COLONIES—
AN ATTEMPT AT A TYPOLOGY*

By Professor M. I. Finley, Litt.D., F.B.A., F.R.Hist.S.

READ AT THE SOCIETY'S CONFERENCE
19 SEPTEMBER 1975

I

IN her recently published diary of her first visit to Africa, in 1929, Margery Perham reported a conversation with seven degree-course men at the newly established college at Fort Hare. When, inevitably, talk got round to conditions in South Africa, they asked 'terrible questions'. 'Can England do *nothing* then?' 'But South Africa is the possession of England.' 'But the *King*! He is King of South Africa. What does he think? Will *he* do nothing?'[1]

One cannot resist a smile at such a simpleminded view of 'possession'. The seven young men fresh from the bush were of course not wrong to use the word and to link it with the king. They were constitutionally correct, at least: the Interpretation Act of 1889, for example, defined 'British possession' as 'any part of Her Majesty's dominions exclusive of the United Kingdom. . . .'[2] Along with 'possession', it is to be noticed, there is a second, etymologically even stronger term of property, 'dominion'. Both, furthermore, are interchangeable with 'colony' in constitutional documents. Two acts of Parliament a quarter of a century apart will serve to exemplify: the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 defined a 'colony' for purposes of that act as 'all of Her Majesty's Possessions abroad in which there shall exist a legislature' (with exceptions irrelevant in my context), replaced in the Interpretation Act by 'dominions exclusive of the British Isles'.[3]

The mistake Miss Perham's interlocutors made was to take a metaphor literally, and so we smile. But is it so self-evident that 'possessions' and 'dominions' were always just metaphors? And why these particular words? Metaphors do not arise arbitrarily or capriciously. I go further. I am confident, though I cannot demonstrate,

* This is a slightly longer version of the paper read at the Conference. I am grateful to John Dunn for his advice and patient criticism.

[1] M. Perham, *African Apprenticeship* (London, 1974), p. 50.

[2] 52 & 53 Vict., c. 63, sect. 18 (2).

[3] 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, sect. 1, and 52 & 53 Vict., c. 63, sect. 18 (3), respectively.

that the property connotation was never far from men's minds, at home and abroad, virtually until our own day. Seeley's jeremiad on the word 'possession'—'the expression almost seems to imply slavery'[4]—though housed in his chapter on the 'old colonial system', was obviously directed to public opinion at the time he was lecturing, in 1881 and 1882. I cannot *demonstrate* the property-tone, however, because, to my knowledge, the semantics of colonial terminology have not been systematically investigated (unlike 'empire' and its cognates), a situation which I find astonishing.

Only the administrative semantics are fairly clear—some of the time. Administrators have to draw distinctions in more complex governmental situations. The classical Greeks, for example, differentiated an *apoikia* from a *klērouchia*, the Romans of the Republic a Latin *colonia* from a Roman *colonia*, according to whether the migrants did or did not retain citizenship in the mother-city. That was a neat and meaningful dichotomy, more so than the Victorian one based on whether or not a foreign possession had its own legislature. Since Victorian times there has been a riot of terminology and administrative distinction, to the point that Lord Hailey dismissed all the 'labels' in the British Empire as 'immaterial'.[5] When the Colonial Office List of 1946 carries thirty-six main headings, which do not include all the colonies but do include protectorates and trust territories inhabited by more people than lived in the colonies,[6] the historian (and sociologist) had best abandon the lot and establish his own classification.

For the present I shall assume, without trying to defend, that there is value in a typology. That requires converting 'colony' into a technical term (irrespective of administrative usage), which it is not in ordinary speech. There the latitude is boundless. One honourable member rose in the Commons debate over the Corn Laws to argue that free trade was the principle by which 'foreign nations would become valuable Colonies to us, without imposing on us the responsibility of governing them'.[7] No one misunderstood him, any more than we misunderstand when we read that 'colonial territories' occupied about one third of the earth's surface at the end of the Second World War. We understand—most of the time—'decolonization', 'semi-colonial countries' and the rest, though the shifts in

[4] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, ed. John Gross (Chicago and London, 1971), p. 55.

[5] Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, rev. 1956 (London and New York, 1957), p. 146.

[6] See Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions 1947* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 1–5.

[7] Quoted from B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 8.

meaning that are implied may be considerable and are not always uncontroversial.

When I now suggest the need for converting 'colony' into a technical term, I am not embarking on the absurd enterprise of trying to change the world's speech habits, or even my own. I shall continue to speak of 'semi-colonial countries' and 'decolonization' when the context supplies the necessary shading; I do not mind such metaphors as the 'English colony in Florence' or the 'German colony in Milwaukee', any more than I mind a 'nudist colony' or a 'colony of bees'. What I am seeking, however, is a way to overcome some of the difficulties and errors in which historians have embroiled themselves by their retention of loose usage in many complicated contexts—historians of ancient Greece, of the twentieth century, and of any and all the centuries in between. Twenty-five years ago two American historians, Merril Jensen and Robert L. Reynolds, published a plea (their word) for comparative study of the 'European colonial experience'.[8] If they have gone largely unheeded, it must be said that their approach was not very encouraging: their stress was on the 'unbroken' 'continuity of European experience in organizing colonial societies' for a thousand years, and their proposed categories of analysis are too incoherent and shifting. Yet a start had been made on the continent in the nineteenth century, not by historians but by economists, lawyers and publicists, in Germany and especially in France. The language of the latter—*comptoirs* or *colonies de commerce*, *colonies d'exploitation*, *colonies de plantation*, *colonies de peuplement*—has found some echo among continental historians, but only as language.[9]

These men required a typology because they were closely involved with policymaking—they were almost all vigorous advocates of colonial expansion—and with the government, and therefore drew

[8] 'European Colonial Experience. A Plea for Comparative Studies', in *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto*, iv (Milan, 1950), pp. 75–90.

[9] As an illustration, note how Robert Lopez unnecessarily explains why the medieval Genoese *comptoires* in the Levant could not have become 'colonie di popolamento': *Storia delle colonie genovesi* (Bologna, 1938), p. 457. The two most important works I have in mind are W. Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung*, originally published in 1848 and much enlarged in a 3rd edn, with K. Jannasch (Leipzig, 1885), by the addition of a new section, 'Deutsche Aufgaben in der Gegenwart'; and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modèrnes* (1874; 3rd edn, Paris, 1886). In view of the repute of R. Maunier, *Sociologie coloniale* (2 vols, Paris, 1932–36), it is worth noting that among the many remarkable things to be found there is the claim that the only attempt before his own to 'define colonization systematically' is Georges Hardy, 'Colonisation', *Revue de synthèse*, i (1931), pp. 61–80. Hardy's sole concern was the French policy of colonization after the Restoration, and his article consists largely of long quotations from the *Grand Larousse*, Leroy-Beaulieu, Girault and others.

distinctions in order to recommend one policy and reject another. It is symbolic that the abridged sixth edition of the popular manual by Arthur Girault was published in Paris by the well-known law publisher Sirey in 1943 and prepared by Maurice Besson, sous-directeur in the Ministère des Colonies and directeur of the Agence Economique des Colonies Françaises.[10] The fact that historians are not normally enmeshed in policy-making does not seem sufficient ground for abdicating the role of analyst. In what follows, I shall argue that it is important to retain the narrower sense of 'colony' which prevailed until it became, in the late nineteenth century, a loosely used synonym for the genus 'dependency' rather than a species of the genus. I hold, in other words, that for most of its history the term had its own specific denotation which the historian, at least, needs to hold on to conceptually, whatever his linguistic habits, a denotation encompassing specific, intrinsic elements that can be enumerated and examined over a range wide enough to take in, say, ancient Bologna or Narbonne and modern Australia or Mozambique.

II

My starting-point is yet another, once common English synonym for 'colony', namely, 'plantation'. Today the dominant sense of 'plantation' is that of a large estate, often with monoculture and usually located in tropical or semi-tropical regions—cotton plantation, sugar plantation, tea plantation. That is the etymologically strict sense. But from at least the sixteenth century into the nineteenth, in English the word 'plantation' took a turn that was very rare in ancient and medieval Latin and effectively unknown in modern Romance languages: people, not crops, were the objects of the 'planting' and the 'transplanting'.[11] That is the theme of Francis Bacon's thirty-second essay, entitled 'Of Plantations'; it is the meaning of the term in the act of the Privy Council of 1 December 1660

[10] The 'title' is worth reproducing in full: *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale. Les Colonies françaises avant et depuis 1815. Notions historiques, administratives, juridiques, économiques et financières.* The first edn appeared in 1895; the 5th (1926–29) required five vols.

[11] Thus, I could find only 'colonie', never 'plantation', in this sense in the documents, beginning as early as 1635, quoted in Emilien Petit, *Droit public ou Gouvernment des colonies françaises* (1771; ed. A. Girault, Paris, 1911); or in V. P. Malouet, *Collection de mémoires et correspondances officielles sur l'administration des colonies* (5 vols, Paris, 1802), whereas the latter occasionally uses 'plantation' in the tropical sense' *e.g.* 'plantatiou de café' (*i*, 71). Among modern French writers, 'colonie de plantation' or 'système de plantation' is of course restricted to the latter type; see *e.g.* Leroy-Beaulieu, *Colonisation*, p. 155; H. Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français 1871–1914* (Paris, 1960), pp. 1–2.

establishing a Council for Foreign Plantations, a document in which 'dominions' and 'colonies' both occur as synonyms for 'plantations';[12] it is the language of the bitter seventeenth-century controversies over the settlements and resettlements in Ireland.[13] Late in the next century, Burke's speech on American taxation, 19 April 1774, was directed against the Act 'for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America' (in which 'dominions' again appears as another synonym). The following year, his resolution for reconciliation began with these words, 'That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North America, consisting of fourteen separate governments. . . .' The year after that, Adam Smith, in the opening pages of his chapter 'On Colonies', wrote: 'The Latin word (*Colonia*) signifies simply a plantation'—a definition naturally not now to be found in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*.

I need not go on: the available documentation is infinite, showing that, for more than three hundred years, however much disagreement there may have been about the objectives of colonization or about the ways of governing colonies, there was complete agreement that a colony was a plantation of men, a place to which men emigrated and settled. *Colon* in French, *Siedler* in German, make the same point. That qualification effectively rules out British India, which needs no discussion, but, in my view, it also rules out the so-called Genoese colonies in the Middle Ages, and it implies that the late nineteenth-century struggle for Africa was largely not a struggle for colonies. We shall return to both Genoa and Africa a bit later.

There was also, in those three hundred years, complete agreement that a colony was not only a plantation but also a dependency of the country from which the emigration was initiated.[14] But now there is a tendency, among historians at least, to equate 'colonization' with any 'emigration', which I believe to be as objectionable as the equation, colony = any dependency. As with the latter, there are contexts in which 'colony = any emigration' may not be objectionable. When Edward Gibbon Wakefield wrote explicitly in 1833 that he would use the term 'colony' to express 'the idea of a society at once immigrating and emigrating, such as the United States of America and the English settlements in Canada, South Africa and

[12] See G. L. Beer, *The Old Colonial System* (2 vols, 1913; repr. Gloucester, Mass., 1958), i, 231–34.

[13] See *e.g.* T. W. Moody, *The Londonderry Plantation 1609–41* (Belfast, 1939); T. C. Barnard 'Planters and Policies in Cromwellian Ireland', *Past and Present*, no. 61 (1973), pp. 31–69.

[14] The participation of migrants from other countries is a complication which I cannot discuss, except for a brief mention below.

Australia',[15] he was advocating a policy designed to deal with what he saw to be overpopulation and difficulties in capitalist production in England. He was writing as a political economist, not as a historian,[16] and he was consciously twisting the word 'colony' into a new sense. He was, in fact, in the mainstream of the debate over free trade imperialism, the context which made it reasonable, as it could not have been earlier, for the M.P. I have already quoted to say, even metaphorically, that 'foreign nations would become valuable Colonies to us'.

That need give us no trouble, though it troubled Seeley, curiously, and I cannot resist quoting him on the subject. 'There would be no question at all about the value of colonies,' he wrote, '. . . if it were not for the existence of the United States. But the United States are to us almost as good as a colony; our people can emigrate thither without sacrificing their language or chief institutions or habits. . . . In estimating the value of colonies in the abstract, we shall only confuse ourselves by recollecting this unique case; we ought to put the United States entirely out of view.[17] I do not understand why Seeley floundered so badly, even granted his excessive confidence in the powers of kith and kin and his lack of sophistication in both demography and political economy. Certainly his French contemporaries and counterparts, Leroy-Beaulieu for example, would have known how to dismiss the United States alternative more brutally and more effectively than 'we shall only confuse ourselves by recollecting this unique case'.

There are greater sources of confusion, to which I now turn. Koebner's famous opening chapter of the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* is entitled 'The Settlement and Colonization of Europe', and throughout he uses the two words, 'settlement' and 'colonization', as synonyms. The only justification I can find in the chapter consists of a short phrase at the end of the second page: 'The use which Roman rule and Roman or Romanized society made of the provinces *implied colonization in the strict economic sense of the term*' (my italics). Koebner does not say what the 'strict economic sense' of the term is, and I am compelled to believe that by 'economic' he means 'etymological': every writer on the subject since the sixteenth

[15] *England and America* (2 vols, London, 1833), ii, 74 (from the 200-page 'note' entitled 'The Art of Colonization'). It is perhaps worth reporting that the 'plantation' synonym for 'colony' was still a current term for Wakefield: 'In the case of every plantation in North America, whether English, French, or Dutch, the settlers had to contend. . . .': *Letter from Sydney* (Everyman's Library edn, London, 1929), p. 36.

[16] On Wakefield's place in the economic debates of the time, see Semmel, *Free Trade Imperialism*, and Donald Winch, *Classical Political Economy and Colonies* (London, 1965), both via the index.

[17] *Expansion of England*, p. 50.

century knew, and most said, that the Latin word *colonia* stems from the verb *colere*, to cultivate, to farm. For a more recent, more extreme and explicit deployment of that linguistic fact I refer to Herbert Lüthy's monograph-long essay, 'Die Epoche der Kolonisation', which begins by noting that 'culture' and 'colonization' have the same etymology and then proceeds, not to write about colonization as promised in the title, but to offer a 'philosophical' *Kulturgeschichte* differentiating Oriental society from Western, and so on.[18] This may be a caricature, but the basic fallacy of etymological arguments remains in more sober treatments. What the Romans meant by *colonia* has no binding force on later ages, but it is perhaps worth noting nonetheless, first, that the *colere*-root conceals the military aspect of Roman *coloniae*; second, that from the beginning of the Empire, *colonia* lost its Republican meaning and became something not only different but etymologically unrelated, namely, the highest status to which a *civitas* could aspire in the municipal administrative structure of the empire, regardless of its origin and early history.

Man's conquest of the earth's surface is a most important theme. Colonization is a part of it, not the whole of it. It is not unrevealing that Koebner writes 'colonization' and 'colonist' on every page, but not 'colony'. There can be no colonization without colonies. I therefore rule out all manifestations of what is often called 'internal colonization'. No one speaks of the colonization of the midwest and west of the United States, and I am unable to find any more justification for that term when it is applied to settlements within the Roman empire or within Charlemagne's empire, or to enforced transplantations by tyrants or conquerors.

The proposition that a colony must be a dependency also rules out all migrations to foreign territory in which from the outset the migrants established independent communities or converted existing organizations into independent states. It is irrelevant whether there was conquest or peaceful settlement by agreement: an early legal distinction in this country between ceded and conquered territories was abandoned because the two overlapped much of the time.[19] More recent attempts to retain the distinction have to rely on such trivialities as Reunion Island, Tahiti or the purchase of Manhattan from the Red Indians.[20] The so-called Greek and

[18] 'Die Epoche der Kolonisation und die Erschliessung der Erde: Versuch einer Interpretation des europäischen Zeitalters', in his *In Gegenwart der Geschichte* (Köln and Berlin, 1967), pp. 179–270.

[19] See Wight, *Colonial Constitutions*, p. 5.

[20] That is the mouse produced by Maunier, *Sociologie coloniale*, in his thunderous assault in the opening chapter on the 'conventional conception' that 'colonization is only one form of conquest', against which, he says, it is 'a contact of peoples'.

Phoenician colonies of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C., extending from the coasts of the Black Sea to Marseilles and Carthage, were more peaceful enterprises in some instances, less in others, but what is essential is that they were all, from the start, independent city-states, not colonies (apart from a small number of unimportant exceptions). The extensive Macedonian and Greek migration into the territories of the Persian empire conquered by Alexander the Great, which led to the establishment a generation after his death of the Hellenistic kingdoms of Egypt, Syria and the rest, was not a colonizing movement. Neither were the barbarian invasions of the Roman empire, nor the Normans in England and Sicily.

These are the easy cases, and one may wonder why I am insistent on the labels. There are two reasons. The first comes under the heading of abatement of a nuisance, perhaps most understandable to an ancient historian. The nuisance is word magic: words unavoidably carry their semantic clusters with them, and, once a settlement is labelled a colony, that word's cluster becomes attached. Anyone familiar with the literature about the early Greek and Phoenician settlements will immediately recognize the symptoms. Commercial domination, monopoly, even export drives occur and recur in the literature, not because the evidence suggests these things but simply because we have acquired the unfortunate habit of calling the settlements 'colonies'.

My second reason is more substantial. A typology cannot be correct or incorrect; it is only more or less useful for the purposes for which it is designed. Obviously there are contexts in which the fact of emigration is so weighty that the destination (geographical or political) of the migrants may be reduced to a minor variable or ignored altogether—the demographic history of a country or region, for instance. However, the history of colonies is surely the history of the ways in which the power, prestige and profits of some countries were enhanced (or so they hoped) by external dependencies of migrant settlers. Dependency is then a significant variable, which is understressed, when not wholly lost sight of, by a bad system of classification. As Fieldhouse insisted, in a different context, ' "formal" empire' gave a 'power to determine the character of economic development to a degree inconceivable in "informal" dependencies'.[21] I am of course not suggesting that the establishment of the Hellenistic monarchies, say, had no impact other than demographic on old Greece. My point is that, unless one is satisfied with an infinite series of discrete units, a useful classification will

[21] D. K. Fieldhouse in *France and Britain in Africa*, ed. P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (New Haven and London, 1971), pp. 600–01.

inevitably have 'floating' variables that appear in more than one class. Some emigrants are colonists, some are not colonists. Nothing could be more elementary or obvious, yet I find it essential to say the obvious in forthright language.

Now let us look at four less easily agreed cases, all of them medieval—the Crusader states in Palestine, the German expansion east of the Elbe, the Venetian Romania and the Genoese trading 'colonies'. That the first of these, the Crusader states, should be bracketed with the Hellenistic monarchies or the Normans in England as migratory conquests resulting in new, independent states seems self-evident. That is how Roscher, for example, took them.[22] Now, however, a quarter-century of persistent publication by Verlinden and Prawer has separated them off from antiquity and converted them into the first modern colonization movement. Verlinden calls them, together with the Genoese 'colonies' of the Levant, 'entirely comparable' to the New World, with 'no essential differences' in the 'colonial techniques'.[23] The Pilgrim Fathers would have been astonished to know that. Prawer, a pupil of Koebner's,[24] has made a more overt attempt to justify the position, notably in the final chapter of his recent book, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, with a subtitle which states his theme, 'European Colonialism in the Middle Ages'. There he begins with a definition: '. . . migration and colonization must not be confused. . . . Only when the migrating element becomes the dominant factor in a newly created polity can one speak of colonization.'[25] But his thesis then requires him to get rid of Greek, Phoenician and Roman 'colonizing movements' in antiquity, the Germanic migrations into the Roman empire and the Normans in Sicily, which he attempts by *ad hoc* arguments.

I cannot go into the arguments, none of which impresses me.[26] I cannot, for example, see the relevance (or even the import) of the statement that the ancient movements were merely Mediterranean whereas the Crusaders were 'bearers of the common heritage of European culture'.[27] Two points seem to me decisive, both of which

[22] *Kolonien*, pp. 3–4.

[23] C. Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), pp. xiii, xviii. This volume is a collection in English translation of articles published over a considerable time-span.

[24] The relevance of that relationship is particularly clear in Prawer's 'Colonization Activities in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, xxix (1951), pp. 1063–1118.

[25] *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1972), p. 469.

[26] Nor did they impress the one review in a scholarly journal I have seen, J. A. Brundage in *Speculum*, l (1975), pp. 145–47, though he concludes that the wrong-headed notion was worth pursuing.

[27] *Latin Kingdom*, p. 470.

Prawer concedes and then pays no attention to. The first is that 'there was no actual colonizing centre or homeland with political or economic claims to future conquests',[28] or, I believe more tellingly, no homeland with claims of any kind. When, in 1100, Baldwin I had himself crowned 'King of the Kingdom of Jerusalem', he was, on this score, doing precisely what Ptolemy I did in Egypt in 304 B.C. (a precedent Prawer neglects to consider). Either both were manifestations of colonization, or neither. To call the Crusaders 'rather unique' and 'a particular case' in colonial history,[29] is to concede that the phenomenon is classified badly.

The other decisive point is that the system which the Crusaders established was a feudal one.[30] Feudalism and colonialism, I would argue, are essentially incompatible. Feudal relations of dominance and subordination are personal, not state relations, and it does not matter whether they fall within or outside what we should call a 'nationality'. Anyway, the feudal relationships of Crusader Palestine existed solely within Palestine: there was no allegiance to kings or barons in Europe. Precisely the same is true of the great medieval German expansion eastwards, a complex movement in many ways unlike the Crusader activities but identical in the respect that the new kingdoms and principalities were never, not even in inception, subordinate to anyone in the territories from which the migrants came.[31] This topic is a minefield, even today, but, no matter what stance one adopts about Germans and Slavs, about conquest or peaceful amalgamation, the basic conclusion that we are concerned with feudal organizations not subject to, or dependent on, a 'motherland' cannot be challenged.[32]

The Venetian Romania, in contrast, was under total control from the motherland. The archives of the Consiglio and other state organs of Venice reveal day-to-day regulation, down to minutiae, of the Romania, which included at its peak Corfu, Crete, Euboea, various Aegean islands and a toehold or two on the mainland of Greece. Again our major authority speaks in his subtitle of the 'domain

[28] *Latin Kingdom*, p. 478.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 478, 480.

[30] For an analysis unhampered by the self-imposed chains of 'colonialism', see J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1973).

[31] The best short account known to me is G. Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (2nd edn, Oxford, 1947), chap. 10.

[32] A prime example of the political overtones in present-day accounts is W. Schlesinger, 'Die geschichtliche Stellung der mittelalterlichen deutschen Ostbewegung', *Historische Zeitschrift*, clxxxiii (1957), pp. 517–42. He finds the 'colonization' label 'nicht völlig gerecht' because eastern neighbours do not like it, and because the movement resulted in a 'Wohn- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' that grew into a 'Schicksalsgemeinschaft'.

colonial vénitien'.[33] I note, however, that in the thousands of extant documents the Venetians did not use the term *colonia* (any more than did the Crusaders in Palestine or the Genoese of their 'colonies'). That is not decisive, but it is suggestive. The original Venetian interest was in trade and trade routes. Later, the breakdown of Byzantine authority compelled Venice to intensify her control, and in the thirteenth century she even sent a small number of military settlers (called *feudatorii* and *cavalerie*) to Crete to back up her administrators, merchants and artisans in the cities. She also came to rely heavily on compulsory grain imports from the Romania to meet her own food needs, and, after the Black Death in particular, when shortage of labour on the land became a major worry, Venice imported Armenians and transplanted Aegean islanders to Crete and Euboea. The key element in all this is that agriculture remained exclusively in Greek hands, organized along Byzantine feudal lines, and that there was never any significant Venetian emigration. In my language, therefore, the Romania was not colonial and the Venetians were right not to speak of *coloniae*.

So were the Genoese. Their trading-stations or *comptoirs*, for which there are precedents going back to the Assyrians early in the second millennium B.C., were urban complexes established by treaty. They were granted certain extra-territorial privileges, and they were valuable enough to be fought over constantly by Genoese, Venetians and Pisans. But on no account were they political entities subject to the mother-city. Nor were there many Genoese emigrants. The occasional exception, such as the island of Chios (where the agricultural land was retained by Greeks),[34] does not warrant the colonial identification any more than does the fact, stressed by Verlinden and others, that individual Genoese seamen and adventurers entered the employ of the Portuguese and Spanish monarchs, climaxed of course by Christopher Columbus. More important than their nationality was their invariable practice of occupying newly found territory in the name of the monarch who employed them. That practice by itself breaks the continuity which is claimed by historians. The continuum within which these *comptoirs* are correctly to be located is that of the system later known as Capitulations, traceable from at least the time of Haroun al Rashid in the ninth century and familiar to the ancient world as well.[35]

[33] F. Thiret, 'La Romanie vénitienne au moyen-âge' (*Bibl. des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, no. 193, 1959).

[34] See P. P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese . . . 1346–1566* (3 vols, Cambridge, 1958), i, chap. 12.

[35] That is where the 11th edn of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* located them.

III

'Agriculture is the proper business of all new colonies', wrote Adam Smith, and earlier in the chapter he began the section entitled 'Causes of Prosperity of New Colonies' with these words: 'The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness, than any other human society.'[36]

Even when we put aside the large issues of political economy which lay behind this pronouncement, it remains correct, I believe, that land is the element round which to construct a typology of colonies. That is not the customary approach among historians, or even among publicists and theorists contemporary with events, but I suggest that is because they habitually view the issues from the metropolis, rather than from the colonies. When one looks inside the latter, in Africa for example, a first fundamental distinction becomes inescapable, that 'between those in which agriculture came to be based upon an expatriate farming class, and those in which African peasant producers were dominant.'[37]

Territory to be colonized was normally, perhaps always, thinly inhabited, but it was waste land only in the sense that it was inadequately or incompletely exploited.[38] More important, it was invariably someone else's land that was taken away through one device or another. Conquest and confiscation do not necessarily lead to colonization: Roman senatorial occupation of large tracts of *ager publicus* was not colonization, nor, to point to another kind of development, did the imposition of the zamindari and ryotwari land systems in British India benefit colonists, ruinous though it was to the native peasantry. It is the reverse which concerns me: colonization implies expropriation and settlement of land. Both contemporary observers and modern historians tend to concentrate too much on initial motives—glory, trade, overpopulation—which are usually disentangled only artificially and which were never binding on successive generations. Whatever Columbus or Cortez or La Salle may have had in mind, or their backers, they would have

[36] *Wealth of Nations*, ed. E. Cannan (Univ. Paperbacks edn, London, 1961), ii, pp. 124, 75.

[37] E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa* (London, 1973), p. 44.

[38] For 'waste land' as a euphemism, see the documents in the unsuccessful attempt, between 1885–1900, to take the land in the Gold Coast into the Crown's possession, quoted extensively by D. Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana* (Oxford, 1963), chap. 9.

marked the end of the history of the New World, not its beginning, had they not been followed by settlers.

Conquest, colonization, expropriation require justification. Although it is not my intention to consider the theory or ideology of colonization, one digression may be useful at this point, because it takes us to the beginning of modern colonization and places the land issue squarely in the centre. In the second book of *Utopia*, Thomas More wrote the following:

> And if the population throughout the island should happen to swell above the fixed quotas, they enroll citizens out of every city and, on the mainland nearest them, wherever the natives have much unoccupied and uncultivated land, they found a colony (*colonia*) under their own laws. They join with themselves the natives if they are willing to dwell with them. When such a union takes place, the two parties gradually and easily merge and together absorb the same way of life and the same customs, much to the great advantage of both peoples. By their procedures they make the land sufficient for both, which previously seemed poor and barren to the natives. The inhabitants who refuse to live according to their laws, they drive from the territory which they carve out for themselves. If they resist, they wage war against them. They consider it a most just cause for war when a people which does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste nevertheless forbids the use and possession of it to others who by the rule of nature ought to be maintained by it.
>
> If ever any misfortune so diminishes the number in any of their cities that it cannot be made up out of other parts of the island without bringing other cities below their proper strength (this has happened, they say, only twice in all the ages on account of the raging of a fierce pestilence), they are filled up by citizens returning from colonial territory. They would rather that the colonies should perish than that any of the cities of the island should be enfeebled.[39]

1516 seems an early date for an Englishman to involve himself in this particular debate, and the passage is regularly overlooked in work on colonies.[40] Yet More could not have been unaware of the notorious papal bull of 1492, *Inter Caetera*, granting Ferdinand and Isabella dominion of all lands in the New World not already pos-

[39] *Utopia*, ed. E. Surtz and J. H. Hexter (New Haven and London, 1965), p. 137.

[40] I must thank Quentin Skinner for directing my attention to the passage. The brief commentary on it by the Yale editors is almost wholly irrelevant, but at least they avoid the higher nonsense of others, briefly reported by Russell Ames, *Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia* (Princeton, 1949), pp. 163–67.

sessed by a Christian king or prince; of Henry VII's letters patent, of 1496, granting John Cabot the right to conquer and possess for the king any territory previously unknown to Christians; or of how the issue promptly became enmeshed in the older controversy over spiritual and temporal authority, which had, at least since Wyclif's day, been extended to certain questions of the rights to possessions. In 1510, six years before *Utopia* was published, the Scottish theologian and teacher John Major (or Mair), the first modern writer, so far as we know, to apply Aristotle's theory of natural slavery to the Amerindians, nevertheless acknowledged the 'proprietary rights of the infidel in his own land'.[41] I cannot say whether or not More knew Major's publication, but the Spanish theologian Vitoria certainly did when he published his *De India noviter inventis* in 1532.[42] Vitoria was the fountainhead of a line of theorists who fought a losing battle against the 'law of conquest'. Somehow the proponents of confiscation could always manage to find an ideological justification for their 'fell and butcherly stratagems', as the *Gold Coast Methodist Times* called them.[43] Witness the charade about 'tribal ownership' which surrounded the expropriation, in favour of the *colons*, of all the best land in Algeria following the suppression of the Moqrani revolt of 1871, eventually of more than one-third of the total.[44]

Putting ideology aside, we must consider in turn the variables from which a typology of colonies, based on land, can be constructed. The first would obviously be the natural resources: some land was best suited to agricultural and pastoral products also available in the homeland, some to such products as cane sugar, cotton, tobacco or coffee, for which Europe had to rely on foreign imports. No demonstration is required that both the relationship of the colony with mother country and other communities and the internal development of a colony diverged sharply according to this basic distinction in natural resources. It is, of course, the distinction underlying the French classification into *colonie de peuplement* and *colonie de plantation*.

However, soil suitability was not the sole difference between the two. The *colonie de plantation* was most often found in tropical or

[41] J. H. Parry, *The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 20.

[42] A translation will be found in J. B. Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law* (Oxford, 1934).

[43] Quoted in Kimble, *History of Ghana*, p. 339.

[44] C.-R. Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871–1919)* (2 vols., Paris, 1968), i, chap. 4–5; ii, chap. 27–28. On Rhodesia, see W. Roder, 'The Division of Land Resources in Southern Rhodesia', *Annals of the Assn. of American Geographers*, liv (1964), pp. 41–52, at pp. 45–46.

semi-tropical regions, and there was a tendency to monoculture with slaves or some other form of compulsory labour. The tie is so close that there is an impulse to think of these various aspects of land utilization as a unit. Europeans could not or would not work the land under tropical conditions—the standard explanation starts from there. There is truth in that, of course. 'The mosquitoes saved the West Africans' from having much of their land confiscated, said one commentator, 'not the eloquence of the intellectuals.'[45] But the simple explanation is not a sufficient one. It will not explain the radical difference between East and West Africa, between Kenya and Uganda, between Algeria and the rest of the Maghreb, or between the development of the absentee-owned plantations of Asia and the settler-plantations, often with the same tropical crops, of East Africa.[46] Climate, preference for monoculture or mixed farming as the case may be, absenteeism or settlement, the number and nature of the labour force are each either independent variables or functions of independent variables.

Two New World developments will illustrate. In Mexico, where very large holdings quickly emerged after the conquest, where there were silver mines and where the tropical climate was suitable for such products as sugar-cane, the dominant activity on the large estates to the end of the sixteenth century was cattle-ranching and sheep-farming. The decisive variable, in the persuasive argument of François Chevalier, was the desperate shortage of labour.[47] One is reminded of Wakefield's concern over the availability of cheap land and the unavailability of labour in Australia. It was not until the Europeans and Creoles in Mexico, who numbered no more than 100,000, having won their long struggle with the Spanish authorities, were able to reduce the Indians to peonage that crop-raising progressed significantly and the 'mixed hacienda type' (Chevalier's phrase) emerged.

To the north—and this is my second example—Josiah Child complained as early as 1668 that 'New England is the most prejudicial plantation to the kingdom of England' chiefly, though not solely, because 'all our American plantations, except that of New England, produce commodities of different natures from those of this kingdom, as sugar, tobacco, cocoa, wool, ginger, sundry sorts of dyeing woods etc., whereas New England produces generally the

[45] George Padmore, quoted in Kimble, *History of Ghana*, p. 354.

[46] On Kenya and Uganda, see Brett, *Colonialism*, part III, who also gives a brief analysis of the difference between settlement and absentee plantations, pp. 173–75.

[47] *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico*, translated by Alvin Eustis (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963).

same as we have here, viz. corn and cattle.'[48] When Child wrote that, the southernmost of the continental colonies were Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas, and, though there were marked climatic and ecological differences between them and New England, they were neither tropical nor sub-tropical, nor was there a significant disparity in the numbers of whites. In 1670, there were 36,913 whites, 225 blacks in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts together; 48,215 whites, 4,370 blacks in Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas. A century later, shortly before the outbreak of the Revolution, the corresponding figures were 333,053 whites, 5,908 blacks for the northern group; 574,858 whites, 396,201 blacks in the southern group. The difference with respect to slaves had become spectacular, but my present concern is with the whites, who, furthermore, were as English–Scotch–Irish in the south as in the north.[49] That last fact is of little significance to me; I mention it because it has mattered to others. Roscher spoke of the 'weak gift of the French' for colonization, and he rather unfairly called on Leroy-Beaulieu as a witness.[50] The latter, in turn, worried about the ratio of Frenchmen among the *colons* in Algeria, only 58 per cent in 1861, but consoled himself with the statistics showing that the French net increase was becoming progressively higher than that of Spaniards, Maltese and Germans in the colony.[51] But no one ever doubted the British 'gift'.

The temptation to play numbers games is powerful. One could say, for example, that in 1965 there were *only* 219,500 whites in Southern Rhodesia, the majority of them urban, against 4,070,000 Africans, or in Mozambique *only* 97,300 whites, 6,431,000 Africans. Virginia alone had almost as many white inhabitants in 1770—259,411—as the two large African colonies in our day.[52] There are contexts in the study of European history in which 'only' has a denigratory connotation, when the trifling numbers are compared, for example, with the tens of millions of Europeans who migrated to post-colonial North and South America in the nineteenth and

[48] *A New Discourse of Trade* (2nd edn, London, 1694), p. 213.

[49] I have compiled these figures from *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957*, published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, 1960), p. 756.

[50] *Kolonien*, p. 20 and n. 2.

[51] *Colonisation*, pp. 326–27. Mixed settlers could create difficulties: see J. Poncet, *La colonisation et l'agriculture européennes en Tunisie depuis 1881* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 341–47.

[52] These figures are taken from Clare Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888–1965* (Oxford, 1966), p. xvii, n. 2; eds. D. M. Abshire and M. A. Samuels, *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (London, 1969), p. 82; the U.S. Bureau of the Census volume cited above, n. 49.

twentieth centuries. But there are other contexts, within colonial history in particular, when 'only' has very different overtones, in comparing the settlers in Rhodesia with the far more numerous *colons* of Algeria or Australia. The raw land figures offer one such context—35·7 millions acres set aside for whites, 44·4 millions for Africans in Southern Rhodesia; more than four million and some seven million, respectively, in Mozambique.[53] I say 'raw figures' because they grossly underrate the relative productivity, access to railways, and other considerations in the two land categories, as with the slightly more than one-third of the total in Algeria I mentioned earlier.[54] And all other major aspects of the economy and the political organization provide further contexts within which to assess and compare population figures.

The complaint Leroy-Beaulieu actually made about the French was wholly unrelated to Roscher's 'gift' for colonization. The fatal flaw in early French attempts to colonize North America, he said, following Adam Smith and de Tocqueville, was the 'feudal property regime', both at home and in the colonies.[55] And that brings me to my next variable: the economic, social and political structure of the imperial country. Neither the official Spanish resistance to emigration, nor the mercantilist policy of successive English governments, nor the willingness or unwillingness of Europeans to migrate or to take to the land and work on it, nor the decision on any other fundamental policy was a matter of different royal preferences, national qualities or caprice. I would apologize once again for saying anything so obvious were it not for the way this variable is ignored in so much contemporary historical discussion. What I may call the Verlinden doctrine, with its belief in a thousand-year continuum beginning with the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and the Genoese *comptoirs*, collapses on this count alone.

'Structure' should in fact be in the plural: they change, and so do the colonies. To illustrate, it is sufficient to consider the numbers of men available for emigration and settlement. Into the nineteenth century there was a chronic shortage, even where the whole process was not discouraged, as in France and Spain (again for structural reasons). Then came the nineteenth-century flood, and a new complication: why should Englishmen assume the burdens and risks of settling in Kenya when they could go to the United States, Australia or South Africa? Seeley could 'put the United States entirely out of view', but Whitehall could not. Only a complex and expensive 'development' programme in Kenya could put the United States

[53] Palley, *op. cit.*, p. 265 n. 4; Abshire and Samuels, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
[54] On Rhodesia, see especially Roder, 'Land Resource'.
[55] *Colonisation*, pp. 150–52.

out of view,[56] and the British government's willingness and ability to do that for Kenya, but not for Uganda or the Gold Coast, is an essential, if not the only, key to the eventual differences among these three dependencies, differences so great that, in my categorization, Kenya was a colony, Uganda and the Gold Coast were not. Nor were the Congo, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and perhaps it is now more clear why I said earlier that the struggle for Africa was not, or at least not in large part, a struggle for colonies.

Finally, there are the indigenous populations to add to the list of variables. Except in Asia, they were technically backward, small-scale in their political organization, incapable of concerted action, as compared with their European conquerors. Above all, they were, the Asiatics included, hopelessly outclassed in their ability to apply force. That they differed considerably in their capacity for incorporation into a colonial system, which means essentially as a labour force, hardly needs demonstration, nor that the great heterogeneity which existed, and exists, arises from varied social structures, not from 'racial' differences. Furthermore, their adaptability and usefulness have not been a fixed quality, even when we look at any single population alone. The changes and the differences, in this respect, among the natives of Angola as between the slave-trade period and the era of Portuguese settlement in the twentieth century, offer a fair example of the dynamic interrelationship between changing colony and changing metropolis.[57] Nor could Kenya have been colonized in the days of mercantilism, before, that is, the emergence of advanced industrial capitalism.

IV

Taking a long view, and narrowing the variables to three, land, labour and the socio-economic structure of the metropolis, I suggest the following crude three-stage model. In constructing it, I have ignored such temporary phenomena as indentured or convict labour, not because they were not important in one place or another at one time or another, but because, in my judgment, they were always marginal devices. To incorporate them into a simple model would introduce more confusion than clarification.

In antiquity, there were the following possibilities when territory was encroached upon or subjugated:

1. it could be left largely autonomous on payment of a regular tribute, as in the Persian satrapal system;

[56] See Brett, *Colonialism*, pp. 167–71.

[57] See W. Rodney, 'European Activity and African Reaction in Angola', in *Aspects of African History*, ed. T. O. Ranger (London, 1968), chap. 3.

2. it could be incorporated into the state, as in the provinces of the Roman empire, usually with a substantial amount of settlement, a complication I shall return to;

3. it could be colonized by military settlements on confiscated land, as in the *coloniae* of the Roman Republic, but that, it should be stressed, was an untypical practice in the ancient world; or

4. it could be peopled by the newcomers, migrating in small numbers to found a new city-state, as among the archaic Phoenicians and Greeks; or migrating as a ruling elite to a new, or newly recreated, independent state, as in the eastern Hellenistic monarchies.

In so far as the newcomers either brought their own labour system with them or adopted the indigenous one, labour was an inert variable, so to speak. Slave labour was a metropolitan institution, not a colonial (or pseudo-colonial) one. That is to say, slaves were imported, at times in large numbers, usually from more backward societies, to meet the labour needs of the metropolis. When the practice was then carried over to newly acquired or conquered territories, that was merely a continuation of the metropolitan practice in another place but under the same socio-political conditions. The one exception to all this was a restricted one: Greeks who founded new settlements—not colonies, I repeat once more—on the margins of the old Greek world in the archaic period not infrequently reduced some of the indigenous people to a semi-servile condition roughly akin to Spartan helotage.[58]

In the early modern period, there were further instances of the difficult Roman imperial syndrome, conquest–incorporation–settlement, but the major development was of course overseas colonization, in which the settlers had the following possibilities:

1. work the land themselves with or without hired labour, chiefly European;

2. work the land with native compulsory labour, peonage; or

3. work the land with imported slave labour.

These were not mutually exclusive possibilities. Size of holding was obviously a factor, so that smallholdings with little or no additional labour coexisted with large estates worked by peons or slaves, as in Mexico or the southern colonies of the United States. There was also some absentee land ownership, that is, non-settler ownership, but

[58] The most important study is restricted to the Black Sea area: D. M. Pippidi, 'Le problème de la main-d'oeuvre agricole dans les colonies grecques de la mer Noire', in *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne*, ed. M. I. Finley (Paris and The Hague, 1973), pp. 63–82, reprinted in his *Scythica Minora* (Bucharest and Amsterdam, 1975), pp. 65–80.

that was not quantitatively or otherwise significant except in the earliest days of some of the colonies.

In the third phase, finally, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, peonage and slave labour were largely displaced in the genuine colonies by wage labour, while the small family-farm also continued in existence. That a sufficient wage-labour supply was created by a variety of compulsions, such as large-scale expropriation of land and calculated tax devices, is certainly true,[59] but the big distinction between more or less unwilling wage labour and slave labour is not to be brushed aside. The third phase saw a second new and important development, namely, the establishment in dependent territories of large holdings worked by local labour, more or less free, without the settler element. The metropolis provides managers, overseers, clerks, but they, like the army, the police, the civil servants and the mercantile employees, consider themselves sojourners, not migrants, and so they are in the overwhelming percentage of cases. Although both these developments of the third phase can be illustrated in embryo in earlier times, they are pre-eminently the consequence of the transformations that have occurred in the metropolitan economy, of the same structural changes which made it increasingly difficult to stimulate genuine colonization except by sophisticated and massive governmental effort.

On the political level, the paramount distinction which follows centres round the extent to which the settlers have both reasons and the power to determine policy, not only against the indigenous population but, even more important, against the metropolis. This is not a matter of mere numbers, absolute or relative, as South Africa, Rhodesia and Algeria demonstrate. Nor is it the same distinction as the commonly adduced ones of kith-and-kin or the emergence of nationalism, which even Engels was seduced by. Replying to an enquiry from Kautsky in 1892, Engels wrote: 'In my opinion, the colonies proper, that is, the countries occupied by a European population—Canada, the Cape, Australia—will all become independent; on the other hand, the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions—must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible to independence.'[60] That he was not a very good forecaster here is

[59] See *e.g.* W. L. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa* (London, 1971), pp. 29–39, and the alternative analysis by G. Arrighi in chaps. 5 and 7 of Arrighi and J. S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York and London, 1973).

[60] Quoted from *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, ed. S. Avineri (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), p. 473. For the original, see the edition of the Engels–Kautsky correspondence by B. Kautsky (Vienna, 1955), p. 63.

self-evident, but the two-way classification he employed was (and is) widely shared, and we must ask why, in the event, the achievement of independence did not divide in that neat way. I can phrase my answer in two rhetorical questions. A central aim of the Algerians in their war for independence was the physical expulsion of the *colons*, and most of them, some 800,000 in fact, left within six months of the end of the war. Whom did the Canadians or Australians wish to expel, or the thirteen American colonies in 1775? And who were the *colons* of India, Nigeria or Ghana? My two rhetorical questions point to two wholly different situations—that is obvious—and I believe my crude model elucidates basic elements of the difference.

Lest I appear to be claiming too much, I turn briefly to a situation about which I confess to being uncertain, namely, what I have called the 'Roman imperial syndrome', to which I should attach the English in Ireland and Wales. In all three, conquest was followed by immediate and formal incorporation into the metropolitan organization, and by confiscation of substantial tracts of land for settlement by migrants from the conquering nation. Administratively the Roman provinces, Wales and Ireland were distinct from colonies. William Molyneux in 1698 protested bitterly any suggestion that Ireland was a 'colony from England' like the Roman *coloniae*. Speaking for the Protestant interest, he wrote: 'Of all the objections raised against us, I take this to be the most extravagant; it seems not to have the least foundation or colour from reason or record.' Ireland, he continued, is 'a complete kingdom in itself. Is this agreeable to the nature of a colony? Do they use the title of Kings of Virginia, New-England or Maryland?'[61] Whatever the merits of this argument in debate, we saw at the start that administrative definitions are essentially unhelpful. Algeria was a fully incorporated department of metropolitan France, yet it was indubitably a colony. In every respect other than the administrative, Algerians in the overwhelming majority still considered themselves, more than a century after the conquest, to be the exploited subjects, not so much of the metropolis as of the settlers backed by the coercive power of the metropolis. This was not the case in the Roman provinces. There the empire rapidly 'ceased to be an alien dominion imposed on unwilling subjects by force. . . . Discontent of the subjects with foreign

[61] *The Case of Ireland's Being Bound by Acts of Parliament* . . . (Dublin, 1698), p. 148. This is the notorious book in which Molyneux openly and without permission employed, in a 'subversive' way, the arguments which his friend John Locke had propounded anonymously in the *Second Treatise* against a conqueror's general right to the possessions of the subjugated people; see John Dunn, 'The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century', in *John Locke; Problems and Perspectives*, ed. J. W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 45–80, at pp. 65–67.

rule was not . . . the cause of disruption, if only because the rule was not foreign.'[62] That there are men in Ireland and Wales who would not subscribe to these generalizations about Rome as an accurate reflection of their views and circumstances is certainly true. It is equally true, I believe, that few Irishmen or Welshmen would, if given the required information, think themselves in a similar position to the Algerians. And so I hesitate and waver.

If I have managed not to mention Irish and Welsh nationalism, that was by design. Of course nationalism (or national liberation) has been an emotive and ideological component in some colonial situations, particularly in colonial revolts. It was not, however, in the North American colonies in the eighteenth century. Nor, in the twentieth, is the concept of nationalism of any use in explaining the complex differences between Algeria and Tunisia, creating divergence both in their colonial history and in their decolonization.[63] Nor does it explain anything about Rhodesia, and on the colony of Rhodesia I rest my case.

Jesus College, Cambridge.

[62] P. A. Brunt, 'Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vii (1965), pp. 267–84, at pp. 274, 276.

[63] The distinctions are brought out in detail and sharp clarity by Poncet, *Tunisie*, implicitly throughout and sometimes explicitly.