On the History of Man-made Destruction: Loss, Death, Memory, and Germany in the Bombing War

by Robert G. Moeller

My mother-in-law was born in Belleville, Illinois in 1924. At the age of seventy-eight, she decided to start seeing the world. She's now travelled through much more of Europe than I have, so I was happy when in September 2004 she finally opted for a trip to *terra* that at least for me is a bit more *cognita* – a cruise on the Mosel and the Rhine. For the most part, my mother-in-law's interest in my job has extended little beyond her concern that I provide adequately for her granddaughter, but after she returned from Germany, we had many other things to talk about.

My mother-in-law's first comment when she got back from her trip was: 'They sure do like to talk about how they were bombed in World War Two. Well, I guess they were. But you know, I have a different memory of the war. I remember how many people I knew didn't come home. I remember how many of our boys died'. It is not surprising that as she travelled through Germany in the fall of 2004, she heard a lot about the bombs that fell on Germany in the Second World War. In remarkable ways, for the last five years, Germans have been fighting the war all over again in illustrated magazines, television documentaries, the feature sections of their newspapers, big box-office films, fat books with many, many footnotes and still others with many, many pictures. In Germany, the Second World War is 'in'.

Perhaps more than any other single book, *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945* ('The Conflagration: Germany in the Bombing War 1940-1945') by Jörg Friedrich, a freelance historian who was already well known for works on the post-war failure to bring Nazi criminals to justice and the Holocaust, initiated a national discussion of the bombing war. *Der Brand* was previewed in serialized form in the mass circulation *Bild-Zeitung* before it was published and, as a book, it has been a runaway bestseller, widely discussed in the press. It is also slated for translation into English and will be published by Columbia University Press.[1] Because it has emerged as a central marker in the politics of the past in contemporary Germany, I want to look at it in some detail. But it's worth emphasizing that it is not the only recent account of the bombing war. You can read more than one book about the bombing of Hamburg, one of the most

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

Courtesy of the Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, Bildarchiv.

Fig. 1. Friedrich describes in detail the bombing raids that levelled Cologne. This picture was probably taken in 1945.

destructive raids of the Second World War, but you can also read about Allied attacks on Kassel, Göttingen, the Edertalsperre, Krefeld, Solingen, Dortmund, Darmstadt, Berlin, Freiburg, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Main, Düsseldorf, Rostock, and of course, another very famous case, Dresden. An entire publication series devoted to 'German Cities in the Bombing War' suggests that there's much more yet to come.[2]

If you want to read still more, you don't have to go far to find it. A very interesting website, <historicum.net>, produced by historians at the Universities of Cologne and Munich, has devoted considerable space to the bombing war, including extensive guides to further reading.[3] And if you don't have that much time to read, you can pick up one of the special editions on the bombing war – 'Hell must have looked like this' – published by the weekly news-magazine *Der Spiegel*.[4] Or go to <Amazon.de> and get 'Firestorm: the Bombing War Against Germany', a documentary produced by Spiegel-TV and seen by some five and a half million viewers when it first aired on German television. Much of it is in living colour, and bonus materials include an extensive interview with Friedrich.[5]

In 1997, the novelist W. G. Sebald, a German expatriate, at home in England since 1966 but intellectually and emotionally never far from the country of his origin, turned his attention to this same bombing war. In an essay in his collection *On the Natural History of Destruction*, Sebald commented that 'the destruction, on a scale without historical precedent, entered the annals of the nation, as it set about rebuilding itself, only in the form of vague generalizations'. He described 'a kind of taboo like a shameful family secret, a secret that perhaps could not even be privately acknowledged', surrounding the 'darkest aspects of the final act of destruction, as experienced by the great majority of the German population'.[6] Sebald died in a car accident in December 2001. Had he lived, he might have been pleased to see the extent to which many dark aspects have been brought into the light of television documentaries, the press, and scholarly publications... or he might have learned that you need to be careful what you wish for.

What is going on? Why now? And what does this explosion, as it were, of interest in the bombing war have to say about the intersection of the politics of the past with the politics of the present in contemporary Germany? In what follows, I will offer some answers. I first want to review the basic outlines of the bombing war. Then I want to consider what variations on these themes Friedrich puts forward; I want to suggest how Friedrich's book fits into the 'memory landscape' – to borrow Rudy Koshar's phrase[7] – of contemporary Germany; I want to say why I find *Der Brand* a very troubling book; and I want to reflect on how the historical account of the bombing war that I'd prefer might look by outlining a research agenda which, if we all set out to pursue it, we might complete in time

for the seventieth commemoration of the end of the Second World War in 2015.

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First, a few facts on which everyone can agree, basic outlines that have been around for a while, and which, though reproduced in much of the recent literature, long predate the flood of books in the last few years. American, British, and German scholars have focused more on how the bombing war came about and was executed, not the details of its consequences for which Sebald sought in vain. They emphasize that the bombing campaign against Germany emerged from preparations for total war that originated before the First World War as strategists in advanced industrial countries began to think about how to use air power as a weapon. In two important ways at least, planning for a war that would include aerial bombardment in the 1920s and 1930s was a response to the First World War. Firstly, there was a widespread desire to avoid the kind of war of attrition that led to the death of hundreds of thousands of ground troops. Secondly, the First World War was a total war in which the mobilization of the industrial army on the home front was vitally linked to the fate of the army in uniform. From this perspective, the boundary between civilians and the military was blurred, and destroying the means of war production and disrupting the daily routines of those doing the producing were parts of a strategy to win the shooting war at the front. The air war prompted excessively optimistic expectations because it was quintessentially modern, based on the most sophisticated technology that an advanced industrial society could deliver.[8]

To translate theory into practice was not easy, but the British found a laboratory in which to experiment with aerial bombing before the 1940s. Twenty years earlier, British fliers, including Arthur Harris who designed the British bombing campaign in the Second World War, had been dropping bombs on Turks who sought to challenge the British presence in Iraq. Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, was more than ready to use air power against 'uncivilised tribes'.[9] American military planners were no less captivated by the possibilities of aerial warfare, and they carefully assessed the impact on domestic morale of the Japanese bombing of Shanghai and the German bombing of Guernica.[10] Still, not all military strategists were convinced that aerial bombardment could be effective, and as Richard Overy notes, Britain and the United States were the only major powers that were convinced that destruction dropped from the sky on industrial plants and industrial producers could be part of a successful military strategy.[11]

However, once the Second World War began, it was not the British and Americans but the Germans who first used aerial attacks that not only destroyed military targets but killed civilians. The Second World War

began with the bombing of Warsaw in September 1939. Historians agree that the subsequent German decision to bomb London, initiating the *Blitz*, convinced British political and military leaders to 'take the gloves off': to disregard the ambiguity of international law on the topic of aerial warfare, and retaliate in kind.[12] As military historians emphasize, German military leaders, unlike the Americans and British, never committed the resources required to develop the medium and heavy bombers that would have been required for a systematic campaign of strategic bombing. German military strategists used air-power primarily as a source of tactical support for ground troops. The *Blitz* was the exception; the *Blitzkrieg* was the rule.[13] The British, on the other hand, developed a bomber fleet that set out to do in Germany what British ground forces couldn't accomplish – destroy industrial capacity and undermine civilian morale. Even before the entry of the United States into the war, American industrial production supported this effort.

Although the British had begun bombing German cities in the spring of 1940, the results were mixed. Bombs made little dent in German industrial production, and the costs in downed planes and flight crews were extremely high. Among political leaders, public intellectuals, clerics, the general public, and even some military strategists, there were real concerns about the ethical implications of killing large numbers of civilians. Still, the bombing campaign continued, and after December 1941 British fliers were joined by Americans, who by August 1942 were dropping destruction on targets in occupied France. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to give the highest priority to the bombing campaign. The 'Combined Bomber Offensive' defined a division of labour which left Americans conducting 'precision' bombing missions and British squadrons 'carpeting' German cities with bombs at night.[14] Both British and American military leaders – with approval from the highest levels of the civilian political order – agreed that bombing to undermine domestic morale was legitimate. The destruction of housing – or 'dehousing' as the British called it – achieved by using incendiary bombs, was, they reasoned, potentially as disruptive to industrial production as the levelling of factories.[15]

As the war progressed, Britain and America produced more and more heavy bombers, and more effective fighter planes to provide defence for the bombers. The technological development of more devastating bombs including incendiary bombs, more effective technical means to jam enemy radar, and better radar devices on board planes improved the chances that pilots would find their sites and bombardiers would hit their targets. The bombing campaign intensified throughout 1943, and the heaviest bombing took place in the last months of the war.[16]

By spring 1945, the bombs had killed over 400,000 Germans. According to the best available estimates, this total covered some 360,000-370,000 who had lived within Germany's 1937 borders. The balance was made

up of Austrians, citizens of countries occupied by the Germans, slave labourers, prisoners-of-war, and soldiers. Because so many men were at the front, women were over-represented among the dead, as were infants. Older children did not die in numbers proportionate to their share of the population, because of the success of Nazi initiatives to evacuate young people from the cities. All casualty counts are estimates because local officials were kept so busy tending to the living that they could not accurately count the dead. Hundreds of thousands more Germans were injured. And in many big cities where as much as seventy per cent of housing stock was destroyed, millions more were left homeless at the war's end.[17]

After German surrender in May 1945, there was no consensus about whether aerial bombing hastened German defeat. Extensive post-war surveys by the British and Americans yielded anything but unequivocal evidence,[18] and the bombing campaign in the Second World War left a legacy of controversy about the legality of such military tactics. It's telling that at Nuremberg there was no mention of German bomb attacks as 'crimes of war', an indication that the Allies were uncertain about what was and wasn't a crime according to international rules of warfare, and of their concern that any mention of Coventry and Rotterdam would be met with mentions of Pforzheim, Hamburg, Berlin, Essen, Düsseldorf, Munich, Nuremberg, Dresden, and many other German cities.[19]

Friedrich presents these themes, with some variations, in chapters entitled 'Weapon' (*Waffe*), 'Strategy' (*Strategie*) and 'Protection' (*Schutz*), drawing on histories of Allied strategy, technological developments and the bombing campaign by German, British and American historians. In his criticism of British advocates of carpet-bombing, he echoes critical opinions expressed in Britain during the war. In fact, in order to contain the protest of those who did not support civilian bombing, political and military leaders did their best to limit public access to the full story about the consequences of the 'Bomber' Harris campaign.[20] Virtually all students of the air war would agree with Friedrich's conclusion that Germany was the first 'nation to test [the impact] of the fury of war let loose from the skies', but not all would accept his speculation that because of the absence of alternative weapons and an adequate land army and the unstoppable momentum of British inter-war strategic planning, the British bombing campaign might well 'have happened anyway'(p. 76).[21] And not everyone would agree with Friedrich's conclusion that the Americans were 'humane', engaging in the bombing of civilians only once their troops were on the ground. As many historians have argued, US policy was driven more by tactical and strategic than moral considerations. Although daytime bombing became more accurate as the war progressed, even by 1945 bomber squadrons were landing fewer than half of their bombs within 1,000 feet of their targets, with far less precision and far more 'collateral damage' than they wanted to admit.[22]

Friedrich is certainly correct to emphasize that bombing was never pursued as retribution for the German attempt to kill all the Jews of Europe,[23] but he tells us only in passing that the British bombing campaign was at least in part meant as a way to reassure Stalin that while preparing a ground offensive in the west, the British would do what they could to distract the Germans. Thus if the British answered the bombing of British cities with the bombing of German cities, they were also responding to the deaths of millions of Soviet civilians and Red Army soldiers (some of whom were Jews) who were being killed by Germans.[24] In addition, although *we* know that US and British bombs were not retribution for what Germans were doing to Jews, Nazi propaganda connected Jews and bombs, attributing the 'terror' campaign to the influence of Jews on decision-makers in Whitehall and the White House, all part of what Goebbels called the 'Jewish War'. This Nazi propaganda campaign appears only occasionally in the margins of *Der Brand's* nearly 600 pages.[25] Not surprisingly, historians who know far more than I do about military history and the RAF and USAAF (US Army Air Force) bombing campaigns in the Second World War have weighed in on these topics. Their criticisms of *Der Brand* make it clear that those who want the full story of strategy and tactics and the political and moral contexts in which US and British decisions were made would do well to have more than Friedrich on their reading lists.[26]

Still, Friedrich's accomplishment – and what Sebald was, I think, calling for – is to provide powerful descriptions of the face of mass death. 'For a long time', Friedrich writes, 'nothing has been written about the form of suffering [*Leideform*]' in the bombing war (p. 543). Suffering that is cordoned off in accounts that detail the 'balance of destruction' in cubic meters of rubble and totals of lives lost, houses destroyed, and people displaced, or even the photographs of moon landscapes of bombed out cities, can only begin to convey a sense of the consequences for those who lived their lives between bomb shelters and bombed-out residential areas and for whom sirens, blackouts, uncertainty, death and fear became part of a daily routine. Friedrich tells these stories in *Der Brand*. In *Brandtstätten* ('Sites of Fire'),[27] a volume of photographs compiled by Friedrich that appeared soon after *Der Brand*, he offers visual evidence of destruction – bodies piled high or lined up as they await burial in mass graves, human forms transformed into charcoal, scenes of extraordinary physical destruction and glimpses of how the living attempted to survive in the rubble. In one of many interviews that he's given since the book appeared, Friedrich emphasized that 'Seventy percent of my book [*Der Brand*] consists in describing realistically, very graphically, the true situations of people trapped in burning cities. The women, the old, the young, the babies, even the animals trapped in zoos. Nothing emotional, just plain description'.[28] But of course confronting death in this form evokes strong emotions. In both books, Friedrich makes sure that human

suffering does not vanish into charts and numbers, and this is an important achievement of his work. He delivers powerful reminders that bombs do not just target enemy defences or destroy enemy factories. They kill human beings.

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What forces have combined to open the space in Germany's 'memory landscape' into which Friedrich has charged?

The end of the Cold War is a big part of the explanation. Until German unification, stories of the Second World War were always told in the context of the ideological conflict that followed.[29] West Germans were not completely silent about the bombing war, but it was in the East that Dresden became the most important symbol of the destruction caused by 'Anglo-American gangsters from the air', a prelude to the destruction imperialists dropped on Korea only five years after doing the same thing to Germany. In West Germany, although the bombing war was not forgotten, as I'll discuss below, the expulsion of Germans from the east and the retention of POWs in Soviet hands took pride of place in public memory. The enemy who had brought devastation to Germany was the enemy who threatened to do the same after 1945. The ideological division of the world into East and West coloured public memory of the Second World War. But once the Wall came down, it was possible for Germans to reflect on what *all* Germans had suffered, re-examining parts of their past that had been subordinated to Cold War priorities. In Friedrich's account, the bombing war and its consequences become part of a unified German history, no longer refracted through the prism of the Cold War.[30]

If stories of German suffering join East and West, they also can create a basis for reconciliation between those who came of age after the war and those who lived through it as adults. Many press reports make much of Friedrich's credentials as a radical 'sixty-eighter', part of the '1968' generation that was too young to have any first-hand memories of the war and for whom political engagement included excoriating the generation of their parents for their complicity in the crimes of National Socialism. According to Friedrich, a critical confrontation with the Nazi past 'was the task of my generation, the 1968 generation, the sons. We broke the silence imposed by our fathers and conquered the memory of their crimes. We began to rewrite history'.[31] Friedrich claims a bit too much, since many others had already chipped away at the silence before 1968. Since the late 1950s, West German courts had brought some Nazi war criminals to justice. The neo-Nazi National Democratic party that emerged in the mid 1960s was forcefully opposed and had only limited electoral success. High-ranking political leaders who had been active Nazis were forced out of office. Public intellectuals like Günter Grass and Michael Walser insisted that Germans

Courtesy of the Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, 1989/2337.6.

Fig. 2. Friedrich is particularly intent on capturing the human costs of the Allied bombing campaign, depicted in this photograph of Dresden, taken in February 1945.

acknowledge the legacy of Auschwitz.[32] The sixty-eighters, however, did contribute to this larger intellectual and political mix that put in place a left-liberal consensus according to which silence about German loss – of life, territory, material property, honour – was the price to be paid for the crimes of National Socialism. Any mention of German suffering, it was feared, would be seen as a move toward apologia, a moral 'settling of accounts' (*Aufrechnung*) that might lead to demands to lay the past to rest. Friedrich's selective memory of the 1960s notwithstanding, there is no question that many sixty-eighters supported this view. *Der Brand*, thus, represents a change of heart, a sort of peace offering of rebellious sons to fathers (and mothers).[33]

The readiness of many on the left-liberal side of the political spectrum to talk of German suffering also reflects their belief that the past of German crimes is an irrefutable part of the foundations of the Berlin Republic. Since 1990, it has been clear that the view that dominated the politics of the past in West Germany by the late 1970s and 1980s – defined by the acknowledgement of the centrality of the Holocaust – has continued to be dominant in a unified Germany. The most significant symbolic expression of this view, the 'monument to the murdered Jews of Europe'

Courtesy of Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, F62/269.

Fig. 3. This stylized representation of a quotidian that included dodging the bombs was taken in Berlin in 1945. The woman is wearing the so-called 'Volksgasmaske' (people's gas mask), and the marquee on the movie theatre advertises a film entitled 'Journey into the Past'.

in the centre of Berlin, dedicated in May 2005, is a powerful reminder that what joins Germans in the present is a past in which millions of other Germans enthusiastically supported a regime that sought to eliminate European Jewry. The broad acceptance of this view has made it possible to call for the remembrance of other deaths without fear that commemorating German victims will lead to attempts to dodge responsibility for the ways in which Germans victimized others.

The evocation of German fates in the Second World War has also become a point of reference in the contemporary politics of the unified Berlin Republic. In interviews Friedrich has made explicit how Germans' rejection of the US intervention in Iraq reflects their own firsthand experience with the horrors of 'shock and awe', and, as Friedrich would have it, 'the stance of the Germans and their spiritual place is since 1945 beneath the bombs and never in the bombers'.[34]

Finally, decades are important markers for memory and public commemoration of important events. Friedrich's book began to appear in serialized form in a mass-circulation illustrated newspaper just as commemorations of the sixtieth anniversary of the Second World War's end – and the destruction by Allied bombers of the first German cities – kicked into high gear, an important opening salvo in what Norbert Frei has called the 'battle for memory' that continued unabated until May 2005.[35]

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Still, if this conjuncture of events can explain why in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century there was a space in which it was possible to tell a different story of the end of the Second World War in Germany, there is much that is troubling about the way Friedrich has chosen to fill it. Let me offer three major objections:

1) In ways he does not deny, Friedrich uses language to describe the effects of the bombing war on German civilians that has also been used to describe the crimes of Germans against Jews and other civilians in the Second World War. As many reviewers have noted, Friedrich's prose is peppered with words that evoke the comparisons of victims of Germans and German victims (those bombed out of their homes, POWs left in Soviet captivity, and ethnic Germans driven out of Eastern Europe) which characterized at least some of the public discourse of the 1950s and loomed large in the 'historians' dispute' of the mid 1980s, when Andreas Hillgruber compared 'two demises', the 'end of the German Reich' and the 'end of European Jewry'.[36] For Friedrich, the bomber squadrons become Einsatzgruppen (the special German killing squads that murdered countless civilians in the war on the eastern front), the bomb shelter is a crematorium, and when libraries go up in flames, Allied bombs are responsible for the 'biggest book burning of all time' (p. 515) – bigger and thus even more pernicious, Friedrich implies, than the one staged by Goebbels in 1933.

Friedrich's response to his critics is that language cannot be deemed 'contaminated' just because it has been used to describe the Holocaust, and he asks rhetorically what other terms are available.[37] The question is either naïve or disingenuous. By employing the terms without reflection or commentary, he lines himself up with those who argued for the moral equivalence of the suffering Germans caused others and the suffering others caused Germans, uncritically reproducing categories that can be traced back to the bombing war itself. He moves from arguing that Germans too were victims of war crimes to implying that what Germans suffered was *like* what Jews suffered.[38] Elsewhere, Friedrich chooses the language of a 'Mongolian hurricane of destruction from the air' (p. 138), and he describes the burned corpses with 'lips like Negroes' in Pforzheim (p. 434). Rather than reflecting on the meanings such terms might have carried in the Third Reich, he simply reproduces them.

2) Friedrich sets out to historicize the experience of the bombing war; he wants us to know what it was like to live through the horror that fell on German cities from 1940 to 1945. But he makes no attempt to historicize how the bombing war was incorporated into public memory in East and West Germany after 1945.[39] My concern is that those who have not stopped to study *this* history may, as it were, be condemned to repeat it, constantly claiming to break a silence around German suffering. But has that silence ever really existed? In ways Friedrich never acknowledges, particularly in the decade or so after the end of the Second World War, memories of the bombing war registered in many forms. Although far more significant in the commemorative culture of the East, the public memory of the vertical aggression of US and British bombers was hardly absent in the West.[40] The legacy of falling bombs became part of local histories and school atlases which carefully documented the extent of destruction, monuments memorialized those whom the bombs had killed, and at annual days of mourning political leaders recalled the dead. The rubble left by Allied bombers defined an entire genre of movies – so-called 'rubble films' – made in the immediate post-war period.[41] The 'woman of the rubble' took on enormous importance as a symbol of survival and a new beginning immediately after the war's end, depicted most frequently in the midst of what the bombs had wrought.[42]

Compensation for victims of the bombs loomed large in social policy debates in the early post-war years. Rebuilding cities destroyed by the bombs was another path followed by Germans in both East and West to move from the status of victims to shapers of their own destinies, not as a form of denial or silence but as an act of renewal that acknowledged a destructive past.[43] These forms of politics and public commemorative practice did not illuminate the 'mode of suffering' of those killed by the bombs. A closer look at the post-war years suggests, however, that the silence surrounding the memory of the bombing war was nowhere near as complete as Friedrich would have us believe.

Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when a left-liberal consensus made it more difficult to talk of both German victims *and* the victims of Germans, there was no absolute taboo on discussions of the bombing war, nor could stories of bombs be heard only at neo-Nazi rallies, around some family dinner tables or at the local pub. For example, *Deutschland, bleiche Mutter* ('Germany, Pale Mother', 1979), by the feminist film director Helma Sanders Brahms, tells a mother-daughter story in which bombs drive the protagonists from Berlin. And in Alexander Kluge's 1979 movie *Die Patriotin* ('The Patriot'), a West German high school teacher 'who has sympathy with the dead of the [Third] Reich' tries to find a way to locate them in a history that she can present to her students. Kluge's earlier meditation on the bombing of his home town, Halberstadt, provides another indication that long before Sebald and Friedrich, German writers were seeking ways to narrate German loss and suffering.[44]

A decade later when Helmut Kohl came to Dresden to meet with the East German President Hans Modrow in December 1989, he chose to address the public in front of the ruins of the Frauenkirche. The effort to restore the church, levelled in the Allied bombing campaign, became a major symbol of how a unified Germany offered new possibilities for coming to terms with the destructive legacy of the Second World War. Financial assistance from a British-run 'Dresden Trust' testified to Anglo-German reconciliation and a transnational form of collective mourning that tied together a post-Cold War Europe.[45] In 1995, the first major commemorative year after German reunification, local papers from one end of Germany to the other told the types of stories that appear in *Der Brand*.[46]

Why then do Friedrich and so many reviewers of his book insist that he is breaking a taboo? Foucault's famous observations in his *History of Sexuality* might provide one explanation: 'The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? But rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed?' And as Foucault makes clear, this insistence on repression becomes an incitement to discourse: if the repression has been so great, it will require an enormous effort to overcome it.[47] In Friedrich's case, it's not Victorian morality that allegedly does the work of repression; rather, it's the memory of the Holocaust. It can't be displaced; it has taken concrete form in the centre of Berlin. But in popular receptions of Friedrich's book that emphasize that he is breaking a silence, the subtext is that the Holocaust should not be permitted to prevent Germans from talking about the crimes that others committed against them. In the case of German suffering, however, I would argue that, like sex in the Victorian age, in both post-1945 Germanies it was discussed all along. The context in which stories of German suffering are being told and the meanings these tales carry have changed in a post-Cold War world. But the insistence that a taboo has prevailed justifies telling

the stories again... and again... and again, and neglecting the other contexts in which they have been told in the past.

Read with a sense of irony, the OED's definition of 'taboo' can perhaps offer other insights. It defines the term:

> As originally used in Polynesia, Melanesia, New Zealand, etc.: Set apart for or consecrated to a special use or purpose; restricted to the use of a god, a king, priests, or chiefs, while forbidden to general use; prohibited to a particular class (esp. to women), or to a particular person or persons; inviolable, sacred; forbidden, unlawful; also said of persons under a perpetual or temporary prohibition from certain actions, from food, or from contact with others.[48]

The knowledge of the bombing war was something that the people – and especially women – always possessed. It was a key part of their narration of the war, as Lutz Niethammer documented over twenty years ago when he set out to interview working-class people in the Ruhr.[49] In the 1990s, the high priests have laid claim to knowledge that the people always had. The taboo for Friedrich was not one on speaking; rather, it was on listening.

3) Friedrich devotes no space to a consideration of how the bombing war was represented in post-war West and East German novels, movies, memoirs, illustrated magazines, historical accounts and commemorative culture, but in other ways *Der Brand* offers a history that far exceeds the years 1940-1945 announced in its title. His Third Reich begins only once the bombs begin to fall, not in 1933, but he takes his reader on an excursion through many other parts of the German past. When the German military strategists began a plan of retaliatory bombing against the British in 1942, they called it the 'Baedeker Bombing Raids', because they vowed to bomb every city that had at least two stars in the famous guidebook. In the longest section of Friedrich's book, entitled '*Land*'(which can also mean country), fully forty per cent of this massive text, Friedrich provides a different sort of Baedeker, taking us on a tour through Germany, from North to West, from South to East, detailing what city after city endured – how many bombs, how much destruction, how many dead. But '*Land*' implies much more than physical location. Friedrich also wants us to know how much German history, embodied in buildings and architecture, the bombs levelled. At each stop along the way, we learn much about a particular city's past, not one that begins when the city turns brown under the Nazis but rather one that dates back to times when Romans and Huns ranged over German territory and invading Swedes fought wars of religion. Friedrich reminds us that throughout much of its history 'Germany was the object of power politics of the far more powerful', not an aggressor (p. 325).

The Germans who are bombed by the Allies in the Second World War are a '*Wir*' (We) with a long, complex history that cannot be collapsed into

the Third Reich. In Friedrich's account, this history is profoundly Christian. Friedrich's guided tour through Germany is a pilgrimage, its 'stations of the cross' (*Kreuzwege*) marked by the 'fires, destruction, pillaging and massacre' that most German cities suffered from 1940 to 1945 (p. 177). Again and again, Friedrich's ledger of destruction begins with churches and cathedrals, symbols, he implies, of a nation whose citizens believed in God, not the *Führer*, and in his descriptions of bombing raids it is the religious calendar, not weather patterns or Allied estimates of German defences, that seems to determine the timing of bombing missions. As the historian Horst Boog points out, RAF commanders were careful to avoid any suggestion to pilots that they might be levelling cultural treasures or otherwise acting in an uncivilized fashion. The commanders were fully aware of the limits of what they could include in 'operational orders', even if pilots might well know that their targets – often rail transportation hubs at the centre of cities – were in close proximity to buildings of no military significance.[50] But from Friedrich's account, it would seem that churches, cathedrals, symbols of a *Germania Sancta*,[51] indeed, the Christian faith, were at the top of the target list.

Consider only a few examples. In an 'inexplicable destructive drunkenness' in late March 1945, British bombers hit every church in Danzig (p. 189). In Münster, the British ravage the city on the celebration of the Festival of Mary, Mother of God, in 1943. Clemens August, Graf von Galen, the Catholic bishop who had been openly critical of the Nazis' euthanasia program looks on as the cathedral in that city comes under attack (p. 222). In 1945, they bomb Paderborn on Palm Sunday and Soest on Good Friday. Friedrich's preamble to the bombing of Cologne includes the story of St Ursula, killed at the end of the fourth century by barbaric Huns, 'Asians', in her battle to protect the honour of the legendary virgins who had accompanied her from Britain. Their memory was consecrated by the building of a cathedral on their gravesite. In Friedrich's canned 'lives of the saints', the virgins woke from their heavenly slumbers on 31 March 1942, in April and October 1944, and in January and March 1945, as British bombs continued what the Huns had begun. The *real* Huns, Friedrich soberly explains, would be vanquished once and for all only by Charlemagne. They were the 'riders of the apocalypse, born war criminals. They swept through the land, destroying churches and chapels, treacherously murdering the faithful and carrying forth their women. In the area of the Mosel and the Pfalz, they burned all the cities'. For readers who are still curious about where Friedrich will end this argument from analogy, he leaves nothing to the imagination. In the 'modern period', the British would pin the name 'Hun' on Kaiser Wilhelm II, and between '1940 and 1945, Churchill would sweep away the people of Cologne, Berlin and Dresden as huns' (pp. 257-8).[52] But for whom does Friedrich want to reserve the name once the bombs begin to fall?

Again and again, Friedrich reproduces the language of popular religiosity rather than reflecting on why Germans living through the bombing war would have reached to religion to describe and understand their experience. Missing as well is any analysis of how, after 1945, in the western zones of occupation and West Germany, the Catholic and Protestant churches could explain German suffering during the war as part of a process of atonement and redemption while avoiding any confrontation with their deeply compromised relationship with the National Socialist regime.[53] Although Jews are not entirely absent from Friedrich's version of the past, they appear at best on the margins, and in a Germany so thoroughly Christian they cannot be at ease. The flames that consumed their sites of worship and architectural treasures blazed not only from 1940 to 1945 but also in November 1938; and about these flames, Friedrich has very little to say.

In a much shorter chapter entitled *Stein* (stone), history again goes up in smoke, this time in the form of archives, libraries, and cultural treasures that could not be removed in time to be saved from the bombs or which were simply immovable. The Allies apparently knew not only the religious calendar but also dates of key events in German culture. In 1944, they bomb the house where Goethe was born on the anniversary of his death. As bombing continued into 1945, Friedrich argues, the war of the 'present' had long since been won. But Allied bombers continued to level Germany as part of a 'war against the roots of the past that had given birth to disaster' (p. 190).

In 1948 the United Nations defined genocide as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such'.[54] Friedrich does not charge British and American bombers with attempting the physical destruction of the German people, but in these two chapters, he comes close to suggesting that the bombing campaign was a form of historical and cultural genocide, the destruction of a bridge to an historical landscape, which, he sombrely concludes 'no longer exists' (p. 177). Setting out to rebuild that bridge to the past reduced to rubble by the Allies, Friedrich makes symbolic amends not only with the generation of his parents but also with the cohort of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. (Kohl is older than Friedrich, but like him came of age only after 1945.) In the mid 1980s he listened carefully to the advice of Michael Stürmer, a history professor who emphasized how important it was for Germans to define a new sense of national identity grounded in an understanding of the past that did not collapse German history into the twelve years of the Third Reich. Friedrich agrees. However, achieving this goal is not easy, Friedrich suggests, because so much of German history was turned into ash and rubble by Allied bomber squadrons, sent on their missions by political leaders who were convinced that National Socialism was the culmination of German history and who believed a fresh start was possible only if all signs of the past were obliterated.

In still other ways, I think Friedrich tends to echo some of the categories that loomed large in the politics of the past in the 1980s. The chapters providing the most graphic accounts of life in the bomb shelters and visions of bodies ripped apart, trapped in melting asphalt, and blackened beyond recognition are entitled 'We' (*Wir*) and 'I' (*Ich*). Friedrich could not make more explicit his point of empathetic identification, and it is difficult not to hear overtones of Andreas Hillgruber's 1986 account of the 'two demises' in which he advised his reader to

> identify himself with the concrete fate of the German population in the east and with the desperate and sacrificial exertions of the German army of the East and the German fleet in the Baltic, which sought to defend the population of the German east from the orgy of revenge of the Red Army, mass rapes, arbitrary killing, and compulsory deportations.[55]

Friedrich adds to this list the 'concrete fate' of the German population who lived through the attacks of British and American bomber squadrons.

In short, it seems to me that in many respects, Friedrich has not broken any taboo, nor described a new location in the German 'memory landscape'. Rather, he has travelled a familiar route and ended up stuck in a rut. In *Der Brand*, much that was old is new again.

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How else might we imagine the story? Let me briefly suggest alternative approaches to a history of bombs and the Second World War in Europe which might manage to offer a different sort of account rather than simply recycling the past.

We could start by deconstructing the '*Wir*' (we). In her perceptive social history of Britain in the Second World War, Sonya Rose concludes: 'like all collective identities – all definitions of who "we" are – national identity and concepts of nationhood are fragile. Even as they are articulated, once they move beyond the generality that "we are all in this together", once who the "we" is, and what "together" means are specified, the singularity of that identity is exposed as being false'.[56] From 1940 to 1945, Germans who had not fled into exile or who were not deported to ghettos or death camps were in the bombing war together, but this 'we' had many different faces, and what divided Germans was sometimes as significant as what united them.[57]

Consider those Germans who were part of the '*Wir*' before 1933, then were forced outside the *Volksgemeinschaft* (community of the people/ national community) after the Nazis came to power, but were still in Germany when the bombs began to fall. Can we imagine a history of the war in which these other victims – not those whose lives ended in death camps, but those who were also dodging Allied bombs – get to add their stories?

An attempt to historicize the experience of the bombing war might include the tale of Marianne Ellenbogen, a Jew who survived in Nazi Germany whose story has been superbly detailed in Mark Roseman's *A Past in Hiding*. In September 1943, Ellenbogen was on the run from the Gestapo in Essen, the city where Friedrich grew up. Ellenbogen had eluded the secret police. Her family had not, and on 9 September they were loaded on to a train for deportation eastward. Hidden in a former schoolhouse by members of the Bund, a left-wing circle that had gone underground in the Third Reich, Ellenbogen watched as an incendiary bomb flew through the window. She courageously picked up the 'hissing bomb' and tossed it through a window into the garden where it exploded.[58]

What of the story of Victor Klemperer, the rabbi's son and First World War veteran, a professor of romance languages whose conversion from Judaism to Christianity and marriage to a gentile could not forever keep his name off deportation lists? Like many other Germans, Klemperer's fate was profoundly altered by bombs falling on his native city Dresden. Much paper went up in smoke, 'my books, the reference works, my own works', parts of German culture Friedrich does not mention. But in the wake of the Allies' destructive bombing of the city in February 1945, Nazi officials had to turn their attention away from deportations to more pressing problems, allowing Klemperer to move freely about the city.[59] Could a history of Germany in the bombing war also capture the meanings that Dresden's demise had for Klemperer? Or what of Henny Brenner, whose family received news of its imminent deportation to Theresienstadt on the day of the raid, and whose father mused that 'only a miracle, a bolt from the blue, can save us now'? The miracle he hoped for, 'the only thing that can save us', was 'a big attack on Dresden'. It came. Of the 170 Jews still in Dresden, Brenner recalls, forty were 'killed by the hand of their liberator, so close to the end. For us on the other hand, the attack – as macabre as it may sound – was a salvation, and we experienced it precisely as such'. Brenner recounts that as she and her father walked through the city the next day, they despaired at the death and destruction that surrounded them, but when they saw the Gestapo headquarters in flames, 'then we felt some satisfaction'.[60]

The victim of Nazi persecution who gets to speak in Friedrich's account is Martha Haarburger, who reports from the Nazi concentration camp in Theresienstadt that the deportees from Swabia were linked to their region of origin – the *Heimat* – and sustained by their strong bonds with Württemberg and 'a strong Swabian dialect' which allowed them to define unity in adversity. And a lawyer from Stuttgart, Emil Dessauer, who was killed at Auschwitz, died only after he had sent greetings to his native Württemberg (pp. 338-9). But surely a more comprehensive history of the bombing war would include a greater range of voices and stories in which the ties of concentration-camp prisoners to Germany were more tenuous and in some cases stretched to breaking point.

What of the story of Wolf Biermann who tells us that he found refuge from bombing raids on Hamburg in a park where two years earlier a number of relatives had been assembled before being loaded on to cattle cars for a journey to Minsk, where they were shot in the forest?[61] Or imagine a history of the bombing war in which Anne Frank's heart soars as Allied bombers fly over Amsterdam, never knowing that the bombs they drop will leave her former school friends in Frankfurt dead in the rubble.

A more complicated history of the bombing war might also reveal that some Germans who lost homes and loved ones to the bombs had also been among those who bought 'Aryanized' businesses at reduced prices in the pre-war years. Some of the workers in war-related industries, 'dehoused' by British bombs, may also have exalted in reaching a higher rung of the hierarchy once they had a slave foreign labour force working next to them.[62] The women over-represented in bombing death tolls included some of the nearly half-million who provided auxiliary service to the Wehrmacht and who by the end of the war 'manned' the air defence network throughout Germany, pointing spotlights and shooting anti-aircraft guns under the supervision of regular army officers.[63] These women were also part of the '*Wir*', remembered six months after the war's end in a woman's magazine, *Sie* (You), that recalled a young woman, just returned from an Allied POW camp: 'There lay the street along which she had strode, one long year ago, cheerfully, confidently, even a bit proud of the uniform that revealed to all that she belonged to the German Anti-Aircraft Service ... that was once the uniform that made every young girl so endlessly proud'.[64] The history of the bombing war I propose would include the stories of the women the bombs killed and the women who cleared away the rubble. But it would also tell the stories of women who helped to down British and American pilots, women for whom the war meant pride and pleasure.

The '*Wir*' also disintegrates when we hear the voices of the Düsseldorf miners whose refrain was 'Dear Tommy, please fly further on your way; spare us poor miners for today. Fly instead against those people in Berlin; they're the ones who voted Hitler in'. Or the Cologne workers who did not reflect on the graves of the Ursuline virgins or share with intellectuals dismay over the destruction of architectural treasures, but rather commented: 'Germany can live without [the] Cologne Cathedral, but not without its people'.[65] And perhaps a study of the bombing war that interrogated whether the '*Wir*' ever existed, rather than simply reproducing the category, would ask if the intensified bombing campaign in late 1944 and 1945 in any way impeded the smooth functioning of 'People's Courts' and of the summary tribunals established after mid February 1945, designed to administer even swifter justice, which continued to send some members of the '*Wir*' to their deaths by execution right up to the end of the war.[66] It might pay more attention to the German resistance that *did* exist, rather than concluding, as Friedrich does, that any resistance was impossible

Courtesy of Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, Inv.-Nr.: BA (Schirner).

Fig. 4. In the immediate post-Second World War period, the 'woman of the rubble' was celebrated as a symbol of Germany's survival and recovery from the destruction wrought by Allied bombers.

for a '*Wir*' caught between 'the terror of the bombs and the terror of the regime', allegedly leaving Germans no choice 'but to try to save their own skin' (p. 371).[67] Some Germans tried to save more.

The story of the war in the air should also include a much fuller consideration of the ground war on the eastern front, about which Friedrich has very little to say. Key to his argument is that the most devastating bombing of German cities came in the very last months of the war. The implicit message is that the war was already over when the worst destruction took place. Friedrich describes the faltering advance of British and American troops eastward – made more complicated at times, he argues, because ruins created by the bombs provided better cover for German resistance – but any history of the war's end must also include the movement of Soviet troops westward. Friedrich cites the staggering daily figure of over one thousand German victims to the bombing war in the months from January 1945 until the war's end (p. 168). But we should also keep in mind that during the same period, German military casualties were running at about 10,000 a day, and we still have no accurate figures for Soviet losses at this time. If we lose track of the ferocity with which the Wehrmacht was attempting to slow down the Soviet advance, the fears of what Soviet occupation would entail, and the widely-held perception that the longer the war continued, the more time could be won for Germans fleeing the Red Army, we cannot fully comprehend the context in which the British and American Allies continued to pursue the bombing campaign, devastating

cities whose contribution to the war effort was not always clear. Sixty years after the fact we can certainly debate whether this was the best strategy, and we can question whether bombs ultimately strengthened rather than weakened German resistance. But only by comprehending the war's end on both fronts can we begin to understand fully why British and Americans fliers continued to drop bombs on German cities, convinced that they would hasten the war's end.[68]

The Rashomon-like history that I propose, a historicized account of the bombing war told from many perspectives, would also include the 'they', others who were not German but whose lives were profoundly affected by the bombing war.[69] What if Ben Halfgott, a Polish Jew transported from Buchenwald (where his father was killed) to the satellite camp of Schlieben, near Dresden, in December 1944, might also offer his perspective of the bombing of that city and the 'huge red glow' that 'was like heaven for us'?[70] Any full account might also give voice to some of the 5,700,000 foreign 'civilian workers' and the nearly two million POWS who were still in Germany in August 1944, over half of them employed in industries located in the cities that were prime targets. This group, according to Ulrich Herbert, constituted 'the greatest resistance potential of all against the National Socialist regime' in the last year of the war, resistance that intensified as they learned of the devastating effects of Allied bombing. They appear in the shadows of Friedrich's version of the bombing war, clearing away rubble and bodies in the wake of Allied raids, and he records that the British and Americans killed 42,000 of them, but could we tell a story that made them into more than numbers?[71]

'They' might even include those who dropped the bombs. Friedrich hooks his reader immediately by beginning *Der Brand* with a dramatic vignette in which the crew of a British Lancaster bomber delivers its deadly load on Germans in the Ruhr. In Wuppertal, where most firefighters have taken off for the weekend, a wedding couple celebrates with friends outside the city, unaware of impending doom and oblivious to air raid sirens until the lights go off and they hurriedly seek cover. When the sirens sound in Barmen, Luise Rompf springs from her bed and takes her son Uli into the cellar that will serve as a bomb shelter. The devastation wrought by the bombs is described by an English woman, Sybill Bannister, and the horrifying injuries the bombs inflict are detailed by Dr Elisabeth Stark. Thus victims have faces. Perpetrators do not. What if an account of this evening included in the bomber squadron a flier like Randall Jarrell's 'Ball Turret Gunner', telling this other story of the bombing war:

> From my mother's sleep I fell into the State,
> And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
> Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
> I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
> When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.[72]

Jarrell reminds us that for British and American fliers, the real combat was between flight crews and German fighter pilots in the air and the operators of anti-air craft guns on the ground.[73] This more complex history of the bombing war might also extend to include the Czechoslovak pilot, flying with the Royal Air Force, whose bombs bore the slogan 'For Lidice'.[74]

Estimates of American and British deaths in the air war vary. Some sources cite a figure of 140,000 American and British losses. Friedrich tells us of 55,000 dead British fliers, a figure found elsewhere in the literature. He compares these military losses with the 420,000–570,000 Germans he estimates were killed by the bombs the squadrons dropped, urban dwellers who 'fought no one'.[75] From another perspective, Allied losses represented a stunningly high percentage of the total for military and civilian casualties on all fronts of some 300,000 Americans and 400,000 British.[76] With the discovery of incendiary bombs, Friedrich concludes, 'the Allies could feel like the gods, who hurl lightning bolts at the vileness of the enemy. Only God can send the plague, because he isn't subject to any law. He is the law' (p. 102). Even granting Friedrich a measure of poetic licence, a more complete story of the bombing war in which American and British fliers had faces, families, fates, and bellies filled with fear, in which they dropped bombs where they were told to, without knowing if cathedrals or churches were below, might render them less godlike and more human. That they were capable of proving their mortality right up to the last day that bombing missions were flown is eloquently demonstrated in Thomas Childers's *Wings of Morning: the Story of the Last American Bomber Shot Down Over Germany in World War II*. For Childers, who tells the story of his uncle, it would come as a surprise that in the last eight months of the air war, according to Friedrich, 'all [Germany's] methods of defence and revenge were useless, the fighter planes were destroyed, the anti-aircraft guns were unmanned or moved, the rockets of no more use than a club' (p. 489).[77] 'They' would also include the woman depicted on the dust-jacket of Sonya Rose's book, her hair tied up in a handkerchief as she waves to bombers flying overhead, doubtless on their way to Germany. The wartime poster suggests that she is proud of what she's done for the war effort, building planes and the bombs they carry.[78]

Finally, a history that included 'them' would not shy away from some of what is most important to Friedrich – an analysis of the ideological, moral, political, and military context that added 'dehouse' to the English vocabulary. Writing of the controversy surrounding Friedrich's book, Charles Maier notes: 'Ultimately those of us who would accept the air war say that under certain conditions it may be necessary to burn babies'.[79] My history of the 'bombing war' would also include a full treatment of how 'they' understood the conditions under which this was necessary.

To be sure, American and British historians have shown themselves fully able to celebrate brave men in uniform and societies that mobilized

successfully to 'fight the good fight' or win 'the people's war', while paying little attention to the victims on the other side of the conflict. But like *Der Brand*, such histories tell only part of the story. They promote a vision of a '*Wir*' that never existed, while all but completely omitting a multi-faceted 'they'. They reproduce national memories and echo wartime propaganda appeals in which the world was divided into friend and foe, victims and perpetrators, innocent and guilty. The post-war settlement, Nuremberg, and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen also delivered such neat binaries; but now, more than sixty years after the end of the war, historians have demonstrated that they can tell far more complicated stories. Germany was no more a 'nation of murderers',[80] the title of a collection of essays on Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, than it was a 'nation of victims', the doubtless deliberately ironic title of a collection of responses (some quite critical) to Friedrich's *Der Brand*.[81] A history that did not shy away from seeing the past from many different perspectives could prevent us from drawing facile conclusions or imposing retrospectively a set of moral categories in which few of the people we are describing lived their lives. It could also better explain how, after 1945, different interpretations of the war translated into different modes of commemoration and remembrance, and produced many histor*ies*, not one single history.

A history of the bombing war in which 'we' dissolved and 'they' appeared with many faces, in which some women rushed children into bomb shelters, others cheered when bomber pilots were downed, and others produced the bombs the planes dropped, in which the bombs that irreversibly disrupted daily life and killed many, also threw into chaos the network that would have carried others to their death, a history in which all the dead have names and faces, might get us closer to the multiple meanings of the war than an account that divides the world into innocent victims on the one side, and on the other Allied bombers who are also 'following orders' that embody another type of crime against humanity. It would be a history that did more than repackage memories that have circulated in Germany for more than five decades.

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Culture, that bridge to the past that the bombs destroyed, is very important to Friedrich, and culture is important to me too. Who wouldn't regret the destruction of the churches, architectural monuments, medieval cathedrals, works of art, forty per cent of German archival holdings, and irreplaceable libraries that went up in flames? But there are other stories relating to bombs, buildings, books, culture, and German history that belong in any full account of the destruction wrought by the Second World War but for which *Der Brand* leaves no space. Let me offer only one example. As I wrote this paper, I thought that perhaps the distinction between mourning and melancholy – as discussed by Freud and as applied to

post-war West Germany in Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich's classic *The Inability to Mourn* – might help me make sense of how Friedrich was describing the consequences of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany. Rejecting the advice I give my students, I went not to the library's carefully prepared guides to online research but to the internet to see if Freud's work was available in full-text online. It's not, and I was forced out of my study and into the actual, not the virtual, library. Freud wasn't much help anyway. He writes: 'The distinguishing mental failures of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment'.[82] I do not know Friedrich, and I am not a psychiatrist, but given his high visibility in the press, on TV, and at public discussions, I conclude that he has a very lively interest in the outside world. Nor does Freud's description fit the author of a book that is filled with sadness and anger but also accusation, a book which sets out to settle accounts, not to invite punishment.

On my cyber-search for Freud, however, I also came across other references to melancholy, including one to Albrecht Dürer's famous etching, *Melencolia*, which depicts an angel sitting next to a half-finished building, surrounded by the tools of the craftsman which would allow her to complete its construction. She is, however, immobilized, scowling, as she gazes off into the distance, allowing time – depicted by an hour-glass on the wall of the unfinished building – to run out. I am as little an art historian as I am a psychiatrist, and with my search engine ready for more action, I tried Dürer/Melencolia to see what I'd find in the way of commentaries that might help. In only a mouse click or two, I located a copy of the etching at the Metropolitan Museum of Art with references to a work by Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky. Another couple of clicks let me determine that Saxl and Panofsky, both Jews, had left Germany when the Nazis came to power and led me to references that allowed me to pursue this trail a bit further in the library stacks.

Panofsky was in the United States, a visitor at New York University, in 1933 when he learned that he had been stripped of his professorship in Hamburg. He returned to Hamburg briefly to collect his family and say his goodbyes to loyal students who were not ready to denounce their mentor. Then he moved permanently to the United States, where in 1935 he was invited to become a member of the newly-created humanities faculty of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.[83]

Before the Nazis came to power, Saxl, Viennese by birth, had ended up in Hamburg because of his relationship with Aby Warburg, the eccentric art historian and avid book collector. In the 1920s, Saxl had met Panofsky and together in 1923 they published an extensive work on Dürer's print.[84] With financial backing from Warburg's brothers, all well-established

bankers, Saxl expanded Warburg's extraordinary collection that focused on books about the influence of classical antiquity on Renaissance art and photographs of artworks, transforming a private library into a research institute with close ties to the University of Hamburg, which named Saxl Professor Extraordinarius. In 1929, Warburg died, and Saxl became completely responsible for the institute. In January 1933, Saxl severed his ties to the university and acted quickly to move the library – headed by a Jewish intellectual and financed by the philanthropy of Jewish bankers – out of Germany. Dürer would enter the pantheon of Nazi culture as a characteristically Aryan artist, and in 1941 Hitler would enrich his private collection with some drawings plundered from a museum in Lvov.[85] But those who had some of the deepest insights into this artist's work hurried into exile.

With support from the Warburg brothers and colleagues in England, Saxl and the Hamburg institute found a new home in London. By 1939, he became a citizen, adopting the country that had taken him in. Warburg's collection would be spared the bombing of Hamburg in 1943, but at the beginning of the Second World War, the University of London, which had given the institute space, worked with Saxl to evacuate the library, parts of which went to Guildford and Aberystwyth, so that the books would not be destroyed in the Blitz. The institute staff stayed in London until 1941 when a German bomb killed Hans Maier, the librarian, and fire destroyed one of the library's catalogues. With the institute staff, Saxl took the last 12,000 or so volumes to the countryside outside London for the duration. There Saxl quickly learned how to pump water from a well and to maintain a garden, and created a refuge from the bombing for friends in London. He also worked with the National Buildings Record to provide detailed photographic evidence of architectural landmarks in London – the British Museum, 10 Downing Street, sculptures in Westminster Abbey – lest they fall victim to German bombing raids. Like Friedrich, he too was interested in ensuring that the past be remembered.[86]

Dürer's house in Nuremberg was severely damaged in the Second World War. It is depicted in Friedrich's *Brandstätten*, left a skeleton by the bombs. A picture on the next page documents that by 1951 the house had been completely restored. (In fact, restoration had been completed two years earlier).[87] This is a story of devastation that fits in Friedrich's account. But Freud, Saxl, Panofsky, Warburg and the institute that bears his name, Jewish philanthropy, exile, the immeasurable enrichment of the intellectual life of England and the United States and the loss to Germany do not fit. It was not hard to get from Friedrich to this other story of German culture, but it is a path that Friedrich does not follow. He is left with the story only of the bombs that fell on Germany, not those that destroyed parts of Germany's heritage transported to England, and with a '*Wir*' in which Saxl and Warburg have no place. It is the history of the bombing war's consequences that Friedrich has chosen to write, but it is not the one that

I would want to read if I wanted to understand the 'form of suffering' that bombs – German, British, and American – caused Germans in the Second World War.

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I plan to give my mother-in-law a copy of the English translation of *Der Brand*. When she learns that only a year or so before her trip, Friedrich's book was a best-seller, she will better understand why she heard so much about bombs and the Second World War. Horst Boog, born in 1928, thus closer to my mother-in-law's age than Friedrich's, was old enough in 1940 to have his own first-hand memories of the bombing war. He is a member of a team of German historians which for years has been writing a comprehensive, multi-volume history of the 'German Reich in the Second World War'. Boog's assignments include the history of the bombing war. Sixteen years older than Friedrich, he seems to have come of age in a different country. In a contribution to a 1995 conference on the bombing war in general and the record of 'Bomber' Harris in particular, he remarked:

> Whenever Germans think of the Second World War, they mostly think of the bombing war, because it affected them directly and left an enduring impression on their minds. In German public opinion 'Bomber Harris' stands for all the horrors of bombardments and firestorms, not because he was British, but because he became the incarnation of violence.[88]

In his review of Friedrich's book, Boog notes a number of errors of fact and calls Friedrich to task for failing to consider much relevant secondary literature. He concludes that he could applaud *Der Brand* if it bore the subtitle of novel or theatrical drama.[89] Perhaps it would be more accurately described as a National Registry of German Memories, a collection of those 'enduring impressions' that have been around since the early 1940s.

When asked by an interviewer whether *Der Brand* is a history book, Friedrich responded, 'No... because it is the first book that turns its attention to the bombing war against Germany and thus to the largest battle field of the Second World War'. His book, he goes on to explain, includes 'thousands upon thousands of claims of fact' that come largely from information compiled in cities in the 1950s, and these claims must still be verified. Subjected to the critical 'editorial review of the nation', *Der Brand* has also prompted an enormous reader response, providing Friedrich with still more information about a German history that 'academic historical scholarship has persistently ignored'. Telling the whole story of this 'colossal event' exceeds the capacity of the lone researcher, and if his book 'perhaps' had provided a 'panorama', Friedrich commented, it still remained to 'map out the depths'.[90] 'There is still much work for historians to do',

Friedrich told another interviewer. 'History has to be retold'.[91] I do not accept Friedrich's assessment of the historiography; were it not so rich, he could not have written this book. And historians of the former Soviet Union and China might quibble about who can lay claim to the largest battlefield of the Second World War. But at least on one point Friedrich and I agree: *Der Brand* should not be the last word about the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, and history should be retold. He and I just have very different visions of what remains to be said.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1 Peter Dimock, senior executive editor at Columbia University Press, confirmed that the book will be out in English in fall 2006.

2 Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945*, Berlin, 2002. Page references in the text are to this edition. On other histories of the bombing war see Jörg Arnold, 'Sammelrez: Bombenkrieg', H-Soz-u-Kult, 28 June 2004, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2004-2-062 (last accessed 9 Oct. 2004). See also the insightful discussion of *Der Brand* in Mary Nolan, 'Germans as Victims During the Second World War', *Central European History* 38:1, 2005, pp. 7–40.

3 http://www.bombenkrieg.historicum.net/.

4 See Jochen Bölsche, 'So muss die Hölle aussehen', *Der Spiegel*, 6 Jan. 2003.

5 For a discussion of media representations, see Sönke Neitzel, '"Wer Wind sät, wird Sturm ernten": Der Luftkrieg in westdeutschen Fernsehdokumentationen', historicum.net [8 Dec. 2003], http://www.bombenkrieg.historicum.net/themen/fernsehen.html (last accessed 28 Oct. 2004); also *Feuersturm: Der Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland*, Spiegel TV history, DVD-Edition (see also http://www.spiegel.de/sptv/special/0,1518,237418,00.html, last accessed 9 Dec. 2004).

6 W. G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction*, transl. Anthea Bell, New York, 2003, quotations, pp. 4, 10.

7 Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory 1970–1990*, Berkeley, 2000.

8 In a vast literature see for instance Dennis E. Showalter, 'Plans, Weapons, Doctrines: the Strategic Cultures of Inter-war Europe', in *The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939*, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, Cambridge, 2003, p. 60; Richard J. Overy, 'Air Power in the Second World War: Historical Themes and Theories', in *The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War: an International Comparison*, ed. Horst Boog, New York, 1992, pp. 7–28.

9 Geoff Simons, *Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam*, Houndsmills, 1994, pp. 179-81; and Henry Probert, *Bomber Harris, His Life and Times: the Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command*, London, 2001, pp. 52–3.

10 Conrad C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II*, Lawrence KS, 1993, p. 24.

11 Overy, 'Air Power in the Second World War', pp. 7–29.

12 Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Strategic Air War and International Law', in *Conduct of the Air War*, ed. Boog, pp. 298–300.

13 See R.J. Overy, *The Air War 1939-1945*, London, 1980, pp. 102–3; and Horst Boog, 'The Luftwaffe and Indiscriminate Bombing up to 1942', in *Conduct of the Air War*, ed. Boog, pp. 373–404.

14 Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, London, 1995, p. 117.

15 On American policy, see the superb work of Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II*, New York, 1985; on the US and Britain, Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: the Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945*, Princeton, 2002; and on Britain, Mark Connelly, *Reaching for the Stars: a New History of Bomber Command in World War II*, London, 2001.

16 For a first-rate account of the impact of the bombing war on daily life in Germany, see Ralf Blank, 'Kriegsalltag und Luftkrieg an der "Heimatfront"', in *Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945*, Part I, ed. Jörg Echternkamp, Munich, 2004, pp. 357–461.

17 Statistical estimates – which vary greatly – are summarized in Blank, 'Kriegsalltag und Luftkrieg', pp. 459–60. See also Olaf Groehler, 'The Strategic Air War and its Impact on the German Civilian Population', in *Conduct of the Air*, ed. Boog, p. 291–2. Groehler, who did most of his work on the bombing war in the former German Democratic Republic, is the author of a major study of the bombing war published shortly after the fall of the Wall. On the difficulty of getting accurate death tolls, see Olaf Groehler, *Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland*, Berlin, 1990, pp. 316–20.

18 See *Der Brand*, p. 115-6. For other opinions see for instance Overy, *Why the Allies Won*; Overy, *Air War*, p. 123; and 'United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report, European War, Washington, D.C., 30 September 1945', in *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, ed. David MacIsaac, vol. 1, New York, 1976, or at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/ETO-Summary.html (last accessed 27 Oct. 2004); and 'The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale', Vol. 1, Morale Division: Dates of Survey: March-July, 1945, Date of Publication: May 1947, reprinted in *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, ed. David MacIsaac, vol., 4, New York, 1976.

19 On the legal status of the aerial bombing of civilians see the useful discussion in Eric Langenbacher, 'The Allies in World War II: the Anglo-American Bombardment of German Cities', in *Genocide, War Crimes and the West*, ed. Adam Jones, London, 2004, pp. 116-33. Marilyn Young reminds me that in a recent documentary Robert McNamara quotes Curtis LeMay on the American bombing of Japanese cities in the Second World War: 'But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?' McNamara has no answer. *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, director Erol Morris, Sony Pictures Classics, 2003.

20 For a good summary, see Stephen A. Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities*, New York, 1993. In fact, condemnation of Harris has been so universal that a recent account of the bombing war sets out to salvage his reputation. See Robin Neillands, *The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive, 1939-1945*, London, 2001. See also Frederick Taylor's defence of the bombing of Dresden, *Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945*, New York, 2004.

21 Page references in the text are to Friedrich, *Der Brand*.

22 Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment;* Crane, *Bombs, Cities;* Neillands, *Bomber War*; Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality*, pp. 214–61.

23 Indeed, Bernard Wasserstein provides evidence that the British explicitly rejected this as a strategy in 1942 and 1943 with the argument that it would have led to even greater German violence against Jews. Harris's recommendations for an 'Operation Retribution' were rejected by Churchill and the Air Ministry; see Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945*, Oxford, 1979, pp. 306–7.

24 See for example Lothar Kettenacker, 'Churchills Dilemma', in *Ein Volk von Opfern? Die neue Debatte um den Bombenkrieg 1940–45*, ed. Lothar Kettenacker, Berlin, 2003, pp. 48–55.

25 See Nicholas Stargardt, 'Victims of Bombing and Retaliation', *German Historical Institute London Bulletin* 26: 2, 2004, pp. 57–70.

26 A particularly devastating review by Ralf Blank appeared in *sehepunkte* 2, 2002, no. 12 [15 Dec. 2002], URL: http://www.sehepunkte.historicum.net/2002/12/3549071655.html (last accessed 27 Oct. 2004). See the excellent summary of Allied strategic planning in Thomas Childers, '"*Facilis descensus averni est*": The Allied Bombing of German and the Issue of German Suffering', *Central European History* 38: 1, 2005, pp. 75–105.

27 Jörg Friedrich, *Brandstätten: Der Anblick des Bombenkriegs*, Berlin, 2003; and the highly critical review of the book by Ralf Blank in H-Soz-u-Kult, 22 Oct. 2003, http://hsozkult/geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2003-4-044 (last accessed 28 Oct. 2004).

28 'Terror from the Sky', *Exberliner*, issue 20, October 2004.

29 Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: the Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.

30 See Achatz von Müller, 'Volk der Täter, Volk der Opfer', *Die Zeit* no. 44, 2003 and the response from Bernd Ulrich, 'Alle Deutschen werden Brüder', no. 45, 2003.

31 'Terror from the Sky'.

32 See Helmut Dubiel, *Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages*, Munich, 1999. See also Robert G. Moeller, 'Sinking Ships, the Lost *Heimat* and Broken Taboos: Günter Grass and the Politics of Memory in Contemporary Germany', *Contemporary European History* 12: 2, 2003, pp. 1–35.

33 See also Peter Schneider, 'Deutsche als Opfer? Über ein Tabu der Nachkriegsgeneration', in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Kettenacker, pp. 159–65; Cora Stephan, 'Wie man eine Stadt anzündet', in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Kettenacker, pp. 95-102; Klaus Naumann, 'Bombenkrieg – Totaler Krieg – Massaker: Jörg Friedrichs Buch Der Brand in der Diskussion', *Mittelweg* 36: 4, 2003, pp. 49–60; and Nolan, 'Germans as Victims', pp. 23–4.

34 Quoted in Douglas Peifer, review of *Der Brand*, 4 Nov. 2003, http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-german&month=0311&week=a&msg=5/R3pMxMMKXMXQSNhvwxbw&user=&pw= (last accessed 8 Dec. 2004); also Nolan, 'Germans as Victims', pp. 25–7.

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36 Andreas Hillgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums*, Berlin, 1986; and in general Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*, Cambridge, Mass., 1988.

37 'Interview mit dem Berliner Historiker Jörg Friedrich: Von guten Massakern und bösen Massakern', *Spiegel Online*, 2003, http://www.spiegel.de/sptv/special/0,1518,237918,00.html (last accessed on 2 June 2005). See also the critical comments in Startgardt, 'Victims of Bombing'.

38 This tendency is previewed in a 1984 work by Friedrich in which he compares the carbon monoxide poisoning of victims at Treblinka with the deaths of 'a large part of the victims of the bombing war' by the same means. See Jörg Friedrich, *Die kalte Amnestie: NS-Täter in der Bundesrepublik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1984, p. 17. Indeed, Friedrich's brief chapter in this book on 'Städte im Feuersturm' outlines some of the central arguments that reappear in *Der Brand*.

39 In general, see Robert G. Moeller, 'Thoughts on a Post-Cold War History of World War II's Legacies', *History and Memory* 17: 1–2, 2005, pp. 147–94.

40 Gilad Margalit, 'Der Luftangriff auf Dresden: Seine Bedeutung für die Erinnerungerspolitik der DDR und für die Herauskristallisierung einer historischen Kriegserinnerung im Westen', in *Narrative der Shoah: Repräsentationen der Vergangenheit in Historiographie, Kunst und Politik*, ed. Susanne Düwell and Matthias Schmidt, Paderborn, 2002, pp. 189–208; also Thomas W. Neumann, 'Der Bombenkrieg: Zur ungeschriebenen Geschichte einer kollektiven Verletzung', in *Nachkrieg in Deutschland*, ed. Klaus Naumann, Hamburg, 2001, pp. 319–42.

41 Ralph Bollman, 'Im Dickicht der Aufrechnung', in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Kettenacker, pp. 137-8; and Volker Ullrich, 'Weltuntergang kann nicht schlimmer sein', also in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, pp. 110–15; see also Robert R. Shandley, *Rubble Films: German Cinema in the Shadow of the Third Reich*, Philadelphia, 2001.

42 Elizabeth Heineman, 'The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's "Crisis Years" and West German National Identity', *American Historical Review* 101: 2, 1996, pp. 354–95.

43 Michael Hughes, *Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice*, Chapel Hill, 1999.

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45 See http://www.frauenkirche-dresden.org/(last accessed 23 Oct. 2004).

46 Klaus Naumann, *Der Krieg als Text: Das Jahr 1945 im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Presse*, Hamburg, 1998, pp. 33–71.

47 Michael Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. I: *An Introduction*, transl. by Robert Hurley, New York, 1990, pp. 8–9. My thanks to Ulrike Strasser who suggested that I look to Foucault for guidance on this point.

48 *OED Online*, Oxford University Press 2004, http://dictionary.oed.com/(last accessed 14 Dec. 2004). See also the fascinating discussion in *Franz Baermann Steiner: Selected Writings*, ed. Jeremy Adler and Richard Fardon, vol. 1: *Taboo, Truth, and Religion*, New York, 1999. Steiner, an anthropologist and poet, grew up in the German-speaking Jewish community in Prague and left for exile in England in 1939, moving between London and Oxford during the war years. He remained in England, lecturing at Oxford.

49 Lutz Niethammer, 'Heimat und Front: Versuch, zehn Kriegserinnerungen aus der Arbeiterklasse des Ruhrgebietes zu verstehen', in *'Die Jahre weiss man nicht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soll': Faschismus-Erfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet*, ed. Lutz Niethammer, Berlin, 1983, pp. 163–232.

50 Horst Boog, 'Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa und Reichsluftverteidigung 1943-1944', in *Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive: Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943–1944/45*, ed. Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef, Vogel Stuttgart, 2001, p. 24.

51 The allusion is to Matthaeus Rader's *Bavaria Sancta*, an early seventeenth-century guide to Bavaria's saints and sacred sites. See Trevor Johnson, 'Holy Dinasts and Sacred Soil: Politics and Sanctity in Matthaeus Rader's *Bavaria Sancta* (1615–1628)', in *Europa sacra: Raccolte agiografie e identià politiche in Europa fra Medioevo ed Età moderna*, ed. Sofia Boesch Gajano and Raimondo Michetti, Rome, 2002, pp. 83–100. My thanks to Ulrike Strasser for telling me about this article and the *Bavaria Sancta*.

52 Here and at many other points Friedrich provides no references. Thus it is impossible to determine whether he has woven these strands together, whether he is drawing on local histories of the post-war period, or whether he is uncritically reproducing popular memories of the war and post-war years.

53 On the post-war discussion, I have found enormously helpful the work of Frank Biess, 'Men of Reconstruction – the Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWs in East and West Germany, 1945–1955', in *Home/Front: the Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, Oxford, 2002, pp. 335–58. See also Matthew D. Hockenos, *A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past*, Bloomington, 2004.

54 For the full text, see http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/47/IMG/NR003347.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 27 Oct. 2004).

55 Hillgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang*, pp. 24–5.

56 Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain 1939–1945*, Oxford, 2003, p. 285.

57 Nolan, 'Germans as Victims', pp. 32–7.

58 Mark Roseman, *A Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany*, New York, 2002, p. 272.

59 Victor Klemperer, *I Will Bear Witness: a Diary of the Nazi Years 1942-1945*, transl. Martin Chalmers, New York, 1999, pp. 406–15. For a detailed account of the bombing of Dresden in which Klemperer frequently appears, see Taylor, *Dresden*.

60 From a television interview in 1995, quoted in Martin Chalmers, 'Preface', in Klemperer, *I Will Bear Witness*, p. xi; also Henny Brenner, *'Das Lied ist aus': Ein jüdisches Schicksal in Dresden*, Zurich, pp. 86–8. My thanks to Gilad Margalit for calling Brenner's memoir to my attention.

61 Wolf Biermann, 'Die Lebensuhr blieb stehen', in *Zeugen der Zerstörung: Die Literaten und der Luftkrieg*, ed. Volker Hage, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, p. 144.

62 On the use of foreign labour during the war, see Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich*, transl. William Templer, New York, 1997.

63 Karen Hagemann, '"Jede Kraft wird gebraucht": Militäreinsatz von Frauen im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg', in *Erster Weltkrieg/Zweiter Weltkrieg: Ein Vergleich. Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland*, ed. Bruno Thoss and Hans-Erich Volkmann, Paderborn, 2002, pp. 96, 100.

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65 Quotations from Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: a New History*, London, 2000, pp. 762, 765.

66 See in general Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*, Oxford, 2001, especially pp. 230–4.

67 See also Friedrich, *Der Brand*, p. 435.

68 For figures on military deaths, see Rüdiger Overmans, *Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Munich, 1999, p. 283; also Childers, '"*Facilis descensus averni est*"' pp. 102–4.

69 See the comments of Stargardt, 'Victims of Bombing'.

70 Quoted in Neilland, *The Bomber War*, p. 359.

71 Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers/ Forced Laborers/Guest Workers*, transl. by William Templer, Ann Arbor, 1990, pp. 155, 183. For Friedrich's death toll, *Der Brand*, p. 327.

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73 Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, p. 117.

74 Olaf Groehler, 'The Strategic Air War and its Impact on the German Civilian Population', in *Conduct of the Air War*, ed. Boog, p. 285.

75 In the official British history of the air war, Charles Webster and Noble Frankland give the figure of 55,888 killed and another 9,162 wounded. See Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945*, vol. 3, *Victory*, London, 1961, pp. 286–7. Overy gives the figure of 140,000 American and British airmen: *Why the Allies Won*, p. 128. Neilland's figures are 26,000 American deaths (to which he adds 18,000 wounded and 20,000 POWs) and 55,564 British: Neillands, *The Bomber War*, p. 379. Childers comes to a total of 140,000: Childers, '*Facilis descensus averni est*', p. 105. Blank cites figures of 55,500 British and takes his figures for Americans from Neillands. Blank, '*Kriegsalltag und Luftkrieg*', p. 460. And for Friedrich's figures, see *Der Brand*, p. 63. Elsewhere, he quotes a figure of 73,741 members of British Bomber Command 'lost through death, wounds, and imprisonment', *Der Brand*, p. 45. In a 1984 work, he claims that 25,000 British pilots died in the air war over Germany, though again it is not clear where he gets this figure. See Friedrich, *Die kalte Amnestie*, p. 20. A high figure of nearly 160,000 total British and American losses appears in the 'United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War), Washington, D.C., 30 September 1945', in *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (ed) David MacIsaac, vol. 1, New York, 1976; also available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/ETO-Summary.html (last accessed 27 Oct. 2004). However, I have not found this number in any other source.

76 The figures come from Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 894.

77 See Thomas Childers, *Wings of Morning: the Story of the Last American Bomber Shot Down Over Germany in World War II*, Reading MA, 1995. And for what Friedrich has to say about the bomber crews and the hazards they encountered, *Der Brand*, pp. 49–59.

78 See also Stargardt, 'Victims of Bombing', p. 59.

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81 *Ein Volk von Opfern*, ed. Ketternacker.

82 Sigmund Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, transl. James Strachey, vol. 14 (1914-1916), London, 1957, pp. 238-60, quotation from p. 240. And Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn*, transl. Beverley R. Placzek, New York, 1975.

83 Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History*, Garden City NY, 1955, pp. 321–2.

84 A revised version in English translation was published in 1964. The original plan to reissue the 1923 German version was abandoned. Final page proofs were completed in the summer of 1939, but the war interrupted completion, and the type used to produce the book was destroyed during the war. See Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art*, London, 1964.

85 Jonathan Petropoulos, *Art as Politics in the Third Reich*, Chapel Hill, 1996, pp. 11, 101, 268.

86 Gertrud Bing, 'Fritz Saxl (1890-1948): a Memoir', in *Fritz Saxl, 1890-1948: a Volume of Memorial Essays from His Friends in England*, ed. D. J. Gordon, London, 1957, pp. 1–46. My thanks to George and Linda Bauer for helping me better to understand Dürer and Saxl.

87 Friedrich, *Brandstätten*, pp. 226–7. And for information on the restoration, http://www.museen.nuernberg.de/english/duerer_e/index_duerer_e.html (last accessed 23 Oct. 2004).

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89 Boog, 'Ein Kolossalgemälde des Schreckens', in *Ein Volk von Opfern?*, ed. Kettenacker, pp. 131–6.

90 'Interview mit dem Berliner Historiker Jörg Friedrich', *Spiegel Online*, 2003 (see n. 38).

91 'Terror from the Sky', *Exberliner*, 2004 (see n. 29).