewish shops and tried to firebomb a major synagogue. Some Jews contend the government encouraged the disturbances and dragged its feet on restoring order. But, by evening, Tunisian troops were patrolling the area to maintain security and, later, the government publicly apologized to the Jewish community. It also prosecuted those whom it said were responsible for the "intolerable acts" and provided modest compensation to merchants whose stores had been damaged. During the 1973 October War, the government publicly warned against disturbances and no incidents were reported.
2. In the summer of 1973, an annual beauty contest in Casablanca was won by a local Jewish girl. A picture of the attractive new "Miss Legs," along with her runner-up, a Muslim, appeared in the newspaper.
3. In 1973, the children of two prominent Tunisian Jewish families married. Present at the ceremony and the lavish receptions that followed were many Muslims, including several high government officials.
4. When a prominent Tunisian Jewish lawyer passed away in 1972, Muslim friends placed an ad in the newspaper mourning his death and acknowledging his profound contribution to the Tunisian legal association in which he had been active.

5. In Morocco, the government has several times authorized justices on Rabbinical courts to serve beyond the mandatory retirement age of 70. Jews had feared the government would not permit this. But when officials learned that in several towns there were no younger men to replace retiring jurists, the requirement was waived.
6. In Tunisia, a government official comes to the principal Jewish synagogue during High Holiday services to extend the government's good wishes for the coming year.
7. In two small Tunisian towns, Jews have profited from a growing tourist boom. In one, Jewish craftsmen have obtained excellent locations for the sale of their wares, and the government has improved access to Jewish religious sites so they can be more easily visited by paying tourists. In the other, the government encouraged local Jews to invest in a luxury hotel and gave them a loan at favorable interest rates. Today the hotel is one of the most successful in the area.
8. In Morocco, most Jewish schools receive government subsidies. The subsidies of one school were abruptly terminated several years ago and requests for an explanation bore no fruit. Elsewhere subsidies continue.
9. In Casablanca in 1972, a young Jewish professional working in a government agency complained that he was the best trained person in his division but was nonetheless forced to remain subservient to a Muslim. According to the informant, supervisors told him privately, for his own good, that a Jew would never be put in charge and he should not expect too much. Also in Casablanca, officials at an American-run factory privately acknowledged receiving complaints about hiring "too many" Jewish secretaries.
10. In Morocco in 1973, a Jewish importer collected a large sum for goods he had imported for clients and then immediately left the country. The merchandise remained in the Casablanca Port Authority and could not be obtained by purchasers since it had not been fully paid for. Jews feared that the government and potential clients would now be reluctant to trust Jewish importers and most blamed the perpetrator of the affair for ignoring the plight of Jews left behind. Some also blamed the government, saying if Jews could take their wealth out of the country they would not resort to such acts.
11. About ten years ago, a Tunisian Jew completed his B.S. in science at the University of Tunis and went to France to continue his studies. He received a Tunisian government scholarship on the understanding he would return to Tunis to teach and do research, but after his studies he remained in France. Some Jews criticized his action, saying the government would now be unwilling to give scholarships to Jews. Others said the young man was right since he had an uncertain professional future in Tunisia and, anyway, many Muslims did the same thing.
12. In Tunisia, a Jewish professional in charge of an important committee in his field displayed a letter from a Muslim colleague informing him, with obviously sincere personal chagrin, that he could no longer continue as

chairman. A superior body had voted that it was "inappropriate" to have a Jew in this position. The Jew remains a member of the committee and in fact, since receiving the letter, continues to do much of the work required of the chairman.

13. The Central Committee of the Jewish community in Tunis was declared illegal after independence and reconstituted as a "temporary" committee to coordinate Jewish affairs until they can be regulated by state institutions. The Committee still exists, but its legal status is ambiguous. Since it may not hold elections, the government appoints its officials.
14. In Tunisia in 1973, a young Muslim who lived in the same building as a synagogue pounded on the wall one Saturday morning, disturbing the prayer of the Jews inside. This went on for several weeks until finally the man burst into the synagogue and shouted that the Jews were praying too loudly. He said something would have to be done. At this point, several of the Jews went to the police and explained that their mode of worship had never bothered the neighbors before. The police were sympathetic and paid the Muslim a visit, instructing him to leave the Jews alone. Moreover, when he became insolent, the police put him in jail to "cool down." The police told the Jews not to worry, but thereafter they prayed more quietly nonetheless.

Factors in Jewish Emigration

In 1975, twenty years after the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, there were about 6,000 Jews in Tunisia and approximately 20,000 Jews in Morocco. In each case, this is 5 to 10 percent of the number that existed before independence. The Moroccan Jewish community is more intact than the one in Tunisia; however, this situation derives primarily from the greater size and complexity of the Moroccan Jewish community at independence and only incidently from differences in social and economic currents operative in the two societies. Since 1956, there has been steady Jewish emigration from both countries, and the factors responsible for this exodus are similar in each case. A summary of these factors will shed further light on the position of Jews in the Maghreb today.

Culture and Identity. Cultural differences between Jews and Muslims are perhaps the most important determinants of Jewish isolation from Tunisian and Moroccan society. The twin bastions of civilization and political identity in North Africa are Islam and Arabism. These pillars of culture were the ideological focuses of anticolonial nationalism before independence and are central to the identity of the societies being constructed in the contemporary Maghreb. Tunisian and Moroccan Jews, however, are today able to identify only marginally with Arabo-Islamic civilization.

In part, the isolation of Jews flows from the association of religion and politics. No matter how enlightened, a government cannot make Jews first-class citizens—with the same claim on state resources as the majority—and also of-

ficially embrace Islam. But the problem is more accurately understood in general sociocultural terms rather than in a legalistic framework. At both official and popular levels, there is a strong desire to maintain a normative order tied to the values and institutions of Arabo-Islamic civilization. Arabization, for instance is greatly desired, and Arabic is, in fact, gradually becoming the principal language of public life. Also, though significant religious reforms have been enacted, especially in Tunisia, leaders proclaim that their revolutions will be "faithful to permanent spiritual and moral values." While most North Africans have been reasserting and reinvigorating their Arabic and Islamic identity, however, Jews have been becoming more European. Many of the reasons for this have already been mentioned. They include colonial policies aimed at assimilating the Jews, the work of the AIU before and after independence, improvements in political status accompanying colonialism, material advantages flowing from a French education and entree into the French cultural sphere, and the fact that Jewish women, unlike Muslim women, attended French schools in large numbers and thus brought European culture into the home. The result is that today many Jews view themselves as belonging to French civilization rather than to the Arabo-Muslim culture of North Africa.

Two kinds of consequences flow from the dissimilar cultural evolution of Arabs and Jews. First, to many Arabs, Jews are tainted by their association with colonialism. At worst, they are collaborators. At best, they failed to understand the evils of colonialism and to resist it in the interest of Tunisian and Moroccan freedom. During the early postindependence period, and to some extent today, it was the colonial connection rather than potential support for Israel that made Jewish loyalty suspect to many Arabs. Second, many Jews feel threatened by Arab and Islamic nationalism or, at the very least, are not comfortable in societies where its values are supreme. The issue is primarily one of culture and only secondarily one of politics. A Jewish merchant who receives purchase orders in an Arabic he cannot read and a Jewish lawyer who must hire Muslim assistants to translate briefs or plead his cases inevitably feel they are not in their own country. And even many who do not experience such difficulties desire to live in a culture that is their own. In the case of Tunisia, particularly, the overwhelming majority of the country's former Jewish population is now in France, and most who remain visit France often and have family there awaiting their arrival. In the case of Morocco, far more Jews have gone to Israel, but then French culture penetrated less deeply in Morocco. Nevertheless, most Europeanized Moroccan Jews have indeed gone to France or to French-speaking areas to live and most who remain say they will eventually do the same.[5]

Economics and professional life. Many Jews leave North Africa for economic reasons. As with considerations of culture, this is particularly true among population categories at the communities' social, institutional, and political center. The economic problems of Jews result from a number of factors. For one thing, there is some discrimination. Jews who are French citizens have been subject to nationalization measures. Other Jews do not experience official discrimina-

tion, but there are many reports of bias in awarding contracts, hiring, promoting, and the like. It is impossible to determine the accuracy of every report, but at least some unofficial discrimination apparently exists and many Jews consider this a serious problem. Also, though governments encouraged Jews to stay after independence, saying their professional expertise was badly needed, today, with more well-educated Muslims than the economy can absorb, the need for Jewish skills is greatly diminished.

A related factor is the professional unreliability of Jewish communities characterized by steady emigration. Again, it is difficult to determine how many Jews depart with unpaid debts and/or unfulfilled obligations. But Jews frequently agree that their situation is damaged by the behavior of some of their coreligionaries and say they understand why Arab officials and businessmen sometimes hesitate to give a major loan or an important position to a Jew.

Another factor is a tendency toward redistributing wealth and centralizing economic control. This is particularly significant in Tunisia, where socialism was an official policy in the 1960s, but it is also relevant in Morocco. With the importation of consumer goods regulated and heavily taxed, the middle class is affected both in its life-style and its ability to engage profitably in certain commercial activities. Also, since domestic manufacturing is increasingly oriented toward the production of goods for the masses, with the government the major buyer and, often, the major producer, many entrepreneurs have difficulty maintaining a place in the new economic order and find themselves heavily dependent on the goodwill of the government. Some Muslims are also affected by these developments, but independent commercial and industrial activity is more characteristic of Jewish society.

Zionism and the existence of Israel. Zionism has contributed to Jewish emigration in two ways. First, many Jews have answered the Zionist call and immigrated to Israel. This is particularly true of certain segments of Moroccan Jewry. Since it was primarily the more traditional and religious elements within Jewish society that returned to Zion, especially before 1956, the motivating force was probably traditional religious consciousness and not the ideological appeal of modern Zionism. Further, although this is difficult to document, it appears that many Moroccan Jews who went to Israel in the 1960s were motivated by a desire to leave North Africa and by their lack of preparation for life in France. In any event, though the ideological attractiveness of Zionism may have been limited, the existence of Israel offered a place of refuge to many Jews desiring to emigrate.

The other way in which Zionism is relevant is of course its complication of Arab-Jewish relations generally. The Arab public is concerned about the Palestinian problem and often regards local Jews as cousins of the enemy. At least some individual acts of violence and harrassment can be assumed to derive from sentiments about the Middle East situation, and many Jews fear that incidents will increase as governments become more militant in their opposition to Zionism—a direction in which both Tunisia and Morocco have been steadily moving.

Violence and harrassment. Violence and harrassment have already been mentioned but additional comments are in order. Violence is rare, and harrassment, though not insignificant, is not widespread. Individual Muslims and Jews are often good friends. In Tunisia, many departed Jews return every August to spend their vacations, living on capital they left behind. They apparently do not fear physical or legal abuse. Yet Jews believe that the potential for violence and harrassment exists and that their good relations with some Muslims offer little protection against such acts. They note that distinctions between Zionists and Jews are often blurred in Arab political discussions and that anti-Jewish sentiments are readily expressed. They claim that poorly educated younger Arabs, especially those who have recently migrated to the city, are particularly hostile. These individuals have had little personal contact with Jews, are less sophisticated in their response to anti-Zionist currents, and have personal frustrations which incline them to look for scapegoats. While the accuracy of these perceptions and incidents reported by Jews is difficult to determine, the authors believe that violence and harrassment are neither absent nor widespread, that increased anti-Jewish activity is not likely but at least possible, and that Jewish fears are very real and often a factor in decisions to leave.

Fears about violence and harrassment have been particularly significant in Jewish emigration at a few critical historical junctures. Tunisia's experience in June 1967 is one example. Another is the Bizerte crisis of 1961, when anti-French demonstrations spilled over into anti-Jewish sentiment. During periods of political stability, Jewish fears are relatively latent and probably count less than other factors in the continuing departures. Nevertheless, they are rarely completely forgotten.

Community disorganization. In terms of both demography and community structure, Jewish communities in the Maghreb are falling into disarray. Details appear later in the paper, but mention should be made here since this fact affects emigration as well as the situation of Jews who remain. To live in a Jewish environment, to have a full Jewish social life, to fulfill religious obligations, to find a Jewish spouse, all of these things are increasingly difficult as fewer and fewer Jews remain in North Africa. The closer one gets to the present, the more relevant such considerations become, and at present they probably outweigh all other factors contributing to decisions to depart.

Reasons Why Some Jews Stay

Jews outside North Africa inevitably ask, "But why do they stay?" Several factors can be noted. However, since they have also been felt by many who left, these factors constitute general pressures against emigration and not an explanation of why some who experienced them remain while others departed.

A major reason some Jews stay in North Africa is their low level of education and their limited familiarity with European culture. The proportion of such persons is roughly one third to one half of the Jewish population in both Tunisia and Morocco. For the most part, these Jews have left the villages and smaller

towns where they historically resided and have regrouped in major cities. They have no serious opportunity to go to France and are often fearful they could not succeed in Israel. Many of their number *are* going to Israel with the help of international Jewish organizations, but others thus far prefer to remain, choosing that which is familiar to the rigors of adjusting to a new language and culture.

Age is another factor keeping Jews in North Africa. The number of elderly Jews is disproportionately high in Tunisia and Morocco, being especially notable in Tunisia. Retired persons say they prefer to live out their years in the Maghreb—in a society to which they are accustomed and where, they often add, the weather is pleasant, the prices are low, and the pace of life is slower than in Europe. There are also elderly men who still work and who explain their continuing presence in North Africa differently. These persons resist the retirement they feel would inevitably accompany their departure, saying "Here I am still the head of the family. If we moved to France, my sons would be the providers and I'd have to hold out my hand everytime I wanted to buy even a pack of cigarettes." Persons in this category are generally middle class, being relatively successful and feeling they are not yet ready to give up the business or profession they have spent a lifetime building.

Financial considerations are one reason that some middle class Jews remain in North Africa and a major factor in the decision of some wealthy Jews to remain. Understandably reluctant to abandon their assets, which it is illegal to send abroad, some Jews stay, preferring to live in luxury a bit longer, waiting while they slowly build up interests abroad, and possibly looking for an opportunity to salvage some of their holdings. Some working class families also remain for economic reasons. Particularly in Morocco, there are many Jews in white collar and service occupations who maintain a comfortable life-style that they would probably have to forego if they left North Africa. Many in this category have not completed high school and have no professional training. But they are reasonably well educated by North African standards and this, coupled with their fluency in French, makes them attractive candidates for jobs as secretaries, clerks, bookkeepers, and the like. They would not have these professional advantages and the material comforts to which they lead in France or Israel, and so they remain.

Young families sometimes stay because they do not want to interrupt the studies of their children. This applies particularly to middle and working class families identifying with French culture. They value education greatly and fear that should they move their children would either lose time adjusting to a new school or, if older, leave school entirely. Not infrequently, plans include staying in North Africa until one or more child completes university and is established overseas.

About 5 percent of all North African Jews are French citizens, and this is sometimes a factor in their decision to remain. Some of these Jews have jobs in French educational, cultural, or diplomatic institutions and thus acquire the professional advantages of working for France without leaving their homeland. They build up seniority, some qualify for additional "hardship" pay, and part

of their salary is sometimes paid in French currency. Also, as Frenchmen, they can take personal property with them when they leave and in time of trouble are assured of protection.

A final consideration is the expressed belief of some Jews that they belong in North Africa. There are several variations on this theme. To some, the Maghreb's patrimony is multicultural and Mediterranean, not simply Arab. "The Arabs are only one group among many," one sometimes hears. "This is my country too and I refuse to give it up." Others profess an ideological affinity with popular Tunisian and Moroccan aspirations. This group includes young individuals on the political left and older persons who supported nationalism prior to independence. Finally, some Jewish leaders say they remain because they are needed to operate community institutions and assist other Jews who have not yet left.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LIFE AMONG NORTH AFRICAN JEWRY

Most departed Tunisian Jews have gone to France. Perhaps 10 percent have gone to Israel. The majority of Moroccan Jewry is in Israel, although the wealthiest and best-educated Moroccan Jews have also gone to France. There are also substantial numbers of Moroccan Jews in Montreal and many from the northern Spanish-speaking zone have emigrated to Spain or South America. Students of migration and integration are studying the adaptation of North African Jews to their new environments,[6] but almost entirely neglected is the study of Jews who remain in the Maghreb. This is the focus of the present paper. The Jewish communities of North Africa are today reaching a point of nonviability, resembling only remotely those that existed two decades ago. Our interest is in detailing how such communities respond ideologically and politically to their situation. To students of ethnic politics, we hope to offer insights about the political culture of minority groups in a particular kind of social environment. To students of Jewish and North African history, we hope to present part of the saga of the Jews in the Maghreb. Much of the information reported comes from work with informants and community leaders and deals with the situation in 1972–1973, the period during which fieldwork was conducted. Also reported are some results of a survey conducted in 1973 of 250 Jews and 350 Muslims.

Tunisia: Demography and Communal Structure

The size of Tunisia's Jewish population is not known with precision. Estimates are made by community functionaries at Passover but, since they are highly imprecise, the community's figure of 8,900 in 1972 is an approximation. The authors' estimates, based on available statistics—school enrollments, persons in old folks homes, and the like—and interviews with knowledgeable individuals, lead to the following conclusions about the size and demographic character of Tunisian Jewry.

The Jewish population was about 8,000 in 1972 and the number of Jews emigrating annually has been about 500–700 in recent years. Today, in 1976, there

are probably 5,500–6,000 Jews in the country. Few Jews live outside Tunis and its immediate suburbs, the only significant exception being Djerba where two adjacent communities of about 800 and 300 persons, respectively, remain intact. There are three other towns with approximately 100–150 Jewish residents, but these are generally within the cultural and economic orbit of Tunis. There is also a handful of towns with three or four Jewish families. In sum, Tunis, with 4,000–4,500 Jews, is clearly the major center of Jewish life.

Much of the Jewish population of Tunisia is inactive. There is a disproportionately high number of old people, children and, in Tunis, uneducated immigrants from the interior. It is unlikely that there are more than 500–600 families in Tunis where the father, or mother, is steadily employed. The small active population, however, spans a reasonably broad socioeconomic continuum. There are many merchants and shopkeepers, a number of wealthy businessmen and respected professionals, and many white collar workers, some employed in the institutions of the community itself and some working in the agencies of the French government.

The community is educationally and culturally heterogeneous. Much of the inactive population, especially immigrants from the interior, have had little modern education. Their language is Judeo-Arabic and many know no French at all. This category includes young as well as elderly persons, though some young immigrants are educated and gainfully employed. A second category includes well educated and professionally active individuals. Among older persons in this group, Judeo-Arabic is the mother tongue but French is usually preferred today. Younger, well-educated persons are highly Frenchified and rarely speak Arabic well. These two categories represent about 40 percent and 20 percent of the adult population, respectively. The remaining 40 percent are persons with intermediate educational levels—primary schooling and possibly some high school training in French. Most are in their forties or fifties, of urban origin or long time urban residence, and gainfully employed, often in commerce. They are usually bilingual and bicultural, though their children identify strongly with French culture. As can be seen, there is an imperfect but generally significant correlation between high education, low age, longtime urban residence, successful professional activity, and familiarity with French culture. Though skewed toward the more traditional pole of the dimension defined by these variables, Tunisia's Jewish population is in general distributed fairly evenly over the spectrum.

Jewish community organizations are devoted primarily to the provision of social services. Some funds for these agencies are raised locally from taxes on kosher meat and wine. For the most part, however, they depend on subsidies from international Jewish organizations—most notably the American Joint Distribution Committee. Though primarily institutions of social welfare, they are also political in that they constitute the only existing form of organized communal activity. A Central Committee in Tunis serves as the administrative hub for communal service agencies. The Committee operates several nursing homes, a nursery school and day care center, a welfare program for needy and elderly, a Talmud-Torah primary school, and a cemetery. The Committee also

has administrative links to other institutions, such as clinics and some synagogues. Finally, it receives and dispenses modest income from a few pieces of property left by departing Jews. In theory the Committee is a representative body chosen by Jews to direct community affairs and look after Jewish interests. Today, however, it is concerned primarily with administration.

Many synagogues, perhaps fifteen to twenty, continue to operate in Tunis. But most bear little resemblance to synagogues in the West. Few have activities other than worship and only a handful are open during the week. Even on the Sabbath, many have difficulty obtaining ten men for a service. Most are little more than two or three rooms with an ark and a pulpit and many have no rabbis. Worshipers conduct their own services as best they can. The synagogue in Tunis run by the Committee is the principal exception to these generalizations, and a few others also do not fit the preceding description. In Djerba there are a number of synagogues which are frequented daily.

Schools were once a major part of the community's institutional network. Today, however, this is no longer the case. All AIU schools had closed by the mid-sixties. Declining enrollments due to emigration forced the AIU to turn its schools over to the government one by one. The Central Committee in Tunis runs one Talmud-Torah primary school, attended mainly by children of poor families. A private religious school, maintained by representatives of an overseas Hasidic organization, offers modern and religious instruction at the primary and high school levels and is the most important Jewish school in Tunisia today. Children of the well-to-do usually attend the schools of the French University and Cultural Mission (MUC). Places in MUC schools are highly coveted, although a new requirement that Tunisian Jews (and Muslims) study Arabic is beginning to change this. A technical high school operated by the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training (ORT), an international Jewish organization, has operated with minimal enrollment in recent years and finally closed its doors in 1973. There are very few Jews in Tunisian public schools—primarily because they do not wish to study Arabic—except in Djerba and other outlying communities and at the French-speaking University of Tunis, where perhaps ten Jews are enrolled.

The only other major institution is a modern clinic in the former Jewish quarter of Tunis. Associated with Oeuvres de Secours aux Enfants (OSE), an international Jewish organization based in Europe, it provides immediate aid to those who come in—including Muslims—and has beds for persons requiring special care. Part of the building is also a nursing home. The clinic further helps Jews in outlying areas, sometimes paying local doctors for treating them.

In the past there were other organizations, such as youth groups, sports associations, and scout troops. There were also Jewish newspapers and radio programs. But all this has disappeared. In smaller towns, even most of what remains in Tunis has disappeared. The community school in Djerba, for example, provides only religious instruction, after Tunisian public school. The one-room O.S.E. clinic, staffed by a male nurse from Tunis, closed in 1972 for lack of funds. It later reopened, but its future is uncertain. In Nabeul, to cite another

example, about 150 Jews depend almost entirely on Tunis for communal organization. There is no Jewish school. A *shokhet* comes from Tunis about once a week to slaughter kosher meat. The head of the community lives in Tunis and returns to Nabeul when a problem arises.

The distinction between social and political functions is often blurred, but several institutions traditionally played more explicitly political roles. These are the Central Committee, which has already been mentioned, the Central Rabbinate, and the Rabbinical Courts. All have little political authority today, however. The Central Committee in Tunis was originally composed of forty individuals chosen by election among Jews. Towns with smaller Jewish populations had smaller committees. In addition to coordinating the work of communal agencies, the Committee set policy and spoke for the community when the occasion dictated. After independence, however, the Committee was held to be "a state within a state" and the government forced it to reconstitute as the Temporary Committee for the Direction of the Jewish Religion. Elections are now prohibited. Many members who emigrate or die are not replaced, and when they are it is only upon appointment by the government. Today there are only four or five members of the Temporary Committee and meetings are on an ad hoc basis. No central committees exist at all outside Tunis, though some communities have one or two informally designated individuals who direct community affairs and maintain contact with the Committee in Tunis.

The duty of the chief rabbi and his assistants is to represent the community in public and direct it in matters of worship and ritual; and, in theory at least, these functions are still carried out. The rabbinate is responsible for standards of kashruth in the preparation of wine and meat, for example, though instances of inspection appear to be few. The chief rabbi, along with the president of the Temporary Committee, also continues to represent the community. Upon the death of the president of the Committee in 1973, for instance, it was the chief rabbi who contacted the governor of Tunis about appointing a successor. Rabbinial courts, on the other hand, have been abolished. Shortly after independence, Tunisia integrated large bodies of civil and religious law and provided for unified judicial institutions to administer that law. Shari'a, as well as rabbinical courts, were affected and in fact Muslim justices opposed the government at the time. In any event, all civil and criminal matters involving Jews are today handled in government courts.

Clearly the Jewish community of Tunisia has no meaningful political organization and only a minimum of institutional capacity and structural unity. It is wrong to see in this a policy of harrassment aimed at Jews. Other independent political organizations, (trade unions, the Communist Party) have also been disallowed and traditional Muslim institutions have, if anything, been disbanded more thoroughly than Jewish ones. Moreover, much disarray in the Jewish community is due to emigration rather than official policy. Nonetheless, political activity by Jews is at best disorganized, intermittent, and informal. Communication with the government usually involves a message or request transmitted to some official by an individual Jew who knows him.

Tunisia: Individual Attitudes toward Politics

Turning to the individual level, we may examine the political attitudes of eighty-nine Tunisian Jews surveyed in 1973. It was not possible to select respondents randomly, but the sample does contain a cross section of persons with respect to age, sex, and educational level. The focus was on the active sector of the population, with few elderly or uneducated respondents, and of this group the sample appears representative. The N exceeds 1 percent of the total Jewish population and 5 percent of the active adult population. Interviews were conducted in Tunis and Djerba.

A sample of 350 Tunisian Muslims was also interviewed using the same survey instrument, and by comparing the views of Jews and Muslims we may determine the extent to which the attitudes of Jews reflect their special social position rather than conditions prevailing in Tunisia generally. From the pool of Muslim respondents, an individual was selected who closely resembled each Jewish respondent with respect to age, sex, educational level, and place of residence. A Muslim match could not be found for three Jewish respondents. All others were successfully matched, generating a "matched Muslim" sample of 86.

The present analysis considers five items from the interview schedule. These items were also employed in Morocco. The items and the concepts to which they refer are listed below.

1. Political Information: Identify the following political figure (the name of the Minister of Plan and Finance was given).
2. Political Efficacy: People like you have little ability to influence the affairs of the government (agree or disagree).
3. Government Activism: Two men are having a discussion, which one do you think is right? One says a government should do as much as possible for its people. The other says a government should do a lot, but not too much so that the people do not become lazy or stop helping themselves. Who do you think is correct?
4. Respect for Political Authority: Rank the following professions in the order of their importance for society (coded according to whether or not a government minister was ranked first of the ten professions given).
5. Political Trust: The government does not care much about people like you (agree or disagree).

Data on involvement in political groups were also collected. But, in both Tunisia and Morocco, Jewish political participation was minimal. Low levels of political involvement are thus taken as a constant and the focus in these pages is on the ideological and attitudinal response of Jews to their position in society.

Table 1 presents the responses of Jews and matched Muslims to the items listed above. The attitudes of respondents in Tunis and Djerba are examined separately. Turning first to Tunis, the data suggest disinterest and marginality but not hostility or widespread political distrust among Jews. Few Jews could

TABLE 1 *Responses of Tunisian Jews and matched Muslims to five questions about politics (in percent)*

Item and response	Tunis		Djerba	
	Jews (N = 56)	Muslims (N = 56)	Jews (N = 30)	Muslims[a] (N = 30)
1. Able to identify a major political figure	23	37	3	30
2. Feel they have little ability to influence affairs of government	74	72	70	58
3. Believe a government should do as much as possible for its people	71	48	70	35
4. Rank the government minister as most important of ten professions[b]	40 (74)	42 (61)	76 (83)	33 (41)
5. Believe the government does not care about people like them	56	52	90	75

[a] Muslims matched to the Jews of Djerba were drawn from non-Jewish communities on the Island of Djerba and from small towns of comparable size.

[b] Percent ranking the government minister as one of the two most important professions is given in parentheses below the entry.

identify the Minister of Plan and Finance, and most believe they are unable to influence political affairs. Yet they desire government activism, showing little fear of an aggressive government and giving substance to the widely held opinion that Jews are secure as long as Bourguiba and his party remain in power. The importance attached to the profession of government minister indicates respect for political authority and also suggests that many Jews trust the government. It will be noted that about half the Jews feel the government does not care about them. But given the insignificance of Jewish interests in the overall Tunisian context, it may be more significant that almost half the respondents feel the government is sufficiently active on their behalf.

A comparison of the Jews and matched Muslims suggests that to some extent Jewish attitudes reflect orientations prevalent in Tunisia generally. Jews are less able than Muslims to identify a key political leader, but the percentage of Muslims making the identification is also low. Muslims are as unlikely as Jews to believe either that they can influence political affairs or that the government cares about them.[7] Nevertheless, there are some significant attitudinal differences between Jews and Muslims and these tend to reinforce the preceding interpretations. Jews are considerably more likely than Muslims to desire an activist government and to hold government ministers in high esteem. This suggests greater political trust among Jews and a probable difference in Jewish and Muslim complaints about government. While many Muslims appear to believe that government policies are not in the public interest, Jews tend to support these policies and complain that they are not implemented forcefully enough.

Table 2 presents responses of Jews and Muslims from Tunis divided by age

TABLE 2 *Responses to five questions about politics of Jews and matched Muslims from Tunis categorized on the basis of age and education (in percent)*

Item and response	Religion	Younger, well-educated (N = 26)	Younger, poorly educated (N = 9)	Older, well-educated (N = 10)	Older, poorly educated[a] (N = 11)
1. Able to identify a major political figure	Jew	22	13	43	20
	Matched Muslim	42	13	50	29
2. Feel they have little ability to influence affairs of government	Jew	75	57	100	60
	Matched Muslim	79	77	60	64
3. Believe a government should do as much as possible for its people	Jew	68	67	100	40
	Matched Muslim	75	38	10	45
4. Rank the government minister as most important of ten professions[b]	Jew	35 (65)	50 (87)	67 (67)	30 (80)
	Matched Muslim	38 (54)	55 (88)	33 (55)	50 (60)
5. Believe the government does not care about people like them	Jew	55	67	25	78
	Matched Muslim	52	17	57	86

[a] Three respondents in this category are between 30 and 35 years of age. They are included in this category since they have had only a primary school education while all other respondents under 35, even those classified as poorly educated, have had at least a junior high education.

[b] Percent ranking the government minister as one of the two most important professions is given in parentheses below the entry.

and education. Respondents are divided first into two age categories, under and over 35. Then, those under 35 are subdivided according to whether or not they have finished high school and those over 35 according to whether or not they have finished junior high. Older and younger persons are classified differently with respect to education because a high school education is much more common today than a generation ago. Cutting points on both variables also reflect an attempt to maximize the clarity of findings.

According to the table, well-educated older Jews are politically aware and positively oriented toward the government. They are able to identify the minister of Plan and Finance more frequently than others, they all favor an activist government, most rate government ministers high, and the overwhelming majority thinks the government cares about them. These individuals do say they have little political influence, but this probably reflects an accurate perception of reality rather than alienation. In general, then, older well-educated Jews in Tunis have more positive political attitudes than either other Jews or comparable Muslims. Most likely this is because they received their introduction to po-

litical life when the position of Jews was quite different, they had and still have satisfying personal contact with Muslims, and they have had professional experiences satisfactory enough to keep them in Tunisia.

Poorly educated older Jews, to whom some of these considerations might also apply, have different attitudes. They are as politically informed as other Jews and slightly more likely than others to believe they can influence politics. But they are the only category of Jewish respondents in which a minority favor government activism and few either believe the government cares about them or consider a government minister more important than other professions. Some of their views are shared by comparable Muslims, and this suggests that personal status may determine their attitudes as much as religion. The government's emphasis since independence on education, youth, and social change probably threatens older poorly educated persons of both religions. Yet the political attitudes of these Jews relative to other Jews are more negative than those of their Muslim counterparts relative to other Muslims, suggesting that religion compounds marginality in Tunisia. Poorly educated older Tunisian Muslims may question their place in the social order the government seeks to construct; but comparable Jews, not even sure whether they will remain in Tunisia, fear they are too old or unskilled to begin a new life elsewhere and are thus doubly frustrated and politically alienated.

Young Jews fall in between well-educated and poorly educated older Jews on most variables, and differences associated with education among younger respondents are relatively small. The major exception is their low level of political information, suggesting disinterest and the irrelevancy of Tunisian politics for many young Jews. While older, well-educated Jews are relatively satisfied and older poorly educated Jews are comparatively hostile, young Jews seem not to care. Poorly educated young Jews are less likely than matched Muslims or poorly educated older Jews to feel the government cares about them, yet they are more likely to desire an activist government. That they do not fear an activist government reflects their disinterest and is probably due to the fact that few intend to remain in Tunisia. Well-educated young Tunisians have similar views. In general, they are characterized by low political efficacy, relatively low ratings of government policies and personnel, and support for an activist political orientation. A related point of interest is that attitudes of these Jews resemble those of matched Muslims. This suggests again that Jewish attitudes are influenced at least in part by socioeconomic and ideological currents operative in Tunisia generally. But few of these Jews will remain in Tunisia and there are undoubtedly differences in the societies for which they see their views as relevant. In conclusion, then, young Jews are not alienated from politics per se; they simply have little interest in or knowledge about Tunisian politics in particular.

The situation in Djerba is less complicated. The Jewish community is more homogeneous, the association between age and education is stronger, and concern about politics is less. Levels of political information, efficacy, and trust are all low in absolute terms and relative to matched Muslims. Yet there is support for an activist government and esteem for the profession of government minister, suggesting, as among well-educated older Jews in Tunis, that

TABLE 3 *Responses to five questions about politics of Jews and matched Muslims from Djerba categorized on the basis of age and education (in percent)*

Item and response	Religion	Younger, well-educated (N = 7)	Older, poorly educated (N = 23)
1. Able to identify a major political figure	Jew	0	4
	Matched Muslim	33	29
2. Feel they have little ability to influence affairs of government	Jew	57	73
	Matched Muslim	33	67
3. Believe a government should do as much as possible for its people	Jew	14	87
	Matched Muslim	29	37
4. Rank the government minister as most important of ten professions[a]	Jew	71 (86)	77 (82)
	Matched Muslim	67 (83)	22 (28)
5. Believe the government does not care about people like them	Jew	57	100
	Matched Muslim	67	79

[a] Percent ranking the government minister of one of the two most important professions given in parentheses below the entry.

though Jews are politically marginal, they nonetheless support the government. This makes some sense in Djerba where government-sponsored tourism benefits Jews substantially. Muslims, who are more informed and efficacious, are less satisfied with the government.

Table 3 divides Djerbian Jews and matched Muslims by age and education. Since almost everyone with only a primary school education is over 35, and few younger persons have completed high school, only two categories are empirically discernible: older persons with primary schooling or less and younger persons with some postprimary education. Most respondents are in the former category and these individuals in particular are the basis of the observations already offered. Younger better-educated people differ significantly only in that they do not desire government activism. Like poorly educated young Muslims in Tunis and Muslims of all ages in the villages, they apparently are concerned about their place in a government-sponsored social revolution, and this suggests they consider their future much more bound up with Tunisia than do young urban Jews. Nevertheless, similarities between different sectors of Djerbian Jewry are far more striking than differences. In general, these Jews are inefficacious, uninformed, and convinced the government cares little about them, yet they believe they benefit from government policy and are relatively supportive and trusting.

Morocco: Demography and Communal Structure

The most significant similiarities between the situation of Jews in Morocco and Tunisia are emigration, an internal migration toward the cities, and diminished organizational complexity. The size of the Moroccan community is 5 to 6 percent of what it once was, and Jews who remain are concentrated in the largest cities, especially Casablanca where about 70 percent of the population lives today. The institutional capacity of the community has diminished and become more concentrated too. For example, every year witnesses the closing of additional AIU schools. There are simply too few Jewish students to fill them. Virtually every Jewish institution outside of Casablanca and Rabat experiences this kind of pressure. In Fez, for instance, the OSE clinic has been scheduled to close because it serves too few people to justify expenses. And in at least a dozen smaller towns, communal institutions are totally defunct. National Jewish organizations are trying to transfer their assets and religious objects to the capital. Finally, even in Casablanca where the need to assist Jews from the interior permits the maintenance and even the expansion of some social services, many organizations are beginning to shut down. In 1973, for example, the ORT professional school system closed two of its educational facilities. In a few years the situation of Jews in Morocco will probably resemble that of Jews in Tunisia today.

Despite these seemingly irreversible processes, there are major differences between Jewish society in Tunisia and Morocco. Compared to Tunisia, Jews are widely distributed throughout Morocco and the active population is substantial. Four cities, in addition to Casablanca and Rabat, have over 1,000 Jews. At least six more have several hundred. Morocco's Jewish population is also more heterogeneous, especially in Rabat and Casablanca where community estimates put the 1972 population at about 3,000 and 25,000, respectively. There are of course many indigent and elderly; but there are also many wealthy Jews, a large professional and white collar middle class, and numerous merchants and small businessmen. Thus the distribution of socioeconomic status within the active population is more even than in Tunisia, being somewhat skewed toward the middle class. Finally, there are far more people in their 30s and 40s in Morocco.

Community institutions are likewise more active and well structured. The Central Committee of Casablanca runs several modern nursing homes, has a staff of social workers who care for approximately 1,300 needy families, and maintains a day-care center, a Talmud-Torah school, and community cemeteries. These activities, of course, resemble those of the community in Tunis, but in Casablanca the staff and budget are much larger and the facilities far more modern. Moreover, comparable institutions exist in six or seven other Moroccan cities, and several have structures more developed than those of Tunis.

The situation with respect to education is similar. In 1972–1973 there were over 8,000 Jewish youngsters attending school; and while some were in French or other private schools, most attended schools run by Jews. The AIU's Ittihad-Maroc remains the major educational system, with primary and secondary

schools in a number of cities. Ittihad-Maroc receives a subsidy from the Ministry of Education. The ORT professional schools in Casablanca also have high enrollments, especially since they offer dormitory facilities for children whose parents live outside Casablanca. In addition, there are two independent religious school systems—one of which has schools in a number of cities—and community Talmud-Torah schools serving poorer children in several towns. Most Moroccan Jewish schools also offer many cultural and religious activities, such as pageants, sports events, and choral groups. All of this is virtually nonexistent in Tunisia.

Synagogues are better maintained and better attended than in Tunisia. In Casablanca, obtaining ten men for prayer is rarely a problem and even in many smaller communities 75–100 persons attend the main synagogue on Saturday morning. The OSE clinic in Casablanca dwarfs the facility in Tunis in terms of staff, budget, and equipment. Jewish scout troops and youth groups also operate in Morocco. Though diminished in number, they are active all year and in summer camp alongside Muslim groups in government campsites. Finally there are several Jewish clubs in Casablanca and other cities.

Political activity and organizational complexity are greatly diminished but still significant by standards operative in Tunis. In Casablanca, the Central Committee meets regularly, has a full complement of officers and committees, submits a formal budget to Moroccan authorities, and maintains a staff of secretaries, accountants, and administrators. Central Committees also operate on a smaller scale in Rabat and other cities, and there is a National Council in Rabat which coordinates their work and assists Jews in towns without these organizations. The secretary general of the Council is the official head of Moroccan Jewry and, along with the president of the Central Committee of Casablanca, takes the lead in communicating Jewish concerns to the Moroccan government. Often requests are communicated informally through personal contacts, but it is also accepted policy for the secretary-general of the Council to request a formal interview with the prime minister and/or to prepare a formal memorandum setting forth Jewish concerns. The Council is governed by representatives from the central committees of larger towns. An executive committee meets once or twice a month as the occasion requires, and a larger assembly convenes twice a year. The organization of the Council and of the central committees is fixed by law.

Unlike Tunisia, rabbinical courts continue to function in Morocco. The replacement of elderly personnel is a problem and the courts do not appear to be heavily used. Nevertheless, *dayyanim* in smaller communities, three-man courts of first instance in larger cities, and a supreme court located in Rabat continue to serve the populace. They are administered through the Ministry of Justice. The chief justice, who is also the chief rabbi of Casablanca, is an important dignitary and often represents the Jewish population to Moroccan society. Another Jew of political significance is a man who sits on the Casablanca Municipal Council. This individual is not chosen by Jews, but it is understood that he will speak for Jewish interests and take administrative action on behalf of Jews with special problems.

In both Tunisia and Morocco, the articulation of Jewish political demands is

often carried out by individual Jews who use personal relationships with Muslim officials to secure desired political action. In Tunisia, such "interventions" are relatively infrequent, limited almost entirely to Tunis, and often involve Jews who are not community officials. In Morocco, on the other hand, they occur on a wider scale and, most significantly, involve Jewish officials who are fully familiar with the workings of the community and regarded by Jews and non-Jews as its appropriate representatives.

Morocco: Individual Attitudes toward Politics

Two samples of Moroccan Jews were drawn, one based on the secondary school population and one based on the active adult population. For reasons having to do with the political situation and the limited resources of the principal investigator, Muslims were not surveyed.[8]

The student sample is larger and more representative because permission was obtained to distribute questionnaires in schools serving different sectors of the population. Most students sampled were attending school in Casablanca, but about half of these were recent arrivals from the interior. Also, 15 percent of the respondents were going to school in Meknes. In all, 117 students aged 16 to 20, approximately 5 percent of all Jewish students in the upper levels of high school, were surveyed. The sample slightly overrepresents students from lower class backgrounds in professionally oriented schools but appears generally representative of the population from which it was drawn. The adult sample contains respondents from Casablanca, Rabat, and Fez and is well balanced with respect to age, sex, and educational level. Since it contains only 44 individuals, strong confidence in its representativeness cannot be claimed. Nevertheless, its composition does not appear to differ from the active, adult, urban Jewish population. Since there are few differences between students and comparably educated young people in the adult sample, these groups are combined (although student responses are also reported separately) and the entire pool of respondents is divided into the four categories employed when analyzing Tunisian data. People over 35 are divided according to whether or not they have had postprimary schooling. People under 35 are divided according to whether or not they have completed high school or, for students, are in an academic program leading to the *baccalaureat*.

Table 4 presents responses of the entire sample and each category of Moroccan Jews to the five items previously considered. It shows that as a whole Moroccan Jews are low in political information and about equally divided on each of the other survey items. Compared to Jews in Tunisia, Moroccan Jews are highly politically efficacious, more respectful of political authority, and less supportive of government activism. These comparisons suggest that Jewish political attitudes in Morocco reflect at least in part the general character of Moroccan political life.[9] Compared to Tunisia, the Moroccan regime is traditional, conservative, and unconcerned with social change; and since politics in Morocco is more decentralized, diverse social groups can more effectively intervene in political matters. The tendency of Jews to imbibe political orientations

TABLE 4 *Responses to five questions about politics of Jews from Morocco categorized on the basis of age and education*[a]

Item and Response	Total (N = 161)	Younger, well-educated (N = 63)	Younger, poorly educated (N = 72)	Older, well-educated (N = 15)	Older, poorly educated[b] (N = 11)
1. Percent able to identify a major political figure	15	17 (14)	6 (5)	36	30
2. Percent feeling they have little ability to influence affairs of government	52	60 (63)	43 (44)	64	38
3. Percent believing a government should do as much as possible for its people	57	55 (56)	51 (50)	79	75
4. Percent ranking the government minister as most important of ten professions[c]	70 (80)	67 (68) (72)(70)	71 (70) (87)(86)	82 (82)	80 (100)
5. Percent believing the government does not care about people like them	56	62 (63)	54 (56)	38	43

[a] Percentages for students alone are given in parentheses next to percentages for all younger respondents.

[b] Two respondents in this category are between 30–35 years of age. They are included in this category since they have had only a primary school education and all other respondents under 35, even those classified as poorly educated, have had at least a junior high education.

[c] Percent ranking the government minister as one of the two most important professions is given in parentheses below the entry. In Morocco the list included only eight professions.

prevailing in the societies where they live is probably reinforced by the fact that the government in both Tunisia and Morocco usually acts as protector of the Jews, making it natural for official policies to be viewed favorably. In addition, Jewish estimates of how they will be affected by government policies undoubtedly affect their attitudes. Activism in Tunisia is familiar and has generally not been detrimental to Jews. In Morocco, political activism and radical domestic policies are relatively unknown quantities and it seems inevitable that Jews should question their impact upon their own status.

Differences between the Tunisian and Moroccan Jewish communities, as well as between politics in Tunisia and Morocco generally, appear to affect political attitudes. Higher levels of efficacy in Morocco may reflect greater community organization and more well-placed community leadership; higher esteem for political authority in Morocco may be partially due to the existence of Jewish dignitaries and officials; and lower support for political activism in Morocco may reflect the greater conservatism of the country's comparatively prosperous Jewish community. Taken together, these observations suggest that the political culture of Moroccan Jewry is characterized by low political involvement, a belief that politics is dominated by powerful individuals and, accordingly, a high degree of respect for authority, and the view that Jewish interests are reasonably well served by this arrangement.

Some attitudinal variations associated with age and education are similar to those observed in Tunisia. As in Tunisia, older, well-educated Moroccan Jews are better informed, lower in political efficacy, more supportive of government activism, more inclined to respect political authority, and higher in political trust than Jews in any other category. In both countries, they emerge as the group with the most positive political orientations, and probably many of the same factors account for this. Their introduction to political life occurred when the position of their community was more secure; they are self-selected, having chosen to remain while many left; and they have high status in communities with small active populations and relatively few well-educated individuals.

A major difference between Tunisia and Morocco is that while in Tunisia poorly educated older Jews are politically alienated, in Morocco they have comparatively positive political orientations. One probable cause of this is the relatively conservative orientation of the Moroccan government. Poorly educated older persons in Morocco are less threatened by radical social change. In addition, comparative security and political clout is afforded by the greater institutionalization of the Jewish community in Morocco, and this is apparently perceived and appreciated by older Jews, even if they are not well educated.

Young Jews in Morocco are divided on most items but these divisions are not strongly associated with educational levels. In part this may be due to the homogeneity of the student sample; but the same pattern was observed in Tunisia. As in Tunisia, young Jews have extremely low levels of political information and, it seems reasonable to infer, political interest; and again this is probably because they are poorly integrated into Muslim society and intend to leave North Africa. Unlike Tunisia, however, young Moroccan Jews are substantially less likely than their elders to favor an activist political orientation. In both countries, differing national political philosophies are probably reflected particularly strongly in the views of the young since they have grown up after independence and had little exposure to alternative models.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Several conclusions about the political culture of North African Jewry emerge from our analysis. In both Tunisia and Morocco, Jews consider themselves powerless and politically marginal. Yet, they are comparatively trusting of the government. Many believe that the government cares about them, and many who do not believe that Jews benefit at least incidentally from government policies. This general orientation, which regards the government as authoritarian but essentially benevolent, is particularly characteristic of Jews in Tunisia but, as a general description, applies to Morocco as well, especially to the older Moroccan Jews.

Factors relating to life experiences and social position affect political orientations. With one exception—that of older, poorly educated Tunisian Jews—older Jews tend to be more supportive of the government than younger Jews. This probably reflects their greater integration into Muslim society and personal experiences satisfactory enough to have kept them in North Africa during

a period of emigration. In Tunisia, poorly educated older Jews are more politically alienated and this too reflects their personal situation. Their marginality as Jews is compounded by a potentially personal marginality, and hence a frustration that leads to negative political attitudes. Younger Jews are generally unconcerned about politics, at least in part, because they are not well integrated into Muslim society, know little Arabic, and, in sum, do not regard themselves as Tunisian or Moroccan the way their parents do.

Factors relating to demography and communal organization are also associated with political orientations. To the extent the Jewish community is relatively intact, offering a meaningful social identity and some psychological security, people are less likely to feel threatened by the government and be politically alienated. Morocco's Jewish community is more institutionalized than Tunisia's, and this is undoubtedly one reason that poorly educated Jews have more negative political orientations in Tunisia. Differences are particularly striking among older individuals. In Tunisia, few of these persons believe they have political influence, feel the government cares about them, or have high levels of respect for political authority. A related proposition is that support for political activism declines as a function of communal organization. If the minority is relatively disorganized, as in Tunisia, its members welcome an activist government and view it not as threatening but as increasing their protection from other, more powerful, forces in society. If the group is comparatively powerful, however, as in Morocco, its members prefer to articulate and defend their own interests. They seem to fear that government activism will reduce their political influence.

Finally, factors relating to the institutions and political culture of the country generally influence political attitudes. Differences between Tunisian and Moroccan Jews are consistent with the differing political styles of the two countries. Moroccan Jews are more conservative and Tunisian Jews are more activist in their political orientations. Further, in Tunisia where Muslims are available for comparison, there are many similarities between the opinions of Jews and Muslims. Older, poorly educated persons of both religions respond to government initiatives in the same way, for example. In both countries, young Jews have assumed many political orientations prevailing in society, probably because they are less familiar with alternative approaches. This is the case even though they have little objective knowledge about local politics and view their conceptions as relating primarily to another society.

The situation of Jews in North Africa is not unique. Neither is it identical to that of other groups with which comparisons might be profitable. One such group is the population of Asians in East Africa. These individuals are culturally different than the majority population and largely uninterested in assimilating its norms. Further, like Jews in North Africa, Asians in East Africa are associated with colonialism in the minds of much of the dominant population. They are also higher than the rest of the population on most measures of development. Finally, they are few in number, relatively powerless, and to some extent concerned with physical security. Despite these similarities, however, there are many differences between Jews in North Africa and Asians in East

Africa. The latter are not indigeneous; their presence is a direct result of colonialism. Also, there is no portion of the community culturally and linguistically similar to the dominant population. Finally, they are not part of a people with whom the dominant population is at war. The relative importance of differences and similarities depends on one's interest, and whether observations about North African Jewry shed light on the response of East African Asians to their own situation remains unknown. But the possibility is reasonable enough to be suggested as a line for future research.

The principal additional group with which we are concerned is Arabs living in Israel. Again, there are both similarities and differences between this group and Jews of the Maghreb. A major similarity is the cultural distance between majority and minority and the fact that neither desires assimilation. Educational systems are largely separate, with different languages; social mixing is extremely limited; and, above all, the state is deliberately linked to the identity of the majority. Another similarity concerns professional life. De jure discrimination in Israel is rare. But Arabs have difficulty advancing in many professions and have more trouble than Jews obtaining business loans and purchasing property. At the same time, as in North Africa, there *are* some minority group members in prominent positions. A third similarity is tension between the majority and minority, fed by the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. Arabs frequently report incidents of harrassment. Many Jews view Arabs with suspicion, believing they threaten the security of the state. Another similarity is that each minority is prevented by the Arab-Israeli conflict from having normal relations with the intellectual centers of those who share its identity. Jews in North Africa must eschew contact with Israel. Arabs in Israel have only limited contact with the rest of the Arab world. A final point of similarity involves constraints on political activity by the minority. Israeli Arabs do have widespread freedom of expression. But, perhaps even more than Jews in North Africa, Israel's Arab population has but limited opportunities to organize politically in defense of its collective interests.

One significant difference between Jews in North Africa and Arabs in Israel is that the Arabs form a relatively complete community. Much of its leadership left in 1948, and some young, well-educated Arabs emigrate today. Nevertheless, the community is not at all characterized by a disproportionately large number of inactive persons as in the North African case. Another difference is the fragmentation of the Arab community in Israel. Religious divisions among Muslims, Druzes, and a number of Christian groups are important. Moreover, Arab life often revolves around traditional local institutions which reinforce these divisions or subdivide them further on the basis of village or clan. In North Africa, the Jewish communities possess comparative structural and ideological unity. A third dissimilarity is that Arabs in Israel are educationally and economically disadvantaged compared to the dominant population, the opposite of the situation of Jews in North Africa, giving Arab-Jewish relations a different character in Israel. Jews in North Africa are often resented for their advantaged position. Arabs in Israel are frequently seen as backward. A related difference is that Israeli Arabs are principally a village population, and

even in cities they rarely reside in Jewish neighborhoods. There is, of course, contact between Arabs and Jews—especially at work. Nevertheless, residence and occupational patterns greatly limit contact between the two communities in Israel. Thus, Arabs and Jews know each other less well and there are proportionately fewer Arab-Jewish friendships in Israel than in the Maghreb. A final difference is the freedom of expression of Arabs in Israel. There are, of course, limits to this freedom. Moreover, though less restricted in absolute terms than North Africa's Jewish population, the latter is probably better off relative to its host population. After all reservations are noted, however, it remains important to observe that Israeli-Arab newspapers, politicians and intellectuals publically criticize the government in a way that North African Jews would never dare.

Data on the political orientations of Arabs in Israel are presented in detail elsewhere. But some similarities and differences between these orientations and those of Jews in North Africa can be briefly noted to place this analysis in comparative perspective. A major similarity is that levels of political activity among the minority are low in both places. Arabs vote in elections, but otherwise, with few exceptions, are not involved in political life. A related similarity is that levels of political efficacy are low among both minorities. An important difference is that Arabs in Israel have more political knowledge but lower levels of political trust than Jews in North Africa. This suggests that Israeli Arabs are sensitive to political affairs and view the government, rather than Jewish society generally, as their principal political enemy. In North Africa, where Jews are few in number and in a comparatively privileged position, the government is seen as protector. Private Arab-Jewish relations, though sometimes excellent, are the major source of tension. In Israel, most Arabs view the government not as authoritarian yet benevolent, but as a semicorrupt political machine: rewarding its friends, who are the majority and "docile" Arabs, reinforcing divisions between majority and minority, supporting reactionary elements in Arab society, and harassing Arabs who dare to oppose it. Thus, as a general summary observation, the political culture of nonassimilating minorities seems to be characterized by limited individual involvement with the political system of the majority, by relatively atrophied or undeveloped political institutions serving the minority, by a sense of inefficacy and powerlessness, by limited psychological identification with the state, and by a view of the government that varies from positive to negative as a function of the size and relative socioeconomic position of the minority.

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NOTES

[1] Some of the material in this paper is also discussed in Mark A. Tessler, Linda L. Hawkins, and Jutta Parsons, "Minorities in Retreat: The Jews of the Maghreb," in R. D. McLaurin, ed., *The Political Role of Minorities in the Middle East* (New York 1979); additional comparisons of Jews in North Africa and Arabs in Israel are to be found in Mark A. Tessler, "The Identity of Religious Minorities in Nonsecular States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20 (July 1978), 359–373, and Mark A. Tessler, "Ethnic Change and Non-Assimilating Minority Status: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel," in C. Keyes, ed., *Ethnic Change* (Seattle, forthcoming): and some findings relating to Arabs in Israel are presented in Mark A. Tessler, "Israel's Arabs and the Palestinian Problem," *Middle East Journal*, 31 (Summer 1977), 313–329.

[2] For a fuller discussion of the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Middle Eastern society, see Mark A. Tessler, "Secularism in the Middle East? Reflections on Recent Palestinian Proposals," *Ethnicity*, 2 (July 1975), 178–203.

[3] Most literature on North African Jewry is in French. Perhaps the most useful general account of recent vintage is Andre Chouraqui, *La Saga des Juifs en Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1972). A useful introductory work in English is the translation of one of Chouraqui's earlier books, *The Jews of North Africa: Between East and West* (Philadelphia, 1968). For the interested reader, an extensive bibliography, which includes monographs and a thorough review of the periodical literature, is to be found in Robert Attal, *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord: Bibliographie* (Leiden, 1973). Finally, for a look at recent scholarship in the field, attention is directed to the many papers presented at an International Conference on Jewish Communities in Muslim Lands, held in Jerusalem in the Spring of 1974 and sponsored by the Institute of Asian and African Studies and the Ben Zvi Institute.

[4] In cases where the publication of certain facts or opinions might be prejudicial, details have been changed to protect the identity of informants or the persons about whom they reported.

[5] Jews from the Spanish-speaking zone of northern Morocco have for the most part gone to Spain or South America.

[6] Among the most important works are D. Bensimon-Donath, *Immigrants d'Afrique du Nord en Israel* (Paris, 1970), S. Deshen, *Immigrant Voters in Israel* (Manchester, 1970), S. N. Eisenstadt, et al., eds., *Integration and Development in Israel* (London, 1970), and M. Shokeid, *The Dual Heritage: Immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in an Israeli Village* (Manchester, 1971).

[7] It may be noted that political participation and efficacy levels among Muslims were not always as low as in 1973. See Mark A. Tessler, "The Application of Western Theories and Measures of Political Participation to a Single-Party North African State," *Comparative Political Studies*, 5 (July 1972), 175–191. Ideally, it would be desirable to assess Jewish attitudes at a time when Muslims had more positive political orientations and higher levels of political participation in order to distinguish more fully between currents which derive from the general situation and those which derive from the position of Jews in society.

[8] Social science faculties at the national university in Rabat were closed in 1973 as a result of student unrest. Survey research on questions of potential relevance was not encouraged and, unlike Tunisia, few indigenous scholars were carrying out such research.

[9] Differences in the Tunisian and Moroccan political style can be appreciated by reading and comparing Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia since Independence* (Berkeley, 1965), and John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful* (New York, 1970). Comparative political studies of the two countries include Douglas Ashford, *National Development and Local Reform* (Princeton, 1965), Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa* (Boston, 1971), and Elbaki Hermassi, *Leadership and National Development in North Africa* (Berkeley, 1972).